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Abstract
In China, teacher performance pay has been implemented for eight years, but teachers’
perceptions regarding its implementation have been examined seldomly. Exploring
teachers’ perceptions is a path to hear teachers’ voices, inspect implementation practice,
and evaluate impacts. This mixed-method study explored teachers’ perceptions toward
performance pay in Panda School District of Kunming City, Yunnan Province, China
through surveys, interviews, and artifacts. A total of 333 valid responses to the survey
were collected and 14 teachers participated in follow-up semi-structured interviews. The
quantitative results indicate low to moderate teacher support for performance pay. The
qualitative themes generated through content analysis present teachers’ perceived merits
and problems associated with the implementation of performance pay. A seven-factor
model was extracted through principal component analysis drawn from the teacher
perception survey, with 58.4% of the variance in perceptions explained. Significant
differences in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and evaluation measures
were found based on participating teacher and school characteristics. The findings
suggest that local governments should increase funding in teacher performance pay if it is
to be successful. Additionally, the specific guidance needs to be developed to regulate
school-based performance pay programs that consider school contexts. Further,
policymakers and school administrators should focus on the structure and associated
evaluation indicators of performance pay. It is necessary for school leaders to improve
leadership through professional development programs at the same time of implementing
performance pay.

TEACHER PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE PAY AND
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN YUNNAN PROVINCE, CHINA

CHAPTER 1
Background
In 2008, the State Council of China issued the Guidelines to the Implementation
of Performance Pay in Compulsory Schools, mandating K-9 schools incorporate a teacher
performance pay system, beginning on January 1, 2009. The move to pay teachers based
on their performance spurred a major shift in human resources management in Chinese
public sectors. The new teacher performance pay system required that teachers’ salaries
be comprised of 70% basic salary and 30% incentive salary. Basic salary is largely
contingent on local economic level, consumption level, and teachers’ duty, and jointly
determined and distributed by local agencies of human resource management, finance,
and education (State Council of China, 2008). Incentive salary is based on teachers’ work
load and contributions, and is determined by the school (State Council of China, 2008).
Schools are responsible for designing an implementation plan of teacher performance pay
based on their teacher evaluation methods. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education (MOE)
issued the Guidelines to Teacher Performance Evaluation in Compulsory Schools to
facilitate the implementation of teacher performance pay, and which conveyed the
importance, principles, composition, methods, execution, and administration of teacher
performance evaluation (MOE, 2008). This document suggested that teacher performance
evaluations has the potential to provide a systematic basis for determining teacher
performance pay due to its accurate reflection of teachers’ performance and contributions.
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It ensures that teacher performance pay is evidence-based and legally constituted.
Accordingly, teachers are more likely to be motivated to improve their teaching practice.
Ultimately, the goal of the teacher performance pay program is to retain effective
teachers in schools and to attract more college graduates to teaching as a profession
(MOE, 2008).
According to S. Liu, Zhao, Xie (2016), the reform of teacher performance pay
implied the decentralization of policy in China because it empowered local government
agencies and schools to make decisions. Since 2001, the central government has loosened
its control over curriculum and assessment through the New Curriculum Reform (Preus,
2007); another big step in education reform towards decentralization. Also, the paybased-on-performance concept, which stems from capitalistic ideology, breaks the
premise of the communist system that teachers should be equally paid if they have the
same background (i.e., teaching experience, professional ranking, and educational level)
(S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). To some degree, the reform attempted to lessen the impact of
hierarchical human resource structures, which linked teachers’ salaries solely to their
background, by incorporating a competition mechanism, teaching performance. This
change shifts the traditional payment focus from teachers’ background to teaching
effectiveness and student outcomes.
One of the goals in implementing teacher performance pay is to increase and
moderate teachers’ salaries. The salary level of government officials is used as a standard
to compare with K-9 teachers’ pay. The teacher performance pay reform advocates urge
that teachers’ salaries should not be lower than those paid to government officials.
According to the deeply ingrained Confucianism in Chinese culture, teachers should be
3

placed in a position of high social class and teaching is a highly respected career.
However, the assumed high respect fails to be reflected in teachers’ salaries. In 2008, K-9
teachers’ salaries were ranked 12th out of 19 occupations (National Bureau of Statistics
of China, 2009). In 2014, the rank was moved up to 10th out of 19 occupations (National
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015) and it surpassed the salary level of government
officials. Although the growth of K-9 teachers’ salaries is significant after implementing
teacher performance pay, the other ranked occupations also have had the same growth
under the influence of China’s economic development. Consequently, the inequity of
teachers’ salaries still exists across occupations, areas (urban and rural), schools, and
even among colleagues (Fan & Fu, 2011). The inequality in teacher pay has caused high
rates of teacher turnover (Lai, 2014). A survey study also indicated a large proportion of
teachers were not satisfied with their income, social status, and social respect (Lin &
Wang, 2013). Therefore, learning about Chinese teachers’ perceptions regarding
performance pay is necessary and important.
Additionally, studies of teacher performance evaluation systems in China indicate
that due to the heterogeneity of local circumstances teacher performance evaluation
practices are problematic in achieving their goals (e.g., Hong, 2014; Meng & Yuan, 2014)
and methods (e.g., Chai & Wang, 2010; Mi & Dai, 2011; Xiong, 2009), and utilizing
their results (e.g., Hong, 2014; S. Sun, 2009; Q. Wang, 2015). In many regions and areas
in China, implementation of teacher performance evaluations contradict the policy set
forth by the MOE, such as performance pay is based on administrative positions, not
teachers’ teaching load (Xiong, 2009) or distributing equal incentive payment to teachers
regardless of their different input (Mi & Dai, 2011). Additionally, because each school
4

has its own unique evaluation plan, the ability to use uniform standards of monitoring and
inspecting the progress of performance evaluation is restrained, though they can
potentially ensure the fidelity of implementation. Research evidence indicates that an
array of factors—school types, variety in evaluation plans, degrees of emphasis on
performance evaluation, disparities of performance payment, and conflicting
management—influence the quality of teacher performance evaluation (K. Li, 2013).
Thus, despite national guidelines from the MOE, the lack of conformity by local school
districts in their use of teacher performance evaluation resulted in various problems and
inequality perceived by teachers. Related to the problems with local implementation of
the teacher performance evaluation and teachers’ dissatisfaction of performance pay, a
legitimate question of teacher support for the performance pay policy can be raised.
Without teachers’ support, the performance pay system would fail to effectively motivate
teachers to improve their teaching because if teachers felt the reform agenda is not
aligned with their interests, beliefs, and values, they resisted the reform (Muncey &
McQuillan, 1996).
In the United States, studies regarding teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay
report mixed findings (e.g., Neal, 2011; Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Springer et al.,
2009). Similarly, the research findings in China have also been inconsistent and
inconclusive. In China, two years after the implementation of performance pay, certain
research evidence suggested that a large proportion of surveyed teachers had confidence
in performance pay and were satisfied with the implementation plans (e.g., Fu & Gui,
2010; He & Liu, 2011; X. Li, 2010; X. Liu, 2011). However, other studies showed more
negative results (e.g., K. Liu, 2012; H. Li & Li, 2011; S. Sun, 2009). The total number of
5

empirical studies exploring teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay was limited,
and the extant studies provided little information regarding study design. Most recently,
using a case study, S. Liu, Zhao, et al (2016) found that less than half of teachers studied
supported teacher performance pay; no teacher characteristics (e.g., teaching experience
and professional ranking) had a significant influence on the results. However, the study
only included 132 teachers from three schools in one province of China, therefore, the
generalizability of the study results is questionable. Due to large economic and
educational diversity across China, a great number of empirical studies is needed to fill
the research gap in this area.
Statement of the Problem
The problem I investigated in this mixed-methods study is Chinese teachers’
perceptions toward teacher performance pay in Panda Schools Districts, Yunnan
Province, China. Teacher performance pay has been implemented in China for nearly
eight years, but limited empirical studies have been conducted to explore Chinese
teachers’ perceptions regarding performance pay. Exploring teachers’ perceptions is a
path to hear teachers’ voices, inspect implementation practice, and evaluate impacts. The
study contributed to a comprehensive understanding of teacher perceptions regarding
performance pay from the level of teachers’ support, to perceived effects. Specifically,
the study examined the extent to which Chinese teachers support performance pay
programs and the perceived effects of these programs on them (e.g., teaching
effectiveness, collaboration, work motivation, and job stress). Additionally, the study
looked into the merits, shortcomings, and concerns of performance pay from teachers’
perspectives through teacher interviews and artifacts. Also, the study examined teachers’
6

preferences regarding performance evaluation measures, which provided the evidence for
decisions of performance pay. Finally, the study analyzed the effects of teachers’ and
schools’ unique characteristics (e.g., gender, professional ranking, teaching experience,
and school rank) on their perceptions toward performance pay.
Research Questions
Using both quantitative and qualitative data from this mixed-methods study, the
following research questions are addressed:
1. To what extent do participating teachers support the implementation of
performance pay at their public schools?
2. From the perspectives of participating teachers, what are the specific merits and
shortcomings of performance pay?
3. What are participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation
measures?
4. What factors emerge from a perception survey of participating teachers regarding
performance pay and teacher evaluation?
5. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers toward
performance pay based on selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching
experience, professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g. grades level,
and school rank)?
6. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers regarding
evaluation measures upon which performance pay is based in their public schools in
terms of selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching experience,
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professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g., grades level, and school
rank)?
Significance of the Study
Teacher performance pay is an important topic, which is associated with teacher
evaluation, teacher effectiveness, teacher retention, and student achievement. Teacher
performance pay is an approach to motivate teachers and reinforce effective teaching
practice. Although its effects, especially on improving student achievement, are
controversial, exploring teachers’ perceptions will add research evidence to the
discussions and decision-making to enhance teacher pay structure and ultimately improve
teacher quality.
From a leadership perspective, the study results provided insights to school
administrators and policymakers. First, the study results provided the evidence for school
administrators and local educational agencies to improve local implementation plans of
teacher performance evaluation and existing pay structures to better reward effective
teaching practice. Second, the study offered evaluation results of teacher performance
pay practice to policymakers who can revise policies to better serve the needs of both
administration and teachers. Third, the study provided a way to hear the voices of frontline teachers, which was lacking in the design and implementation of teacher
performance pay as evident in the extant literature (Xiong, 2009).
An abundance of research regarding teacher performance pay has been done in
many Western countries (e.g., Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Fryer, 2013;
Glazerman & Seifullah, 2010; Goodman & Turner, 2010; Marsh et al., 2011; Springer,
Ballou, et al., 2010, Springer et al., 2012), such as the United States and the United
8

Kingdom, but research, especially empirical research, in China is limited. Due to the
large disparities of economic development across China, the implementation of teacher
performance pay in different districts varies (K. Li, 2013). This study contributed to the
empirical studies of teacher performance pay in China, and added to the literature on
international studies of teacher performance pay from Chinese teachers’ perspectives.
Definition of Terms
Motivation, refers to “the inner force that energizes the direct behavior” (Spinath,
2015, para. 1). In the context of this study, motivation relates to teachers’ desire or
willingness to teach effectively in schools.
Perceptions, refers to “how sensory information is processed into perceptual
experiences” from the perspective of psychology” (Twedt & Proffitt, 2015, para. 1). In
the context of the study, perceptions is generalized to teachers’ understanding, attitudes,
and awareness of the policy and the experience of performance pay through the schoollevel implementation.
Performance pay, also called pay for performance or merit pay in different
literatures and contexts, is “a system of compensation in which employees are
remunerated for their achievement of certain performance goals. It can either be used to
supplement an already-sufficient base salary or constitute a significant portion of
workers’ annual salaries” (Vagi, 2014, p. 99). Teacher performance pay is based on the
hypothesis that teachers who are more effective or more competent should receive more
financial rewards than the others. Different from merit pay in United States, which is
dependent on “student outcomes attributed to a particular teacher or group of teachers
rather than on ‘inputs’ such as skills or knowledge” (Podgursky & Springer, 2007, p.
9

912); the teacher performance pay in China is based on multi-factor performance
evaluation conducted by local school administrators; the incentive pay based on teachers’
performance only makes up 30% of their total salaries. Additionally, State policy
indicates that it is forbidden to use student enrollment rates and testing scores to evaluate
teachers as the only source for evaluation (State Council of China, 2012). Therefore,
student outcomes do not carry a large weight in teacher performance pay in China.
Performance evaluation, provided evidence to teacher performance pay in China.
It relates to the teacher evaluation, which involves various indicators and multiple
sources, targets on assessing the quantity and quality of teacher’s work.
Banzhuren, is “similar to the home classroom teacher, advisor or counselor” in the
U.S. schools. Banzhuren at schools in China is “the leader of teachers, and the key person
to develop the whole community of students by classrooming” (J. Li & Chen, 2013, p.
92).
Professional ranking for primary and secondary teachers in China is similar to the
university faculty promotion system. Local educational agencies are responsible for
providing specific requirements for teachers’ professional promotion at each level.
Teacher’s professional ranking is contingent on: teachers’ highest degree, years of
teaching experience, teaching performance, professional knowledge, and mentoring and
research experience. Based on the highest degree, the lower-ranked teacher should have
one to five years of teaching experience to be qualified to apply for the higher ranking.
Teacher type refers to honorary titles given teachers to acknowledge their
distinctive effectiveness and contribution in education. Teachers with “expert” titles at
different levels (e.g., national, provincial, municipal, and school) are regarded as the role
10

model for the particular level. Expert teachers are usually selected or recommended at
different levels based on their age, years of teaching experience, professional rankings,
and teaching effectiveness.
School rank is accredited by local educational agencies contingent on various
indicators, such as teacher quality, students’ academic performance in enrollment exams,
and quality of moral education.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
This chapter includes a review of the literature related to exploring the question of
how teachers perceive performance pay and performance evaluation measures in China.
The literature review highlights the connections between the research questions of the
study and the extant literature with both theoretical constructs and empirical evidence.
Research gaps are identified to provide a rationale for this study, as well as future studies.
The literature review begins with the context of teacher performance pay in China. This
section contains an analysis of the historical development and status quo of teacher
performance pay and performance evaluation in China. It identifies the chronological
development of performance evaluation and relevant national policies of teacher
performance pay in China. It also summarizes problems with the implementation of
performance pay and performance evaluation in recent years in China.
In the second part, the review focuses on theories supporting performance pay,
which includes motivation theory and equity theory. Due to the limited number of
empirical studies in the Chinese context, studies regarding teacher performance pay in the
context of the United States and selected other countries are incorporated to demonstrate
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in non-Chinese contexts. Although
teachers’ perceptions might be shaped by different cultures to some degree, the research
evidence also shows the commonalities of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay
12

by comparing the literature across countries. Also, empirical research evidence from
other countries presents the recent trend of studies in teacher performance pay, and
provides insights for future studies in the Chinese context. The specific topics regarding
teacher perceptions toward performance pay include teacher support for performance
pay, impacts of teacher performance pay, and variables influencing teacher performance
pay.
The third focus is teacher performance evaluation, which is tied closely to
performance pay. This part of the literature review contains measures of teacher
performance evaluation in China and teachers’ perceptions toward performance
evaluation in China. It identifies specific teacher performance indicators that are
evaluated in the Chinese context, which include teachers’ ethics, professional duties,
personality, impact on student academic achievement, and communication and
collaboration in schools. It also provides research evidence on teachers’ perceptions
toward the indicators of performance evaluation in China.
The framework of the literature review is presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Framework of the literature review
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Context of Teacher Performance Pay in China
This section provides the context regarding teacher performance pay in China,
which includes its historical development and status quo. Teacher performance pay and
performance evaluation are closely related. Performance evaluation provides evidence for
performance pay, while performance pay is the application of performance evaluation.
The development of teacher performance pay and performance evaluation are intertwined
and have coexisted.
Historical development of teacher performance pay in China. The
development of a teacher performance pay system in China is contingent on the reform of
teacher performance evaluation. Formal practice of teacher evaluation in China was
started in the 1960s and procedure has been used since the 1980s (Yang & Jiang, 2009).
According to S. Liu and Zhao (2013), the historical development of teacher evaluation in
China included three stages: before 2001, 2001-2009, and 2009-present. Teacher
evaluation before 2001 was regarded as traditional teacher evaluation, which has been
criticized as a “one-dimension evaluation for all practical purposes” (S. Liu & Teddlie,
2003, p. 252). The limitations of the traditional teacher evaluation system are
summarized as follows: the purpose of the evaluation overemphasized reward and
punishment without regard to teacher development; the evaluation sources focused too
much on quantitative data; school leaders were dominant in traditional teacher evaluation;
and, in reality, student scores were the only dimension used in the evaluation system
(normally, the other dimensions include ethics, diligence, and ability; S. Liu & Teddlie,
2003; S. Liu & Zhao, 2013).
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Starting in 2001, with the implementation of the New Curriculum Reform, the
Chinese teacher evaluation system made a significant change. The New Curriculum
Reform emphasized changing test-driven and summative evaluations to formative and
scientific to improve teaching practices and student learning (MOE, 2001). Accordingly,
teacher evaluations started to put an emphasis on improving professional development,
test scores, and teacher ethics, as well as requiring multiple evaluators to participate in
the process of teacher evaluation (S. Liu & Teddlie, 2005; S. Liu & Teddlie, 2003).
In 2009, China adopted teacher performance pay in compulsory education. The
State Council of China issued “Guidelines to the Implementation of Performance Pay in
Compulsory Schools” to regulate compulsory schools’ implementation of teacher
performance pay (State Council of China, 2008). Correspondingly, the Ministry of
Education issued “Guidelines to Teacher Performance Evaluation in Compulsory Schools”
(Guidelines), which pointed out the importance, principles, contents, methods,
applications, and administration of teacher performance evaluation (MOE, 2008). In 2012,
the State Council of China developed “Suggestions of the State Council on Strengthening
the Building Up of the Ranks of Teachers” emphasizing that an integrated teacher
evaluation system should focus on teachers’ ethics, capability, teaching performance, and
contribution to school, involving the participation of school, students, teachers, and the
public. It is forbidden to use student enrollment rates and testing scores to evaluate
teachers as the only source for evaluation (State Council of China, 2012). This document
suggests the importance of including multiple indicators of teacher performance and
multiple evaluators in the evaluation. Additionally, it indicates that teacher performance
evaluation should not be completely based on students’ academic achievement.
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Status quo of teacher performance pay in China. In 2011, two years after the
launch of teacher performance pay, He and Liu (2011) interviewed teachers and
principals across 27 provinces in central and western China and found that both teachers
and principals supported the implementation of performance pay . Approximately 86% of
teachers paid close attention to the policy of performance pay, 79% of teachers held high
expectations of the policy, and 89.3% of teachers were satisfied with the plan of
performance evaluation. Also, the study indicated positive effects of teacher performance
pay in increasing teachers’ salaries in some regions, and motivating teachers to improve
work effort, which was also supported by other studies (Fu & Gui, 2010; X. Li, 2010; X.
Liu, 2011). However, due to lack of information on study design and limited sample size,
the study results are not generalizable and inconvincible to some degree. In the study
conducted by Fu and Gui (2010) indicated, in Hubei, Hunan, Henan and Jiangxi
provinces, the teacher population in higher salary level was increased while the
population in lower level was decreased after implementing performance pay.
Additionally, the adjustment of teachers’ salaries was aligned with government officials’,
which fulfilled the requirements in the national guidelines. X. Li (2010) suggested that
the increased upward mobility of teacher populations towards higher salary levels
demonstrated the increase of teachers’ salaries in general. Fu and Gui (2010) found that
more than 60% of 1,906 surveyed teachers in their study perceived an increase in
motivation.
However, due to the heterogeneity of economic development across different
regions in China and lack of uniform implementation of standards across schools, the
positive effects found in the studies above lacked generalizability. More studies
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suggested the problems with the implementation of performance pay. Noticeably, with
time passing, fewer and fewer studies—either the theoretical analysis or empirical
studies—have been conducted after the implementation of teacher performance pay.
However, in order to assess the long-term impact of performance pay and provide
solutions for the problems with policy implementation identified in previous studies,
more recent empirical studies are needed. Main problems associated with the
implementation of performance pay are described below.
Significant salary disparities among teachers. Researchers have pointed out that
the implementation of performance pay resulted in large disparities in teachers’ salaries
across subjects taught (e.g., K. Liu, 2012; L. Wang, Lai, & Luo, 2014; Z. Zhang, 2010),
teaching experience (H. Li & Li, 2011; K. Liu, 2010; S. Sun, 2009), schools (K. Li, 2013;
H. Liu, 2012), and region (Fu & Gui, 2010; X. Li, 2010). Teacher performance pay was
unbalanced in different regions across China and between urban and rural areas, which
can be attributed to the local economic development and educational input (Fu & Gui,
2010; H. Liu, 2012). Within one school, the disparity of salaries among teachers with
similar background reached up to 50% (H. Li & Li, 2011). Expert teachers, who were
effective in teaching to tests, obtained higher performance pay than the other teachers,
who made great contributions in other areas (S. Sun, 2009). Salaries of teachers teaching
core subjects (e.g., Chinese literature, mathematics, and English) were higher than
teachers teaching the other subjects (e.g., music and physical education) (K. Liu, 2012; S.
Liu, Xu, et al., 2016; L. Wang et al., 2014; Z. Zhang, 2010). The salary disparity was
antithetical to the educational goal of enhancing students’ all-around development (Z.
Zhang, 2010). Additionally, in some schools, performance pay favored those in the
18

administrative ranks, resulting in teachers’ performance pay being lower than
administrators’ (K. Liu, 2012; Z. Zhang, 2010). Teachers were not represented in
designing the performance pay implementation plan (H. Li & Li, 2011); Subsequently
teachers felt the performance pay plans were unfair (H. Li & Li, 2011; C. Li, 2014; H.
Liu, 2012; K. Liu; 2012; X. Liu, 2011), which further resulted in problems associated
with teaching effectiveness, professional development, retention, and recruitment.
Negative impact on teachers’ personal development. Theoretical analysis from
Chinese scholars finds that teacher performance pay discouraged teachers’ intrinsic
motivation, self-development (B. Li, 2014) and professional identity (Q. Wang, 2015).
Based on the limited empirical evidence, only a small number of surveyed teachers
reported that performance pay increased their work effort (He & Liu, 2011; X. Liu,
2011). In some schools, the 30% incentive pay was detained by schools each month and
only distributed at the end of the year according to results of teachers’ performance
evaluation (K. Liu, 2012). This part of the income was unstable for teachers, which
resulted in work dissatisfaction (K. Liu, 2012). In some areas, performance pay had no
effect in motivating teachers due to the small amount of the incentive payment (X. Li,
2010; K. Liu, 2012). For example, a study based on 382 teachers in one city of Henan
province showed that all surveyed teachers perceived the incentive payment to be
incommensurate to the input required to receive the pay; the teachers were unwilling to
put forth the effort to obtain the incentive pay (K. Liu, 2012). For experienced teachers,
with high professional rank and who were satisfied with the status quo, performance pay
failed to make a difference and appeal to them (X. Li, 2010). Although national
guidelines stated that performance pay should not be solely based on student test scores
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and enrollment rates, some surveyed teachers reported that the essence of performance
pay was linked to student academic performance (K. Li, 2013; X. Li, 2010). The
emphasis on teacher teaching load, for the purpose of improving students’ test scores by
increasing teacher input, has led to high teacher pressure and burnout (He & Liu, 2011).
It is teachers’ self-efficacy that support them to resist the demotivating impact of
performance pay, but it is questionable regarding how long such support could last (Mao,
2013). The competition among teachers resulting from performance pay was also a high
source of teachers’ pressure, hampering teachers’ job satisfaction (S. Sun, 2009). X. Liu
(2011) conducted a survey in one county of Fujian province and found that
approximately 60% of teachers perceived that performance pay had a negative impact on
teachers’ professional development because it reduced teachers’ motivation, and teachers
were unwilling to focus on teaching.
Negative impact on school culture. Researchers pointed out that performance pay
increased after-school teaching time because the more time a teacher spent on afterschool teaching, meant more performance pay for teachers (He & Liu, 2011). However,
problems stemmed from after-school teaching; teaching effects were lessened during the
regular school time, and both teachers and students had longer but less effective school
time which negatively affected students’ learning and teachers’ teaching, and both of
their well-being. Teachers were also overtly concerned about students’ test scores rather
than their individual development (H. Li & Li, 2011). Additionally, while competing for
the incentive payment, teachers reported they no longer collaborated with each other (He
& Liu, 2011; H. Li & Li, 2011). Moreover, due to the unequal and unfair performance
payment, conflicts among teachers, and between teachers and administrators emerged and
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resulted in tensions of colleague relationship (X. Liu, 2011). Teachers were less
encouraged to take on extra duties that were not included in the performance evaluation,
such as research and temporary assignments (H. Li & Li, 2011).
Another distinct problem associated with teacher performance pay is the
performance evaluation, which provides the basis for performance pay. The status quo of,
and problems with, performance evaluation are discussed in the following section.
Status quo of teacher performance evaluation in China. With educational
reforms, teacher evaluation in China has stepped into a new era in which teacher
evaluation is more directly connected to a school’s human resource management. Teacher
evaluation is intended to support the improvement of all teachers, and to provide
accountability of both teachers and evaluators. However, from opinion-based journal
articles to limited empirical evidence, teacher performance evaluation in China is
identified as problematic in goals, methods, and application of results. Some scholars
criticize that teacher performance evaluation was based on the assumption of
“commercialized man,” a concept of management science meaning that each human
being is motivated by economic factors in working, and employers used money or
punishment to control employees’ motivation (Hong, 2014; S. Sun, 2009). Additionally,
because each school has its own evaluation plan, a number of school-related factors such
as different school types, degree of emphasis on performance evaluation, disparities of
performance payment, and conflict management affected the quality of teacher
performance evaluation (K. Li, 2013). Thus, the lack of conformity in evaluation plans in
local school districts has resulted in ineffective implementation. Furthermore, regarding
performance pay, “the far greater reliance on the stick than on the carrot has increased
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teachers’ workloads and failed to win their hearts and minds, leading to many teachers
becoming ‘performative workers’” (L. Wang et al., 2014, p. 440). The main problems
with teacher performance evaluation in Chinese context are summarized as below.
Overemphasis on accountability. Due to the major intended functions of teacher
evaluation include accountability, promotion, and professional development (Teddlie,
Stringfield, & Burdett, 2003), the goal of teacher performance evaluation should focus on
teacher development and providing evidence for school improvement. Furthermore, with
teacher quality improvement, the ultimate goal is to enhance school development and
student learning. Meng and Yuan (2014) conducted a literature analysis based on teacher
performance evaluation plans of 56 primary and middle schools in Guangzhou China.
The results indicated that the summative function of teacher performance evaluations was
overemphasized while the function of enhancing teachers’ development was relatively
ignored. Hong (2014) also pointed out that the present teacher performance evaluation
had no effects on enhancing teachers’ development due to the vague evaluation standards,
unregulated evaluation process, and overemphasis on accomplishment of assignment
from the educational agencies. Additionally, the goal of teacher performance evaluation
is to connect a teacher’s individual development with the school’s mission and vision
(Meng & Yuan, 2014). Consequently, teachers’ contributions related to school
development would build acknowledgement, and school development could be realized
through the teachers’ development.
Conflict between teacher evaluation and traditional Chinese culture. C. Li
(2014) summarized the problems of teacher performance evaluation through analyzing
the conflicts between teacher performance evaluation and Chinese traditional culture
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using the cultural dimensions theory developed by Hofstede, a scholar in the Netherlands.
C. Li (2014) pointed out that Chinese people tend to make long-term plans and education
was a long-term process in Chinese culture, while teacher performance evaluation
focused on short-term outcomes (a semester, or an academic year). Therefore,
ambivalence was produced. The goal of teaching spans a long-term period, but for
meeting the evaluation requirements, novice teachers have to reach the goal through
shortcuts, such as teaching to test. They neglect the long-term goal, but just focus on the
short-term one, therefore, regular teaching would be largely driven by tests. There is
almost a consensus that test-driven education negatively influences the quality of teachers
and schools, undermining students’ opportunities to learn higher-level skills that cannot
be readily measured by tests. According to an educational survey, when teachers were
asked about “Have you put more emphasis on students’ testing scores after implementing
teachers’ performance pay?”, 33.25% teachers chose “Yes” (Chai & Wang, 2010). The
results indicated teacher performance evaluation and performance pay would reinforce
teachers’ understanding and approach towards test-driven instruction.
Yang and Jiang (2009) indicated that the traditional evaluation, functioning as
reward or punish teachers, was the summative evaluation targeting on school
development; while the performance evaluation was the formative evaluation targeting on
teachers’ personal development. These two kinds of teacher evaluation are
complementary. Therefore, combining these two evaluation methods suggests the
philosophical convergence of teachers’ personal values and social values. To some
degree, the value of education is to accomplish the convergence of personal and social
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development. The present teacher evaluation system needs to reconstruct its content to
achieve this goal.
Oversimplified evaluation process. The Guidelines emphasized that multiple data
sources and evaluators should be involved in the evaluation process, both formative and
summative evaluation should be used to completely evaluate teachers’ performance, and
the evaluation process should be fair, open, and transparent (MOE, 2008). In reality,
however, school administrators simplified the evaluation process, disobeying the
guidelines for various reasons. A middle school teacher in Shanghai reported that teacher
performance evaluation in the school was based on ranks assigned by the administration
office, but not on teaching performance (Xiong, 2009). School leaders categorized all the
teachers and staff into four levels: the first level is the principal and the secretary; the
second level is the vice principal and the middle-level administrators; the third level is the
expert teachers; and the fourth level is the other teachers. Teachers are paid according to
their levels. In some rural and impoverished areas, due to the limited budget, it was
difficult to design teacher performance evaluation that satisfied everyone and, meanwhile,
differentiated teachers’ teaching load and effectiveness. Therefore, egalitarianism,
distributing equal incentive payment to teachers regardless of differences of their
teaching load, was a method for the reform of teacher evaluation, which prevented
conflicts of interests among teachers and between teachers and school leaders (Mi & Dai,
2011). However, egalitarianism is ineffective in motivating teachers to improve their
performance. Egalitarianism is fundamentally equivalent to no evaluation at all.
In some schools, teacher performance evaluation put higher values on teachers’
working experience than teachers’ contributions. Educational statistics indicated that
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53.54% of the variance in teachers’ performance payment is caused by their professional
ranks, 18.09% accounted by the difference between school leaders and teachers, and
13.69% explained by the difference of teaching load (Chai & Wang, 2010). Therefore,
teachers’ professional level is the key factor that decides teachers’ performance payment.
Overemphasis on quantitative data. The evaluation sources focused too much on
quantitative data (Meng &Yuan, 2014). For example, the evaluation indicators mainly
included: teaching load, attendance, overtime working, student achievement, and the
number of research projects and published papers. Qualitative data, such as teaching
effectiveness, group cooperation, and students’ moral development was severely limited.
The implementation processes were found to be unitary and standardized. Classroom
observation and interview were seldom used in the evaluation process (Meng & Yuan,
2014). Although the quantitative data is more objective, it failed to accurately and
completely demonstrate teachers’ actual performance. In addition, overemphasis on
quantitative indicators resulted in narrowing teachers’ work (C. Li, 2014). From the
teachers’ perspective, however, grown in the culture of low uncertainty avoidance,
Chinese teachers were more likely to work with vague regulations rather than with
specific ones. It was hard for teachers to completely accept precisely quantified
evaluation standards (B. Li, 2014). Additionally, evaluation indicators should be
connected with daily administrative practices and teachers’ lives, so that teachers could
comfortably and effectively adapt to the evaluation reform (Hong, 2014). Quantitative
data provided limited effective information of teachers’ performance. Teachers’
resistance to evaluation with specific regulations negatively influenced the objectivity
and accuracy of teacher performance evaluation.
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Lack of validity and transparency. Researchers found the performance evaluation
data sources lacked validity, and the evaluation process failed to be transparent.
Administrators and teacher delegates were the main evaluators held responsible for
evaluation implementation (C. Li, 2014; Meng & Yuan, 2014); however, the
corresponding training for evaluators was deficient (B. Li, 2014). Lack of training for
evaluators is a threat to the reliability of the evaluation data. Although the Guidelines
emphasized that multiple evaluators should be involved in the evaluation process, the
reality was that the voice of the front-line teachers were largely neglected. At one school
in Shanghai, teacher delegates were primarily school administrators, while none of the
front-line teachers, occupying 55% of the total faculty and staff, were included (Xiong,
2009). Furthermore, even when multiple evaluators participated in teacher performance
evaluation, it was difficult to ensure that all of the evaluators’ evaluations were fair and
objective (S. Sun, 2009). Due to the collectivism of Chinese society, emphasis on
nepotism sabotaged the fairness in performance evaluation and the evaluation outcomes
lacked fidelity (B. Li, 2014). Additionally, concerns regarding primary and middle school
students’ participation in the evaluation were existed because some scholars questioned
about primary- and middle- school students’ limited perceptions toward teacher
effectiveness, which might result in inaccurate and unreliable results of teacher
evaluation (Sun, 2009; Wang, 2015). Involving multiple evaluators should not be
simplified, it requires a sub-system to substantially support its effectiveness within the
evaluation process.
Additionally, teacher performance evaluation might be effective in improving the
quality of teaching and learning in school in the short term. But, from a long-term
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perspective, the financial motivation for teachers would increase the school’s economic
burden and stimulate various conflicts (S. Sun, 2009). Again, the problem indicated the
importance of setting a long-term goal—teacher’s development for teacher performance
evaluation.
Teacher Performance Pay
In this section, I reviewed literature regarding teacher performance pay across
countries. Most of the literature are empirical studies, which provided evidence of
teachers’ attitudes (support or object) and perceptions (perceived impacts of performance
pay) toward performance pay. The review starts from theories supporting performance
pay, and then focuses on teachers’ support of performance pay, and teachers’ perceived
impacts of performance pay on student academic achievement, as well as on their work
and personal attributes. Variables affecting teachers’ perceptions, such as gender,
teaching experience, and grade level are discussed with evidence.
Theories supporting performance pay. Theories of psychology and
management science have been used to explain performance pay. For establishing the
theoretical basis for teacher performance pay, motivation theory and equity theory, the
two fundamental theories in literature, are discussed in this section.
Motivation theory. Performance pay is assumed to enhance teacher performance
and improve teacher quality. The psychological hypothesis of performance pay is to
“change behavior by changing motivation” (Richardson, 1999, p. 23). Incentives that are
outside of an individual are regarded as extrinsic motivation while an individual’s
internalized rewards are intrinsic motivation (Vagi, 2014). Take performance pay as an
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example: Paychecks to teachers are an extrinsic motivation while teachers’ internal desire
to teach children is intrinsic motivation.
Research indicates that individuals who are intrinsically motivated are more likely
to work harder and longer than individuals who are extrinsically motivated; further,
intrinsic motivation is regarded as more important to an individual’s behavior than
extrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). From the perspective of
reinforcement theory, which is one school of motivation theory, performance pay is used
as a motivational tool to reinforce teachers’ efforts (Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2009). In this
case, pay is the consequence and high performance is the desired target behavior (Perry,
Mesch, & Paarlberg, 2006). The reinforcement theory emphasizes on the function of the
extrinsic motivation rather than the intrinsic motivation from the perspective of
organization.
Frey (1997) pointed out that individuals’ perceptions toward external incentives
also impact their intrinsic motivation. Specifically, if external incentives are perceived as
supportive, intrinsic motivation is augmented, resulting in increased work effort;
nevertheless if external incentives are perceived as controlling, intrinsic motivation is
reduced, resulting in decreased work effort. Andersen and Pallesen (2008) conducted an
empirical study regarding the relationship between the financial incentives and the
number of publications at 162 Danish research institutions, and the results supported the
theory that “the perception of the financial incentive is essential for its impact” (p. 42). In
other words, if employees perceive incentives as supportive, they are more likely to be
motivated to improve work effort (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008). But, it is hard to identify
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“a clear, objective, and fair relationship” between the intrinsic and the extrinsic
motivation, although many have researchers tried (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008, p. 43).
Critics of teacher performance pay indicate that external monetary rewards
diminish teachers’ intrinsic motivation (desire to improve teaching practice and to teach
children), which is a strong predictor of teachers’ job satisfaction (Thomas, 2009). S. Sun
(2009) argued that treating teachers as “commercialized men,” who are solely motivated
by monetary incentives, neglected teachers’ social, emotional, and cultural needs, and
failed to take efficacy and creativity of the human being into consideration.
Equity theory. Equity theory was developed by Adams (1963), who pointed out
that individuals adjust their behavior according to their evaluation of the ratio of inputs
(performance) and outcomes (pay). Simply speaking, if individuals feel they are
overcompensated, they may make an effort to make up the discrepancy, and vice versa
(Schay & Fisher, 2013). Additionally, individuals not only balance their own inputs and
outputs, but also compare with others to determine fairness, which influences their
motivation (Johnson & Johnson, 1991; S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). In educational settings,
unfair or unequal performance pay demotivates teachers’ work effort (S. Liu &
Onwuegbuzie, 2014; S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016).
In China, one of the goals of performance pay is to solve income inequality
between teachers working in different schools and regions (L. Wang et al., 2014).
However, literature indicates that teachers in China perceive unfairness regarding
performance pay. The national guidelines (MOE, 2008) suggest that a teacher’s salary
consists of 70% basic salary and 30% incentive. However, in some schools with limited
budgets, the total amount of teachers’ salary has not changed and, moreover, the 30%
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incentive is drawn from teachers’ basic salary “reward” teachers based on their
performance. Teachers felt it was unfair that schools used “their own money” as
incentives and it was ineffective in motivating them to improve work effort (S. Liu, Zhao,
et al., 2016). Additionally, at schools with school choice, where parents “donate” extra
money other than regular fees to have their child enter a “good” school, teachers received
more money than those working in ordinary schools, resulting in teacher salary disparity;
teachers perceived this as unfair (L. Wang et al., 2014). As mentioned in the section of
status quo of teacher performance in China, the inequality of teachers’ salaries, within
one school, and among schools in one district, also led to teachers’ perceived unfairness,
which ultimately negatively affected teacher motivation, work effort, and retention.
Teacher support for performance pay. Teacher support is a key to ensuring
effective implementation of performance pay. Simply stated, without teacher buy-in,
performance pay programs cannot be implemented successfully. In China, most literature
regarding performance pay at compulsory schools are theoretical discussions focusing on
the policy analysis of performance pay (e.g., B. Li, 2014; Mi & Dai, 2011; X. Wang,
2013; Wei, 2013), and comparative analysis of performance pay across countries (e.g.,
Jiang & Wei, 2013; Xin Zhang, & Zhu, 2009). Limited empirical research evidence has
been conducted on teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay in China since the
implementation of teacher performance pay in 2009. For example, S. Liu, Zhao, et al.
(2016) surveyed 132 teachers at three schools in China and reported that approximately
half of the surveyed teachers supported the performance pay program. Fan and Fu (2011)
conducted survey studies in 32 counties in four provinces in China, but little information
regarding study design and sample selection were reported. Results suggested that
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approximately 45% of the 1,906 surveyed teachers perceived teachers’ salaries in one
region were unbalanced after the implementation of performance pay, and 25.4% agreed
that the reform of teacher performance pay enhanced the balanced development of
compulsory education in urban and rural areas. H. Zhao, Hui, and Fu (2011) interviewed
administrators of local education agencies in 77 counties across 25 provinces and
principals at 279 schools. The results indicated that 93% of school principals supported
teacher performance pay, but teachers (no exact number) opposed the incentives being
taken from the original teacher salary.
In the United States, many states have developed and implemented teacher
incentive programs within their teacher management systems (Sojourner, Mykerezi, &
West, 2014). Numerous studies have been conducted to evaluate the programs and
examine teachers’ attitudes. Results from recent studies on teachers’ attitudes towards
performance pay are mixed, including both support and opposition. For example,
Springer, Ballou, et al. (2010) reported that 64% of teachers participating in The Project
on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) in Nashville, Tennessee, supported effective teachers
being rewarded with extra compensation. Similarly, a high support rate for performance
pay (74%) was found for teachers in Austin, Texas (Burns, Gardner, & Meeuwsen, 2009).
However, Jacob and Springer (2008) found only moderate support for performance pay
from teachers in 199 public schools of Florida, with only half of surveyed teachers
agreeing that performance pay was a positive change. Further, the majority of teachers in
Rhode Island were opposed to teacher incentive programs (Forand, 2012). Ballou and
Podgursky (1993) concluded that reasons teachers opposed performance pay included
“fairness of performance assessments, negative effect on relationships with other teachers,
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level of base pay, teacher characteristics, community characteristics, experience of merit
pay” (p. 51-52). Additionally, studies indicated teachers’ attitudes were affected by
teacher and school. Connecting the results of the 2006 Washington State Teacher
Compensation survey with individual characteristics, Goldhaber, DeArmond, and
DeBurgomaster (2011) found female teachers and experienced teachers were less
supportive of merit pay than male and novice teachers across grade levels. Also, teachers
in high school were found to be more supportive of merit pay than those in elementary
schools. Teachers with more trust among colleagues were found to be less supportive of
merit pay.
International studies have also examined teachers’ attitudes toward performance
pay in various countries. For example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) reported
that over 80% of 1056 teachers from 300 government-run schools had supportive
opinions towards incentive pay based on objective measures of student performance
improvement in India. Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2010) reported that after one-year
implementing an incentive program in Kenya, where teachers were awarded prizes based
on students’ academic performance in grades four to eight, all surveyed teachers from
100 schools supported the program and thought it was effective in motivating teachers.
Impact of teacher performance pay on student achievement. The ultimate goal
of teacher performance pay is to improve student academic performance by improving
teaching practice; therefore, quantifiable student achievement is used as an indicator in
evaluating the impact of teacher performance pay. This section presents the empirical
evidence regarding the impact of teacher performance pay on student outcomes in the
United States, China and other countries.
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Impact of teacher performance pay on student outcomes in United States
studies. The literature regarding the impacts of performance pay in the United States is
inconclusive (Neal, 2011; Podgursky & Springer 2007; Springer et al., 2009). The most
recent meta-analysis based on 44 primary studies from 1989-2016 revealed that the merit
pay program is positively affected student achievement with an effective size of 0.052
(Pham, Nguyen & Springer, 2017). While, the previous meta-analysis indicated that the
performance pay program “persistently fail to deliver on its promise” (p. 46) based on 57
studies conducted between 1977 and 2008 (Perry et al., 2009).
Student academic performance is often used as an important indicator to evaluate
the effectiveness of performance pay due to causal theory that performance pay programs
affect teacher behavior which, in turn, affects student academic performance (Jones,
2013). In previous empirical studies focusing on the impact of teacher performance pay
on student academic performance, some studies indicated a positive effect (Figlio &
Kenny, 2007; Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Murnane, Willett, & Levy, 1995; Sojourner et
al., 2014; Vigdor, 2008; Winters, Greene, Ritter, & Marsh, 2008). Other studies indicated
a zero, or even a negative effect (Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Fryer, 2013;
Glazerman & Seifullah, 2010; Goodman & Turner, 2010; Marsh et al., 2011; Springer,
Ballou, et al., 2010; Springer et al., 2012).
Researchers have stated that the composition of the workforce, type of
performance-pay plan (Jones, 2013), context, and pre-and-post compound factors within
the contexts (Sojourner et al., 2014) might explain the different results of previous
studies. Additionally, Heneman, Worth, Arrigoni, Kimball, & Milanowski (2013)
suggested that rigorously-designed studies (e.g., Glazerman & Seifullah, 2012; Marsh et
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al., 2011; Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010; Springer et al., 2012) indicated no relationship
between performance pay and student academic performance, while less-rigorous studies
(e.g., Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Vigdor, 2008) demonstrated some degree of positive
impact. For example, Springer, Ballou, et al. (2010) conducted a randomized control
study to examine the effects of teacher performance pay on student outcomes and
teachers’ instructional practices over three academic years, and found no significant
difference between students whose teachers were assigned to the treatment group and
those whose teachers were assigned to the control group. Figlio and Kenny (2007) used
cross-sectional data and found the positive relationship between students’ test scores and
incentive pay in teacher compensation, but the researchers admitted that because of the
cross-sectional strategy they employed in the study, the positive relationship was not a
definitive conclusion that it might be attributed to unobserved school quality other than
the incentives.
Impact of teacher performance pay on student outcomes in studies from other
countries. Many recent international experimental studies focusing on the impact of
teacher performance pay showed positive results on student academic achievement, and
teachers’ teaching practice and effort (Atkinson et al., 2009; Glewwe et al., 2010; Lavy,
2009; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011; Woessmann, 2011). Atkinson et al. (2009)
employed a difference-in-difference methodology controlling for the effects of pupil,
school, and teacher in England, and found that performance pay schemes improved test
scores on average by about 40% of a grade per pupil. Glewwe et al. (2010) found a
significantly positive effect of a teacher incentive program on student test scores with
Kenyan teachers when schools were randomly selected to participate in a teacher
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incentive program. However, in Sweden, Lundström (2012) regarded performancerelated pay schemes as “a counterproductive pay system” (p. 388) after conducting semistructured interviews with 23 Swedish upper-secondary teachers.
Even the studies with positive results indicated some negative outcomes of
performance pay. After participating in the incentive program, Kenyan teachers were
found to increase test preparation sessions, and the temporary test-score effects were only
found on exams linked to the incentives, not on exams that were not linked to the
incentives. This seems to support the argument in previous literature that, the gains in
student test scores may be attributed to “a temporary boost” resulting from teaching to the
test for the performance pay, rather than a substantial improvement in teaching practice
(G. Liang & Akiba, 2015 p. 381). The increase of exam preparation by teachers was also
found by Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2011), who reported positive effects of
performance pay on student academic achievement in India. However, as an unintended
outcome of teacher performance pay, teaching to the test does exist, and it could have
negative influences on student academic performance (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). In Israel,
Lavy (2009) examined the effects of a teacher incentive plan on English and math
teachers, and the results indicated the positive effects on student mean test scores and
teachers’ teaching effort. However, Lavy (2009) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman
(2011) did not find significant differences between the treatment group and control group
teachers on their teaching practice.
Using country-level performance-pay measures and student performance data on
internationally comparable tests (including reading, math, and science), Woessmann
(2011) found student test scores are 24.8% of a standard deviation higher in countries
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with teacher performance pay than those in countries without teacher performance pay.
The effect size, which is small, is similar to what Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011)
found. From the international perspective, teacher performance pay is effective in
improving student academic performance, but in the future, longitudinal studies should
be conducted to assess impact of incentive programs over a long-term period.
Impacts of teacher performance pay on student outcomes in China studies. In
China, S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) investigated the impact of performance pay on teachers’
collaboration, motivation, and job stress. The results indicated that around half of the
surveyed teachers agreed that teachers are more likely to encourage students to be
persistent when they came across challenges after the implementation of performance pay.
However, less than half of the surveyed teachers perceived that performance pay
increases student learning. The other survey studies (e.g., Fan & Fu, 2011; H. Zhao et al.,
2011) have no results related to the impact of teacher performance pay on student
outcomes.
Impact of teacher performance pay on teachers’ work and personal
attributes. Besides the impact on student achievement, performance pay directly affects
teachers’ teaching practice, motivation, and collegiality, which may be relate to teachers’
job stress. In this section, research evidence of the impact on teacher collaboration,
motivation, and job stress are discussed.
Teacher collaboration. Teaching is a collaborative job. In a collaborative school
culture, teachers are more likely to establish mutual learning to increase productivity
(Che & Yoo, 2001), teach creatively, and develop professionalism (Helsby, 2000). Some
opponents of teacher performance pay argue that incentives have a negative effect on
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teachers’ intrinsic motivation and result in destructive competition among teachers
(Firestone & Pennell, 1993). Historically, the negative impact of performance pay
programs on teachers’ collaboration and collegiality at school (Bacharach, Lipsky, &
Shedd, 1984) is a reason that teachers are not supportive of performance pay (Ballou &
Podgursky, 1993).
Although the construct of “teacher collaboration” is hard to accurately measure,
teachers’ perception could reflect, to some degree, changes in collaboration with the
implementation of performance pay. Some studies have found teacher perceptions of
collaboration have increased after the implementation of performance pay. For example,
based on the use of a similar survey, teachers reported an increase of teacher
collaboration after the implementation of performance pay in the United States (Burns et
al., 2009) and China (S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). Winters et al. (2009) evaluated a payfor-performance program in Arkansas, in which teachers receive awards based
completely on yearly gains of student test scores, and found that teachers in schools
participating in the program perceived collaboration among teachers has increased while
teachers in the comparison group disagreed.
The impact results of performance pay on teacher collaboration differ by
performance pay plan type, individual-based versus group-, or school-, based .
Lundström (2012) reported that teachers in Sweden perceived that an individual
performance-related-pay system caused a negative climate between colleagues. Marsh et
al. (2011) examined the School-Wide Performance Bonus Program in New York City
and found no significant differences between teachers in the treatment group and teachers
in the control group regarding the effect on teacher collaboration. In Springer, Ballou, et
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al. (2010), mathematics teachers in Metro-Nashville Pubic Schools were recruited to
voluntarily participate in a three-year monetary incentive program that a bonus will be
awarded to teachers whose students outperformed on a state standardized test. The
findings suggested no effects of bonus programs on teachers’ perceptions of collaboration
and collegiality. A simple explanation regarding the different results based on incentive
type is that group- or school-based performance pay rests upon collective benefits, so
teachers are more likely to work collaboratively to achieve the incentive pay. However,
Brewer, Myers, and Zhang (2015) argued that the zero effect of Springer, Ballou, et al.
(2010) “is mostly attributable to the fact that the merit pay scheme did not reward
teachers for how they performed comparatively to other teachers, rather, a predetermined
benchmark” (p. 47).
Teacher motivation. The goal of performance pay is to motivate teachers to
improve their teaching practices and, ultimately, enhance student learning (G. Liang &
Akiba, 2015). As the evidence regarding the impact of performance pay on teaching
practice and student academic performance is mixed, the empirical results regarding the
impact on teachers’ motivation are mixed as well. Adjustments to teachers’ behavior that
was motivated by performance pay ultimately results in changes to student academic
performance. Based on this logic, the researcher might conclude that studies, which
showed the positive impact of performance pay on student achievement, teaching
practice, and teacher collaboration, equally demonstrated that teachers were positively
motivated by performance pay. Some other specific indicators that teachers were
motivated by performance pay were decreased teachers’ absence rate (Ahn, 2013; Eberts
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et al., 2002; Fryer, 2013; Goodman & Turner, 2010; Jones, 2013), and increased working
hours (Jones, 2013; Lavy, 2009).
In China, Fan and Fu (2011) reported that more than 60% of surveyed teachers
perceived that teacher performance pay motivated teachers to improve their work effort.
S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) indicated that at one school, where teacher performance pay is
related to teacher workload, and the incentives occupy a large part of teachers’ salary,
teachers were motived to work hard.
For studies that indicated that teachers were not motivated by performance pay,
the following points indicate possible reasons.
1. “While merit pay may increase productivity in jobs performing simple tasks, it
may not be as effective in more complex forms of work, like teaching” (Vagi,
2014, p. 100).
2. Some teachers were found to have limited knowledge on the criteria of
performance pay, and so were not motivated to improve their teaching practice
because of the criteria improving (Lundström, 2012).
3. The design of an incentive program, including as goals, the amount of
incentive, and norms, affected whether teachers would be motivated or not.
1) If the goal to achieve the incentive was too high, teachers were not
generally motivated to change practices. Moreover, even if teachers
perceived the goal as achievable, “they were non-committal on whether
the incentives would motivate them to change practices” (Springer, Lewis,
et al., 2010, p. 132).
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2) Framing the bonus program as designed to emphasize more on
teachers’ accountability for student performance rather than recognizing
teachers’ good performance is less likely to motivate teachers
(Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011).
3) One participant in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) stated that “there are no
influences on teachers’ motivation because the reward amount is too small”
(p. 800).
4) Teachers were more likely to be motivated if “the provision of external
incentives based on objective measures of performance that are
transparently and fairly applied” (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011. p.
396).
4. Teachers already worked as effectively as they could before the implementation
of performance pay, therefore, the program was unable to motivate teachers to
change behaviors (Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010).
In general, to better motivate teachers via performance pay, policymakers and
school leaders should learn more about teachers’ perceptions other than the simple
motivation theory in designing incentive programs.
Teacher job stress/pressure. Job stress is psychologically defined as “a negative
emotional experience being triggered by the teacher’s perception that their work situation
constituted a threat to their self-esteem or well-being” (Kyriacou, 2001, p. 28). It is
positively correlated with teacher turnover (S. Liu & Onwuegbuzie, 2014). Even though
performance pay may increase teachers’ productivity and enhance student academic
performance, “given the choice, teachers will accept decent pay and good working
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conditions over extraordinary pay and a stressful workplace” (Gersen, 2010, para. 9).
Limited studies explored the impact of performance pay on teachers’ job stress, where it
has been included as a survey question in studies examining teachers’ perceptions
towards performance pay to evaluate teachers’ job satisfaction (e.g., Burns et al., 2009;
Springer, Lewis, et al., 2010). According to the research evidence mentioned above,
even though job stress is not a direct product of performance pay, it is a byproduct of the
impacts on student academic performance, teacher motivation, and collaboration. Any of
these factors might cause the stress perceived by teachers as they related to performance
pay, such as accountability of student academic performance, competition among
colleagues, and pressure to obtain incentives. S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) indicated that
more than half of surveyed teachers felt performance pay increased their job stress.
Additionally, the qualitative data suggested that the standards and amount of performance
pay directly affected teachers’ job stress level (S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). Future studies
should be conducted to fill the gap regarding the impact of performance pay on teachers’
job stress so that policymakers and school leaders could have evidence to create a more
stress-free working culture and environment for teachers.
Variables influencing teacher performance pay. Traditionally, teacher pay
schemes were based on teacher education level and teaching experience (Brewer et al.,
2015). In a meta-analysis, Perry et al. (2009) identified the variables of performance pay
in public sectors (as shown in Figure 2); employee characteristics, pay system design,
environmental conditions, and organizational characteristics are the major variables that
affect performance pay in public sectors. All of these variables could be perceived by
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employees as influential to their performance pay, which, in turn, may influence their
behaviors.

Figure 2. Variables of performance pay in public sectors. Adapted from “Back to the
Future? Performance-Related Pay, Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence,” by
J. Perry, T. Engbers, and S. Jun, 2009, Public Administration Review, 69, p. 41.
Copyright 2008 by the American Society for Public Administration.
Previous empirical evidence in educational settings also indicated that teachers’
perceptions toward performance pay were affected by variables such as program design
(Pham et al., 2017; Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010), program type (school-based or
individual-based), teachers’ characteristics (gender, teaching experience, and teaching
effectiveness), and school characteristics (size, subjects, and grade level), as shown in
Table 1. Jacob and Springer (2008) identified teacher characteristics, besides teaching
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experience, that impact teacher perception of teacher performance pay at the individual
level, including teachers’ view of their principal’s leadership ability, and teachers’
teaching quality; both are positively associated with teachers’ attitudes towards
performance pay. But, the school-level variables, such as school size and students’
average achievement level were not associated with teachers’ attitude. Burns et al. (2009)
found teachers were more favorable to performance pay for teaching in a “hard to staff”
school than in a “hard to staff” subject (p. 20). In China, S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) found
no significant differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay based on
gender, teaching experience, and professional ranking; this may be attributed to the small
sample size. However, the qualitative data indicated that the work load associated with
specific subjects, and different school-level incentive programs affected teachers’
perceptions regarding performance pay. Although teachers’ educational background used
to be one of the decisive factor in teachers’ salary, few empirical studies examined its
influence on teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay. Therefore, more studies need
to explore the variables associated with teacher performance pay.
Teacher Performance Evaluation
In this section, the review focuses on teacher performance evaluation, which
provides evidence for performance pay. Two main parts are included. Performance
evaluation measures that are frequently used in teacher evaluation practice and discussed
in journal articles in the Chinese context are summarized. Also, the empirical evidence
regarding Chinese teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation is presented.
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Table 1
Variables of Teacher Performance Pay in Relevant Studies
Levels
Variables
Teacher- Gender
level
Teaching experience

Schoollevel

View of their principal’s
leadership ability
Level of teaching quality
Teaching subjects
School size
Average achievement
level
Grade level
(elementary/secondary)

Relevant Studies
Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Jacob & Springer,
2008; Jones, 2013; S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016;
Goldhaber et al., 2011
Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Goldhaber et al.,
2011; Jacob & Springer, 2008; Jones, 2013;
Sojourner et al., 2014; L. Wang et al., 2014
Jacob & Springer, 2008
Jacob & Springer, 2008; Jones, 2013
Goldhaber et al., 2011; L. Wang et al., 2014
Jacob & Springer, 2008
Jacob & Springer, 2008
Goldhaber et al., 2011; Jacob & Springer, 2008;
Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010

Measures of teacher performance evaluation in China. Teacher evaluation in
China has been focused on teachers’ ethics, competence, attendance, performance, and
effectiveness (B. Wang, 2009). According to Cai and Lin (2006), three dominant types of
teacher evaluation are teacher competence or quality evaluation, teacher performance
evaluation, and teacher effectiveness evaluation. Teacher competence evaluation is
employed to assess the knowledge and skills a teacher possesses and provide evidence for
teacher qualification certification or professional training (Cai & Lin, 2006). Teacher
performance evaluation focuses on teachers’ job behaviors, and it is “a subjective
appraisal made by either supervisors or peers or students in class” (p. 31). Teacher
effectiveness evaluation is used to assess teaching effect on students and the gains of
students’ test scores indicate teacher effectiveness. In practical application, the three
styles are mixed as teacher evaluation (Cai & Lin, 2006). However, students’ test scores
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are regarded as the primary and solely evidence for teacher evaluation in many schools
because they are objective and quantifiable. Although using students’ achievement to
assess teachers with value-added models is a research trend in teacher evaluation
worldwide, with the implementation of teacher performance pay, Chinese government
mandated that teacher evaluation should be based on multiple sources, not only students’
achievement (State Council of China, 2012). The guidelines indicated that teachers’
ethics, teaching performance, and banzhuren work were the primary aspects of teacher
performance evaluation (MOE, 2008).
Previous studies examined teacher characteristics and teaching behaviors as the
evaluation indicators, and found the relationship between the indicators and teaching
effectiveness (Xin et al., 2009). However, a composite score (simply add all indicators
into one score) is not the aim of such teacher performance evaluation, which is
ineffective in comprehensively evaluating teachers’ performance. Also, J. Wang (2012)
reviewed relevant literature of teacher performance evaluation indicators in China and
other foreign countries, and pointed out that teacher performance evaluation in
compulsory schools in China was weak. Three problems were found with the indicators
of teacher performance evaluation: First of all, indicators were more likely to reflect the
goals of school development while the goals of teachers’ personal development were
neglected; second, evaluation content was too general, and specific implementation
process were limited; and third, limited studies provided evidence to the combination of
different types of teacher evaluation (e.g., formative and summative; J. Wang, 2012).
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Five primary indicators of teacher performance evaluation were found via
reviewing previous literatures, which were ethics and professional duties, professionalism
or dispositions, impact on effectiveness, communication and cooperation in schools.
Ethics and professional duties. Teachers’ ethics and professional duties have
served as the most fundamental indicators of teacher performance evaluation. Teachers’
ethics have been emphasized in legislations and governmental policies in China. The
MOE Guidelines (MOE, 2008) suggested that ethics was the priority of teacher
performance evaluation. Additionally, teachers had to obey the Regulations of Teachers’
Profession and Ethics in Compulsory Schools at schools (MOE, 2008). Specific
indicators associated with teachers’ ethics were caring about students, and respecting
students. The correspondently observable behaviors were a good attitude towards
students, equal treatment towards every student, no physical punishment, and so on
(Wang, 2009).
Teachers’ professional duties include the specific steps associated with planning,
instruction and assessment, classroom management, and professional development.
Researchers found the indicator system of teacher performance evaluation in compulsory
education schools included two primary levels: The first-level indicators were planning
(28%), classroom management (25%), after-class activities (20%), and professional
obligations (27%); the second-level indicators were more specific descriptions of the
first-level: planning (instruction goals; instruction plans; planning quality); classroom
management (classroom environment management, instruction delivery management,
students behavior management); after-class activities (reviewing assignment; testing;
extra-curriculum activities); professional obligations (teaching reflection, teaching
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seminars, professional development, teaching effects; Dong & Fu, 2009). The similar
weight of each indicator demonstrated the equal importance of these indicators. However,
the practical application of this evaluation indicator system had not been mentioned in
Dong and Fu (2009); its effectiveness was questionable.
The 360-degree evaluation model, which indicated that teacher performance
evaluation should be comprehensive and integrated involving multiple evaluators,
focused on teachers’ teaching, banzhurens’ classroom management, teachers’ ethics, and
teachers’ abilities in scientific research and innovation (N. Li, 2010). Participation of
students, parents, teachers themselves, colleagues, and administrators within the
evaluation process ensured its comprehensiveness to a great extent (N. Li, 2010). There
are two problems associated with the 360-degree evaluation indicators shown in the
studies. First, teaching is a sophisticated process and teaching behaviors are complex.
These evaluation indicators failed to show the sophistications and the relationship
between teachers’ teaching behaviors and the goal of education, which is to nurture
individual’s development. Secondly, these indicators put more emphasis on teachers’
teaching behaviors over teachers’ educating behaviors.
Professionalism or dispositions. Besides a teacher’s ethics and professional
duties, researchers also found that teacher evaluation should take teachers’
professionalism or dispositions into consideration, which refers to teachers’
characteristics of being caring, fair, enthusiastic, responsible and so on in the Chinese
context. H. Xu (2013) analyzed the evaluation indicator system of expert teachers based
on the results of survey questionnaires of 5000 primary and secondary school teachers in
12 provinces of China. The study results indicated that the evaluation indicator system of
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the expert teachers included two dimensions: professionalism and behaviors. The
professionalism involved teachers’ characteristics of being ethical, fair, enthusiastic,
determined, and harmonic, and teachers’ competence in teaching, self-development,
research and management. Similar indicators of teachers’ professionalism were also
found in Ma, Tang, Wang, and Zhou (2012). D. Sun (2014) suggested that teacher
evaluation should be students-based because teachers and students are coexisted and the
ultimate goal of the development of teachers is the development of students. Teachers
should care about students’ growth (not only the growth of academic achievement, but
the general growth as a whole) in teaching practice. Evaluating the disposition of teachers
reflects teacher performance evaluation is based on human nature (D. Sun, 2014).
Additionally, teachers’ ability to learn and self-development are emphasized in teachers’
professionalism (D. Sun, 2014).
Impact on effectiveness. Student test scores and enrollment rates were primary
indicators of traditional teacher evaluation in China. However, with the reform of teacher
evaluation, student academic achievement has changed from a primary source to one of
the indispensable indicators of teacher evaluation. Value-added assessment is a pattern of
teacher evaluation based on their students’ test scores (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff,
2011. This evaluation method uses statistical models to separate teacher contribution on
student achievement, which is regarded as more fair and accurate (Bian & Sun, 2015). In
the United States, various models of value-added teacher evaluation have been discussed
and applied to empirical studies, while in China, empirical studies in this area are limited.
B. Wang (2005) introduced the value-added method of evaluation and applied the method
with empirical data to a high school in Shanghai. B. Wang (2005) found, from students’
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test score, the value-added method proved that the teacher of one class in Chinese
literature had a greater impact on student achievement than the teacher of the other class.
B. Wang (2005) also discussed the shortcomings of the value-added method, namely that
students’ academic achievement could be influenced by various factors other than
teachers.
Scholars reviewed the development of value-added teacher evaluation in the
United States (e.g., Hu & Shi, 2014; S. Xu & Zhao, 2009; Zhou & Bian, 2012), while
other scholars focused on analyzing the construction of value-added models and the
application within the context of Chinese schools (Bian & Sun, 2015; Deng & Bian,
2012). For instance, Bian and Sun (2015) analyzed the research development of valueadded teacher evaluation and discussed the practical implications of teacher evaluation
reform in China. Deng and Bian (2012) analyzed eight value-added models used in China
and other countries, and provided suggestions for choosing models based on different
hypothesis, confounding factors, and assessment errors.
Besides the theoretical discussion, there were a limited number of empirical
studies that have applied value-added models in the practice of teacher evaluation in
China. For instance, W. Zhang, Xin, and Kang (2012) studied 1,238 fourth-grade students
and 42 math teachers from 42 primary schools in Beijing using value-added model. The
research results indicated that teachers’ characteristics (gender, age, years of teaching,
and major) had no significant effect on students’ achievement gain, while teachers’
professional title, and final educational qualification had a significant effect on the
achievement gain (W. Zhang et al., 2012). Inconsistently, Fan and Ren (2013), who
conducted a study of value-added assessment of fifth grade students’ academic
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achievement in Chinese in Xinjiang, found that teachers’ professional title, gender, years
of teaching, and self-efficacy were positively associated with students’ achievement gain,
while teachers’ final educational degree was negatively associated with students’
academic gain. Due to the limited evidence from studies of value-added models and the
complexity of teacher effectiveness, teacher impacts on student academic achievement
and growth are hard to evaluate accurately.
Communication and cooperation in schools. Teacher communication and
cooperation in the school setting have been emphasized in teacher evaluation as an
indicator for contextual performance. However, teachers’ contextual performance was
neglected in previous studies (Xin et al., 2009). According to the six-dimensional teacher
quality construct theory developed by Cai and Lin (2006), teacher job performance
included both task performance and contextual performance. Task performance included:
“teaching effectiveness, teacher-student interaction, and teaching value” (p. 33). The
contextual performance included “occupation ethics, job dedication, and assistance and
cooperation” (p. 33). Teachers’ task performance and contextual performance were
correlated with each other, and contextual performance tended to have more influence on
teachers’ performance.
With the same emphasis on teachers’ contextual performance, H. Sun, Wang and
Lu (2010) conducted a survey study of teachers, school administrators, and principals in
Shengyang province based on the National Board’s Five Core Propositions for Teaching
developed by U.S. National Board for Professional Teaching Standards. The Five Core
Propositions are:
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“Teachers are committed to students and their learning; teachers know the
subjects they teach and how to teach those subjects to students; teachers are
responsible for managing and monitoring student learning; teachers think
systematically about their practice and learn from experience; teachers are
members of learning communities” (National Board’s Five Core Propositions for
Teaching, 1989, p. 2-4).
The results from 1053 questionnaires were analyzed using factor analysis, and
three factors were found to explain 52.291% of the total variability: Teachers’
commitment to students and their learning; classroom instruction; and teachers’ reflection,
communication, and cooperation (H. Sun et al., 2010). Additionally, among the 21
second-level standards of National Board’s Five Core Propositions for Teaching, 17 of
them have been acknowledged by Chinese participants, which suggested the
homogeneity of professional teaching standards in China and the United States (H. Sun et
al., 2010).
In summary, teachers’ ethics, professional duties, professional or dispositions,
effectiveness, and communication and cooperation in school were five primary indicators
of teacher performance evaluation. All the indicators are interrelated and are associated
with the core—teaching and learning—of school education. It is equally important to
treat teachers as human beings and in a professional manner in teacher performance
evaluation; teachers’ qualities, teaching abilities, and educational competence
simultaneously affect students’ academic and personal growth to a great extent.
Teachers’ perceptions of teacher performance evaluation in China. A limited
number of empirical studies have explored teachers perceptions toward performance
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evaluation measures. S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) conducted a mixed-methods study to
investigate Chinese middle school teachers’ preferences on performance evaluation
indicators. The quantitative findings suggested collaboration with colleagues, students’
test scores, and fulfillment of additional roles were the most important indicators for
performance evaluation, while the qualitative findings suggested teachers’ ethics,
workload, and student test scores were the most important. Qi (2012) surveyed 151
teachers from four elementary schools in Shandong province. The findings showed that,
questioning response to the question, “Who should be the evaluators of performance
evaluation?,” the surveyed teachers’ choices, from top to bottom, were professional
evaluators outside of the school, self evaluation, peers, program coordinators, parents,
students, and school administrators. The rank of teachers’ preferred evaluators was
different from the rank they perceived the school used. Additionally, the surveyed
teachers’ preferred performance evaluation measures, from top to bottom, were students’
test scores, open class, participation in research projects and publications, student
homework, instruction plans, and self-evaluation. F. Liang (2012) found 14.3% of the
surveyed teachers agreed that students should participate in the performance evaluation,
and only 8.8% agreed on parents’ participation. Teachers’ cooperation in performance
evaluation and performance pay is substantially associated with teachers’ attitudes toward
performance evaluation measures. Therefore, more empirical studies should be conducted
to explore this area to provide evidence for improving the design of performance
evaluation and the implementation process.
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Summary
Teacher performance pay is an important part of educational reform around the
globe.
“From a theoretical viewpoint, performance-related pay may elicit both incentive
effects—raising motivation and effort of current teachers who strive to increase
their pay—and sorting effects—attracting and retaining graduates in the teaching
profession who expect to do well under performance-based compensation
schemes” (Woessmann, 2011, p. 404).
The substantial body of research provides a sketchy illustration of how teachers
perceive performance pay and performance evaluation. Also, studies indicated the impact
of performance pay on student academic achievement was mixed, but the impacts on
teachers’ motivation, collaboration, and job stress were mostly negative.
In the Chinese context, teacher performance evaluation has stepped into a new
era, along with the implementation of performance pay since 2009. It has targeted
improving teachers’ professional development and enhancing teacher quality as a whole,
rather than, solely rewarding or punishing teachers. It has incorporated multiple sources
and evaluators in the evaluation process, rather than, using one dimension for all
purposes (S. Liu & Teddlie, 2003). From the legislation, the national guidelines stated the
primary principles for implementing performance pay and performance evaluation in
compulsory education schools is that local agencies and schools have the control of
designing and accomplishing specific implementation plans. In the early years of the
performance pay implementation, Chinese teachers were found supportive of
performance pay and they placed high expectations on it (He & Liu, 2011). However,
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with the implementation moving forward, problems emerged, and teachers were less
supportive than before. Problems found with teacher performance pay included:
significant salary disparities among teachers across regions, school districts, teaching
subjects, and teaching experience; negative impacts on teachers’ professional
development and well-being; and negative impacts on school culture. These problems
contributed to teachers’ perception of the unfairness of performance pay, contradicting
the goals of performance pay which were to lessen the inequality of teachers’ salaries,
motivate teachers to improve teaching practice, and ultimately enhance students’
academic achievement. Without teacher buy-in, the performance pay reform is
ineffective. The reasons resulting in the ineffective implementation of teacher
performance pay in China were unbalanced economic development across areas, and lack
of uniformed standards of implementing performance pay and performance evaluation.
The literature also revealed that, from the theoretical perspective, measures of
teacher performance evaluation had been identified as teachers’ ethics, professional
duties, personality, effectiveness, and communication and collaboration in schools.
However, some of the indicators are not accurately measurable in practice. Moreover, the
lack of uniform standards of teacher performance evaluation and without teacher
representation in decision making, teacher performance evaluation in China was found to
be problematic in goals, process, and results application. The specific problems included
an overemphasis on accountability, conflict with traditional Chinese culture,
oversimplified evaluation process, overemphasis on quantitative data, and a lack of
validity and transparency.
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Admittedly, the conclusions regarding teachers’ perceptions toward performance
pay in the Chinese context are based on both reflective journal articles and limited
empirical research evidence. To hear the voice of front-line teachers and to provide
convincing evidence to administrators and policy makers, more empirical studies are
needed. These studies must explore teachers’ perceptions regarding performance pay,
because teachers’ support is the key to the effective implementation of the reform. More
importantly, most of the published empirical studies in Chinese journals failed to provide
sufficient information of study design, and the validity and reliability of the studies were
questionable. It is necessary to conduct scientifically-designed empirical studies that can
result in valid and reliable findings in this area. Therefore, this mixed-methods study
explored teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay in Kunming, Yunnan province,
China. The study will contribute to the empirical studies of teacher performance pay in
China, and will add to the literature of international studies of teacher performance pay
from Chinese teachers’ perspective.

55

CHAPTER 3
Methods
Chapter three outlines the research design of this study, including its paradigm,
research strategy, instrumentation, sampling method, data collection, data analysis and
limitations. The study orients to a positivist paradigm and incorporates mixed methods,
including both quantitative and qualitative designs. The primary data sources of survey,
interview, and artifacts are used for data collection and generation. Descriptive statistics,
factor analysis, and multivariate statistical analysis are conducted for quantitative data
analysis; content analysis are used for qualitative data analysis. The primary research
questions guiding this study are:
1. To what extent do participating teachers support the implementation of
performance pay at their public schools?
2. From the perspectives of participating teachers, what are the specific merits and
shortcomings of performance pay?
3. What are participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation
measures?
4. What factors emerge from a perception survey of participating teachers
regarding performance pay and teacher evaluation?
5. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers toward
performance pay based on selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender,
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teaching experience, professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g.
grades level, and school rank)?
6. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers regarding
evaluation measures upon which performance pay is based in their public schools
in terms of selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching experience,
professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g., grades level, and school
rank)?
Paradigm
Paradigm is defined as “a worldview, together with the various philosophical
assumptions associated with that point of view” (Teddlie & Tachakkori, 2009, p. 84). It
provides an underlying theoretical framework with assumptions, concepts, and
propositions to orient thinking and research (Mack, 2010). The study used a quantitativedominant mixed method. Therefore, it is oriented on a positivist paradigm and uses
qualitative data to supplement and expand understanding teachers’ perceptions towards
performance pay in China. Moreover, the purpose of research within a positivist
paradigm is to “investigate, confirm and predict law-like patterns of behaviors” (Taylor
& Medina, 2013, para. 4). The objectivity of the research process is the focus (Creswell,
2009; Mack, 2010). Statistical analysis, large sample size and generalizable findings are
characteristic of positivist research (Mack, 2010; Taylor & Medina, 2013). In this study, I
investigated the reality regarding teachers’ support and attitudes toward performance pay
and performance evaluation measures.
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Research Strategy
As noted above, the study used a mixed-methods approach for data collection and
analysis. Compared with the single-method approach, a mixed-methods approach can
help explore complexity more adequately and gain more insight of research questions
(Creswell, 2009). In the study, I investigated not only Chinese teachers’ perceptions
towards performance pay and how they are impacted in general, but also investigated in
depth how Chinese teachers in the Yunnan Province perceive the merits and
shortcomings of performance pay, and reasons supporting their preference on
performance evaluation indicators.
Specifically, the study used the concurrent embedded strategy of mixed methods,
which indicates both quantitative and qualitative data were collected simultaneously, and
qualitative data was embedded within the quantitative design (Creswell, 2009). A paper
survey, including 64, 5-point Likert Scale questions and five open-ended questions, was
distributed to selected teachers. Meanwhile, semi-structured individual interviews were
conducted to generate qualitative data. The quantitative data provided an overall
composite assessment of Chinese teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay and
performance evaluation. The qualitative data enriched the description of Chinese
teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay, including their overall attitudes regarding
performance pay and performance evaluation measures, and their perceived merits and
shortcomings of performance pay and its implementation.
Participants
The study was conducted in Kunming, the principal city of Yunnan Province,
located in southwestern China. Choosing Kunming city is based on three rationales. First,
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the teacher population in China is too large to choose a fully representative sample.
Second, the implementation of teacher performance pay across China is diverse because
teachers’ salaries are largely based on local economic development levels (State Council
of China, 2008). The analysis of teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay can be
explained by local economic development through focusing on one region. Third, based
on previous literatures, teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay has never been
examined in Kunming city, which is an economically and geographically important
second-tier city representing the urban development level of southwestern region in
China. The tier is decided by local population and income level (China city tier system:
How it works and why its useful, 2013). Its education quality ranked among the lowest
cities due to the unbalanced attribution of educational resources nationwide and obtained
less attention from the central government than other cities.
The city consists of 15 school districts - seven urban districts and eight countylevel cities. According to the national guidelines, all school districts have implemented
teacher performance pay, but the extent to which schools implemented the programs
varies greatly due to financial constraints and other problems (Liu et al., 2016a). Based
on feasibility constraints, I only focused on one school district, Panda, which is the core
district of Kunming in terms of economy, politics, and culture. Panda school district is in
the leading position among all school districts of Kunming, which represents the highest
level of education quality of Kunming city. Eighty-two urban public schools are located
at Panda district, including approximately 5,630 teachers and administrators (Yunnan
Department of Education, 2013).
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Stratified random sampling was used to identify a sample of teachers to
participate in the study. Stratified random sampling “involves a sample selected so that
certain subgroups in the population are adequately represented in the sample” (Gall, Gall,
& Borg, 2007, p. 173). In China, most of the secondary schools include both of the lower
(Grades 7-9) and the higher grades (Grades 10-12). Therefore, the sample of teachers in
the study was stratified as two levels—elementary and secondary - instead of elementary,
middle, and high. This configuration better represents the school structure in China. The
sample was stratified to ensure the participants proportionally represent elementary
(Grades 1-6) and secondary (Grades 7-12) teachers drawn from the population.
With quantitative data analysis, the larger the sample size the better (Gall et al.,
2007). For survey research, Sudman (1976) suggested a minimum of 100 participants in
each major subgroup and 20 to 50 in each minor subgroup. In the Panda district of
Kunming, there are 1,710 teachers at public elementary schools and 1,538 teachers at
public secondary schools, which indicates that the proportion of teachers at elementary
level and secondary level are approximately equal. Therefore, in the study, a total sample
of 560 teachers (280 elementary and 280 secondary) from eight urban public elementary
schools, out of 28 in total, and eight urban public secondary schools, out of 19 in total1 in
the Panda district of Kunming were randomly selected. Specifically, the lists of schools at
the elementary and secondary levels were entered in Excel worksheets respectively, and
the “RAND” function was used to randomly select schools from the lists. Thirty-five
questionnaires were sent to each selected school, and a designated teacher was

1

Secondary vocational schools have been excluded from the school population because
curriculum and teacher evaluation is different in these schools.
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responsible for distributing and collecting the surveys. Therefore, sample sizes in both
the major subgroups met the recommended requirements for the study.
For qualitative aspects of the study, “in-depth information from a small number of
people can be very valuable, especially if the cases are information-rich” (Patton, 2002,
p. 242). Therefore, a total sample of 16 teachers (eight elementary and eight secondary)
was randomly selected from the participants to participate in follow-up interviews.
Specifically, name list of teachers from each participating school was input into the Excel
sheet, and the “RAND” function was used to randomly selected one teacher from each
school. The selected teacher was contacted, but, if the selected teacher refused to
participate in the study, a new teacher was randomly selected from the Excel sheet.
Data Sources
Teacher questionnaire. The questionnaire was adopted by Dr. Shujie Liu, a
professor at Qufu Normal University, China, primarily based on Burns et al.’s (2009)
study, which explored the REACH teacher attitudes regarding performance pay in Austin
Independent School District, TX (AISD). Additional items from Springer, Ballou, et al.’s
(2010) study were added to the questionnaire, which is an evaluation report on the
District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) program, a state-funded and locallydesigned teacher incentive pay program in Texas. The adopted questionnaire has been
back-translated by two scholars who were proficient in both English and Chinese (S. Liu,
Zhao, et al., 2016). Items in the questionnaire addressed teachers’ overall attitudes
towards performance pay and performance evaluation measures, teachers’ perceptions of
the impact of performance pay implementation on their motivation, colleague
collaboration, and job stress, which also are a focus of the current study. Moreover, the
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questionnaire has been validated in a Chinese context. Therefore, it was adopted as an
appropriate instrument for the study, and used with permission from Dr. Liu.
Additionally, according to S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016), whose study focused on
Chinese middle school teachers’ preference on performance evaluation indicators, three
factors were generated from the items. S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) investigated Chinese
teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay based on three school cases, a four-factor
model, which included fairness and effectiveness, competition and stress, motivation, and
peer collaboration, was generated to represent the general pattern of teachers’
perceptions. In both previous studies, no significant differences were found in terms of
teachers’ gender, teaching experience, or professional ranking. It was interesting to
explore the factors underneath the items, and differences across teacher groups in the
current study with a different sample of teachers from China. Therefore, the research
results from the previous and the current studies were comparable by using the same
questionnaire.
Composition of the questionnaire. The questionnaire (The English version and
the Chinese version are attached in Appendix C and Appendix D, respectively.)
employed in the study includes four parts (Table 2). Part I, demographic information,
includes teacher characteristics, such as teaching experience, gender, and professional
ranking. Part II consists of 48 closed-ended items asking respondents’ overall attitude
towards performance pay and how the implementation of performance pay impacts
teachers, particularly in the areas of collaboration, motivation, and job stress. The items
were measured on a 5-point Likert-format scale that ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to
5= strongly agree. Part III is composed of 15 closed-ended items asking respondents how
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important they think each indicator is in teacher performance evaluation. The items were
measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale that ranged from 1 = extremely unimportant to 5
= extremely important. Part IV of the questionnaire is comprised of five open-ended
items asking respondents to describe what they think is the most important indicators in
performance evaluation, what are their concerns are regarding the implementation of
performance pay, and what they think are the advantages, disadvantages, and problems
associated with implementation of performance pay.
Table 2
Composition of Chinese Teachers’ Perception towards Performance Pay Questionnaire
Part I

Composition
Demographic Information

•

Part II

48 closed-ended items

•
•

Part III

15 closed-ended items

•

Part IV

5 open-ended items

•
•
•

•

Topics
Teachers’ characteristics (age, gender,
teaching experience, education,
professional ranking, additional duty,
and school level, school ranking)
Teachers’ overall perception towards
performance pay
How does implementation of
performance pay impact teachers
Teachers’ perception on performance
evaluation measures
Teachers’ perceptions on the most
important indicator(s) in performance
evaluation
Teachers’ concerns regarding the
implementation of performance pay
Teachers’ perceptions regarding
advantages, and disadvantages
associated with implementation of
performance
Teachers’ perceived effects of
performance pay on their teaching
practice
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Reliability and validity of the questionnaire. Reliability of a survey instrument
refers to consistency of the instrument (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2009), which indicates
whether the instrument is reliable to generate the intended results. Before the
questionnaire was formally employed by Liu and her colleagues, a pilot study was
conducted to check the appropriateness of all the items of the questionnaire in a Chinese
context. Based on the respondents’ feedback, the appropriate items were adopted and the
inappropriate ones were deleted (S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). Additionally, high reliability
coefficients of two main parts of the questionnaire (Part II and III) have been reported in
previous studies. Specifically, all items in Part II of the questionnaire have been
employed by S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) in a case study investigating Chinese teachers’
attitudes toward performance pay at three middle schools at Jilin Province, China. With
the sample of 132 teachers, the Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency reliability
coefficient obtained from the study was 0.81. All items in Part III of the questionnaire
have been employed in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) to explore Chinese middle school
teachers’ preferences regarding performance evaluation measures. This study, based on
the sample of 204 teachers, obtained a Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency reliability
coefficient of 0.88 with a confidence interval of 0.85 to 0.91.
Validity refers to whether the instrument measures what it purports to measure
(Gall et al., 2007). Content validity suggests whether the instrument covers “a
representative sample of behavior domain to be measured” (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997, p.
115). The content validity of the questionnaire can be demonstrated from the following
two aspects. First, the items of the questionnaire are originally from well-designed
empirical studies (Burns et al., 2009; Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010) that focused on
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teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay. Additionally, the questionnaire has been
employed in a Chinese study and the results have been published in peer-reviewed
journals. Therefore, the item content is valid. Second, the questionnaire is based on the
theories of motivation and impacts of performance pay on teachers. These theories
indicate (a) that teachers’ motivation is affected by performance pay, and (b) that
teachers’ perceptions of performance pay influence their work effort, teaching practice,
job stress, and collaboration with colleagues. The items of the questionnaire, which are
derived from these ideas regarding teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay, are
designed to show teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay and performance
evaluation, and teachers’ perceptions after the implementation of performance pay.
Additionally, the questionnaire can be used with a range of teachers regardless their
characteristics (e.g., gender, teaching experience, educational background, professional
rank, and schools).
Semi-structured individual interview questions. Part IV in the questionnaire is
composed of five open-ended questions, which are designed to supplement the data
collected by 5-point Likert-Scale questions in the other parts of the questionnaire (Gall et
al., 2007). The open-ended questions, which were developed by Dr. Liu and her
colleagues and have been employed in previous studies, were revised and used for the
semi-structured individual interview. Regarding the revision, interview questions are
more general than the original open-ended questions in the questionnaire, as shown in
Table 3. Two additional questions regarding the implementation of performance pay at
the interviewee’s school and suggestions from the interviewee were added. The
framework of interview questions is shown in Table 4 and all the questions have been
65

reviewed by Dr. S. Liu to ensure the validity. During individual interviews, these
questions were used as prompts and allowed for follow-up questions according to the
content of participants’ responses. Because the pertinent qualitative data generated from
both the questionnaires and interviews are used to supplement the quantitative data and
enrich the study, as shown in Table 5, the interview questions are aligned with the survey
questions.
Table 3
Revision of Original Open-ended Questions
Original Open-ended Questions
Which indicator(s) (e.g. teachers’ morality,
professional ranking, education degree,
teaching experience, working load,
teaching process, and student’s
achievement) do you think are the most
important in teacher performance
evaluation? And why?
What do you think are the main problems
associated with the implementation of
teacher performance pay? And why?
(1) how much the salary can be increased
(2) whether teachers’ salary is lower than
local governmental officials or not
(3) how does school allocate the incentive
payment
(4) the disparities of performance pay
across different school districts
(5) the disparities of performance pay
among different schools at the same district
(6) the disparities of performance pay
among colleagues
(7) others (please specify)

Revised Interview Questions
What measures are used at your school to
evaluate teachers’ performance? And what
do you think of these measures?

What are your concerns regarding teacher
performance pay? And why?
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Table 4
Semi-structured Individual Interview Guiding Questions

Interview
Guiding
Questions

1. Please introduce the implementation of teacher performance pay at your
school. What’s the implementation plan at your school?
2. What measures are used at your school to evaluate teachers’ performance?
And what do you think of these measures?
3. What are the influences of implementing teacher performance pay on your
teaching? On peer relationships? On students’ studying?
4. What do you think are the merits of teacher performance pay?
5. What are your concerns regarding teacher performance pay? And why?
6. What do you think are the main problems associated with the
implementation of teacher performance pay?
7. For better implementing teacher performance pay, do you have any
suggestions to your principal and local educational agency?

Table 5
Alignment of Questionnaire Close-ended Items with Interview Questions
Topics of Questionnaire Close-ended
Items
Part I • Teachers’ characteristics
(age, gender, teaching
experience, education,
professional ranking,
additional duty, and school
level, school ranking)
Part II • Teachers’ overall attitude
towards performance pay
• How does implementation
of performance pay impact
teachers

Semi-structured Interview Questions
•

Background information of interviewees

•

What do you think are the merits of
teacher performance pay?
What are your concerns regarding teacher
performance pay? And why?
What do you think are the main problems
associated with the implementation of
teacher performance pay?
What are the influences of implementing
teacher performance pay on your
teaching? On peer relationships? On
students’ studying?
What measures are used at your school to
evaluate teachers’ performance? And
what do you think of these measures?

•
•
•

Part III

•

Teachers’ perception on
performance evaluation
measures

•
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Data Collection
Triangulation. Triangulation is defined as “the mixing of data or methods so that
diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic” (Olsen, 2004, p. 3). It is a
technique facilitating validation of data, which refers to using multiple and different
sources, methods and theories to provide evidence (Creswell, 2013). Triangulation is not
just about validation, but also about deepening and widening the understanding towards
the research questions (Olsen, 2004). In this study, specifically, methodological
triangulation was implemented through survey, semi-structured interviews, and extant
artifacts. Information collected through the survey was limited by the depth of the
questions asked on the questionnaire and respondents’ time for completing the survey.
However, interviews and extant artifacts allowed the researcher to enrich and deepen the
understanding regarding Chinese teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay.
Survey. The survey is an efficient approach for data collection. In this study, 560
paper surveys with a consent form (attached in Appendix B, and the corresponding
English version is attached in Appendix A) on the cover were distributed to 16 randomlyselected schools by an officer working at the Bureau of Education at Panda District of
Kunming, China. A designated teacher at each school was responsible for distributing 35
surveys to teachers at the school and collecting all the surveys after finishing.
Individual semi-structured interview. The 45-60-minute individual semistructured interviews were conducted for collecting qualitative data of the study. In semistructured interviews, all questions were open-ended, and follow-up questions were asked
according to the content of the interviewee’ responses. The pre-designed questions
ensured the researcher covered key areas of the research focus in interviews, and the
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follow-up questions were helpful in encouraging respondents’ deeper thinking on ideas
and issues that emerged during the interview (Kvale, 1999). Interview guiding questions,
which were used in the study, have been discussed in the Data Source section.
Interviews were conducted in a quiet and comfortable place of the participants’
choice, without interruptions. Participants could decide to participate in the interview
face-to-face or via telephone or Skype. An interview protocol, including descriptive
information (time, place, interviewer, interviewee’s pseudonym) and the interview
questions listed above, was used to guide the interviews (The English version and the
Chinese version are attached in Appendix E and Appendix F, respectively).
Member checking was applied during and after interviews, which is an approach
to establish credibility of qualitative data. Credibility refers to the truth of the findings in
research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Specifically, during interviews I reflected participants’
comments back to them to check my understanding of their perceptions. After interviews,
I asked participants to review the summaries of the interviews, and make corrections to
ensure the researcher’s interpretation is accurate. All interviews were audio-recorded
during the process and transcribed into Word documents and translated into English right
after the end of each interview.
Artifacts. During the interviews, participants were asked to share artifact(s) that
provide evidence of performance evaluation and performance pay at their schools, such
as school-based performance evaluation standards and indicators, performance pay
structure sheet, or documents concerning performance pay or performance evaluation
distributed by the school administration. The purposes of including the artifacts were: 1)
the artifact(s) can facilitate the participants thinking about their experience and recall
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their memory regarding performance evaluation and performance pay; 2), the artifact(s)
is an important evidence-based data source for the researcher to incorporate in data
analysis; and 3) artifact analyses “provided greater depth and breadth to the data
generated” (Xu, 2011 p. 92).
Data Analysis
Quantitative Data. SPSS Version 23 was used for statistical analyses in the
study. Descriptive statistics, factor analysis, and MANOVA or ANOVA were used to
analyze quantitative data.
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics are “mathematical techniques for
organizing and summarizing a set of numerical data” (Gall et al., 2007, p. 132). In the
study, they were used to describe (a) the extent that Chinese teachers support the
implementation of performance pay at their public schools; and (b) Chinese teachers’
ratings of their preferred performance evaluation indicators. Specifically, means and
standard deviations were calculated for each item of the questionnaire. Additionally,
percentages of teachers’ response to the question regarding Chinese teachers’ general
attitudes toward performance pay and the extent of their support to the implementation of
performance pay at their schools were calculated to describe their support of performance
pay and different aspects of the implementation. The means of teachers’ ratings on their
preferred performance evaluation measures were ranked from highest to lowest to
indicate what indicators of performance evaluation Chinese teachers perceive as
important.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Principal component analysis is a
statistical technique that “summarizes patterns of correlations among observed variables
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and reduces many observed variables to a smaller number of factors” (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2014, p. 660). The combined factors were manageable for the researcher to
conduct the follow-up statistical analysis and use as dependent variables. Specifically, a
PCA with oblimin rotation was conducted to examine the factor structure of both Part II
(teachers’ overall attitude towards performance pay, and how of implementation of
performance pay impacts teachers) and III (teachers’ preference on performance
evaluation indicators) of the questionnaire. Within the process, multiple methods (e.g.,
eigenvalue-greater-than-one, scree plot, parallel analysis) were used to determine the
number of factors underlying the data.
MANOVA or ANOVA. To explore the differences of teacher perception towards
performance pay and performance evaluation measures based on personal and school
selected characteristics (e.g., professional rank, teaching experience, and grade level),
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) or follow-up analysis of variance
(ANOVA) were conducted. Both ANOVA and MANOVA are statistical techniques for
determining the group differences on dependent variable(s) (Gall et al., 2007). ANOVA
is used for a single dependent variable while MANOVA is used for more than one
dependent variable. In the study, the independent variables were teachers’ and schools’
selected characteristics (e.g., teaching experience, professional rank and school levels),
while the dependent variables were the factors extracted from the PCAs.
Qualitative data. A qualitative content analysis was used to analyze data
collected from survey open-ended questions of the questionnaire and semi-structured
interviews. Qualitative content analysis is “a research method for the subjective
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of
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coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1279). Based on
the quantitative-dominant mixed-method study design, the qualitative data served to
supplement the study and provide in-depth information regarding teachers’ perceptions
towards performance pay. Using qualitative content analysis, I identified the key terms
from the qualitative data, grouped them and categorized them into patterns and
formulated a general description to capture the essence of teachers’ perceptions toward
performance pay and performance evaluation.
Specifically, the inductive approach of content analysis was used, which indicates
that the qualitative data is not based on a specific theory (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). The
analysis involved the following steps:
1. Obtain a sense of the whole (Burnard, 1991). In the beginning, all text documents
were read several times and I immersed in the data and got a sense of the whole
(Creswell, 2013), because no insights appear until the researcher is thoroughly
familiar with them (Polit & Beck, 2004).
2. Open coding. While reading the text, I wrote down notes and themes to describe
various aspects of the content (Burnard, 1991; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The
process of coding requires the researcher to “aggregate the text into small
categories of information, seeking evidence for the code from different databases
being used in a study, and then assigning a label to the code” (Creswell, 2013, p.
184). An online qualitative data analysis tool, Dedoose, was used to code the data.
All the categories were generated from open coding.
3. Create categories. At this stage, I grouped similar categories under higher order
categories (Burnard, 1991). The process involves comparison among primary
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categories (Dey, 1993), which enhances understanding about the phenomenon
(teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation and performance pay).
Furthermore, it sets a foundation for generating knowledge through the
researcher’s interpretation of the research topic.
4. Abstraction. Abstraction refers to generating higher-order categories to develop a
comprehensive description of the research topic (Polit & Beck, 2004). “Contentcharacteristics words” were used to name generated categories (Elo & Kyngäs,
2008, p. 111). For example, in the study, content-characteristics words are support,
teacher collaboration, motivation, and fairness/unfairness. At this stage, I
“formulated a model that best represents how those categories were related, and
used the themes that emerged from that analysis to reassemble the data so as to
answer proposed research questions” (Xu, 2011, p. 95).
To establish the credibility of the qualitative findings, I emailed the original
interview transcripts and summaries of interviews to each participant for review and
correction. All the committee members, organized by faculty members in the School of
Education, reviewed study design and data analysis, which strengthened the credibility as
well. The two steps above (member checking and peer review) can also build
confirmability of the qualitative findings, which means the study results are determined
by the data, but not by the researcher’s bias, motivation, or interest (Lincoln & Guba,
1985). Additionally, I developed a detailed, rich description of the analysis process and
results to ensure readers obtain sufficient information to judge the applicability of
findings to other settings, which is a process to establish transferability of the qualitative
findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
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As a summary, Table 6 below shows the alignment between each research
question with the corresponding data collection/generation and analysis method(s).
Table 6
Alignment of Research Questions to Data Collection/Generation and Analysis.
Research Question

Data
Data Analysis
Collection/Generation
Q1. To what extent do participating Survey Questionnaire Descriptive Statistical
teachers support the
Analysis
implementation of performance
pay at their public schools?
Q2. From the perspectives of
Interview
Qualitative Content
participating teachers, what are the
Analysis (Inductive)
specific merits and shortcomings of
performance pay?
Q3. What are participating
Survey Questionnaire Descriptive Statistical
teachers’ perceptions toward
Interview
Analysis
performance evaluation measures?
Qualitative Content
Analysis (Inductive)
Q4. What factors emerge from a
Survey
Principal Component
perception survey of participating
Analyses
teachers regarding performance
pay and teacher evaluation?
Q5. Are there differences in the
Survey Questionnaire MANOVA and followperceptions of participating
up analyses (ANOVA
teachers toward performance pay
and post hoc)
based on selected characteristics of
teachers (e.g., gender, teaching
experience, professional ranking,
and teacher type) and schools (e.g.
grades level, and school rank)?
Q6. Are there differences in the
Survey Questionnaire MANOVA and followperceptions of participating
up analyses (ANOVA
teachers regarding evaluation
and post hoc)
measures upon which performance
pay is based in their public schools
in terms of selected characteristics
of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching
experience, professional ranking,
and teacher type) and schools (e.g.
grades level, and school rank)?
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Assumptions, Delimitations, and Limitations
Assumptions. The study assumed that all teachers that participated in the study
have experienced the reform of performance pay and their payments are based on the
results of their performance evaluation in their schools. Another assumption is that
teachers’ attitudes and perceptions towards performance pay are influenced by personal
and schools’ selected characteristics. Also, based on motivation theory, the study
assumed that teachers’ perceptions regarding performance pay and its implementation
affected teachers’ collaboration, motivation, teaching effectiveness, and job stress.
Delimitations. The study is restricted to one urban school district in a province in
southwest China. Therefore, the study results are not be generalizable to the rural area
and other regions of China. Additionally, based on previous research evidence and items
of the questionnaire, the study only focuses on the limited impacts of performance pay
perceived by teachers. Other impacts on teachers produced by the implementation of
performance pay are not addressed in the study.
Limitations. There are three limitations of the study. First, the sample size is
relatively small, which influenced the power of statistical analysis. Additionally,
generalizability of findings is constrained due to the relatively small sample size. Another
limitation associated with the study sample is the representativeness. Due to the
unavailability of the demographic data of teachers in Panda school district of Kunming
city, the characteristics of the teacher sample might not be representative across teachers’
variables such as gender, age, teaching experience and educational background.
Second, the study only focuses on teachers from one school district at Kunming
city of Yunnan province, China. The findings from the study might not be generalizable
75

to the other school districts and other locations of China. In addition, all teachers in the
sample are from urban schools, therefore, the findings are not generalizable to teachers in
rural areas.
Third, lack of validity of the survey results is a limitation of the study. In data
collection, designated teachers from selected schools were responsible for distributing the
questionnaires to teachers, but the process of selecting teachers participating the survey
was uncontrollable. The designated teachers might randomly select teachers or only
select teachers who were available. Also, whether participants’ responses are truthful or
not is uncontrollable, and the respondents might make mistakes or have difficulty in
recalling relevant information in the process of accomplishing the survey.
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CHAPTER 4
Findings
In this study, I explored teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and
performance evaluation measures in Panda School District of Kunming City, China. Data
were collected or generated through paper surveys, semi-structured interviews, and
artifact review. A total of 364 K-12 Chinese teachers completed the survey. They were
heterogeneous across various characteristics such as gender, age, years of teaching
experience, professional rankings, as well as subject areas and grade levels taught.
Among all the received survey responses, 333 were identified as valid due to participants’
response to each item of the survey scale, especially the responses to the reverse-scored
items. The quantitative data were statistically analyzed (e.g., descriptive statistics,
Principal Component Analysis, and MANOVA). Qualitative data, composed of written
responses to open-ended questions at the end of the survey questionnaire, as well as semistructured interviews with 14 teachers randomly selected from the school district, were
analyzed by content analysis. Artifacts pertaining to teacher performance pay and
performance evaluation were analyzed by holistic coding. In this chapter, findings of
analyses will answer the following research questions:
1. To what extent do participating teachers support the implementation of
performance pay at their public schools?
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2. From the perspectives of participating teachers, what are the specific merits and
shortcomings of performance pay?
3. What are participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation
measures?
4. What factors emerge from a perception survey of participating teachers
regarding performance pay and teacher evaluation?
5. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers toward
performance pay based on selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender,
teaching experience, professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g.,
grade level and school rank)?
6. Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers regarding
evaluation measures upon which performance pay is based in their public schools
in terms of selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching experience,
professional ranking, and teacher type) and schools (e.g., grade level and school
rank)?
In the following sections I present how I prepared and analyzed the data, and what
teachers shared with me about each of these questions, organized by categories and
themes that recurred across participant responses.
Data Preparation
This section includes the typical process for data preparation, which includes:
present the response rate, identify the valid response, and deal with missing values and
reversed items.
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Response rate. Data for the study were collected during May and June of 2016.
An officer working at the Bureau of Education in Panda School District of Kunming,
China, was hired to distribute 560 (280 for elementary schools and 280 for secondary
schools) paper surveys to 16 randomly selected schools (8 elementary schools and 8
secondary schools) in Panda School District. A designated teacher at each school was
responsible for distributing 35 surveys to teachers at each school and collecting all the
surveys upon completion. The officer collected the surveys and transferred them to me.
The participation rate and valid data rate by school level are presented in Table 7. In total,
364 questionnaires were collected (177 from elementary schools and 187 from secondary
schools). The total participation rate was 65%. The participating rate of elementary
teachers was 63.21%, while that of secondary teachers was 66.79%. Table 8 documents
the participation rate for each school. Real school names have been replaced by
pseudonyms for confidentiality purpose. The participation rates of one elementary school
and two secondary schools were below 50%, while the remaining schools’ participation
rates were above 50%. Neither the officer nor the designated teacher reported specific
reasons to explain the varied participation rates.
Table 7
Survey Response Rate and Valid Data Rate by School Level
Participants Level

Surveys
Distributed

Surveys
Completed

Response
Rate

Valid
Surveys

Elementaryschool teachers
(Grades 1-6)
Secondary-school
teachers
(Grades 7-12)

280

177

63.21%

162

Valid
Surveys
Rate
57.86%

280

187

66.79%

171

61.07%
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Determination of valid response. The strategy of reverse scoring was used for
12 items (Items 6, 13, 19, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 38, 39, 44) in the questionnaire. The
participants’ survey responses were screened before entering the next level of analysis.
When vetting the responses, I regarded those with the same scores on the 5-point Likert
scale consecutively for all items as invalid, because this suggested that the teacher
respondents mistakenly responded to reversed items (Weijters & Baumgartner, 2012). As
a result, 31 invalid questionnaires (15 for the Elementary subgroup and 16 for the
Secondary subgroup) were discarded from the total sample. The final sample used for
data analysis encompassed 333 valid questionnaires (162 from elementary schools and
171 from secondary schools). As shown in Table 7, The valid sample of elementary
school teachers accounted for 57.86% while the secondary school teachers accounted for
61.07%. The total response rate of valid surveys is 59.46%.
Missing values and reverse coding. A total of 23 missing values were identified
for 64 items in the survey. Among them, seven surveys had two items missing and nine
surveys had one item missing. In SPSS, series means were employed to replace missing
values. Missing values were also found for teachers’ demographic information: four
participants failed to report their teaching years of experience; five teachers failed to
report their teacher types; eight teachers failed to report the professional ranking; and 14
teachers failed to report their extra administrative duties (see Table 9). During analysis,
the SPSS default mechanism—listwise missing value deletion—was incorporated, which
indicated that the case with missing value was excluded from the analysis. Additionally,
12 items (Item 6, 13, 19, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 38, 39, 44) were reverse coded to align
with the valence of the other items.
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Table 8
Survey Response Rate by School
School Level

School Name

Elementary
(Grades 1-6)

A
Elementary School
B
Elementary School

Secondary
(Grades 7-12)

C
Elementary School
D
Elementary School
E
Elementary School
F
Elementary School
G
Elementary School
H
Elementary School
I
Secondary School
J
Secondary School
K
Secondary School
L
Secondary School
M
Secondary School
N
Secondary School
O
Secondary School
P
Secondary School

Surveys
Distributed
35

Surveys
Completed
16

Response Rate

35

19

54.29%

35

20

57.14%

35

32

91.43%

35

21

60.00%

35

19

54.29%

35

20

57.14%

35

30

85.71%

35

27

77.14%

35

17

48.57%

35

21

60.00%

35

20

57.14%

35

14

40.00%

35

29

82.86%

35

26

74.28%

35

33

94.28%

45.71%

Descriptive Information for the Quantitative Data
The Teacher Perception Survey: Teacher Performance Pay and Performance
Evaluation includes eight demographic items in Part I. The items requested information
regarding gender, age, teaching years, educational degree, teacher type (according to
which level of expert teachers they are), teachers’ professional ranking, and teachers’
extra administrative duties (besides teaching). All participating teachers were from urban
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schools. Table 9 presents participants’ demographic information by frequency and
percentage.
Table 9
Demographic Information of Surveyed Teachers in Panda School District of Kunming
City, Yunnan Province, China
Item
Gender

Total number of
participants/Missing
Data
333/0

Age

333/0

Teaching years

329/4

Educational
degree

333/0

Teacher type

328/5

School rank

333/0

Teachers’
professional
ranking

325/8

Teachers’ extra
administrative
duty

319/14

Category

Frequency
(Percentage)

Male
Female
21-30
31-40
41-50
>51
<5
5-9
10-14
15-19
>20
Doctor
Master
Bachelor
Below bachelor
Municipal expert
District expert
School expert
Non-expert
National key
Provincial key
Municipal key
Ordinary
Highest
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Principal
Vice Principal
Chief of Teaching
Grade Leader
Banzhuren
None

93 (27.9%)
240 (72.1%)
56 (16.8%)
124 (37.2%)
118 (35.4%)
35 (10.5%)
32 (9.6%)
59 (17.7%)
72 (21.6%)
57 (17.1%)
109 (32.7%)
2 (0.6%)
63 (18.9)
236 (70.9%)
32 (9.6%)
27 (8.1%)
95 (28.5%)
57 (17.1%)
149 (44.7)
0 (0.0%)
128 (38.4%)
29 (8.7%)
176 (52.9%)
97 (29.1%)
131 (39.3%)
79 (23.7%)
18 (5.4%)
1(0.3%)
13(3.9%)
12 (3.6%)
66 (19.8%)
124 (37.5%)
103 (30.9%)
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Gender. Among 333 valid responses, 93 (27.9%) were male and 240 (72.1%)
were female. The number of female teachers was almost three times the number of male
teachers.
Age. Teachers in the age group of 21 to 30 accounted for 56 respondents (16.8%
of the total survey sample). One hundred and twenty-four teachers were in the age group
of 31-40, which represented 37.2%, the highest percentage of respondents. One hundred
and eighteen (35.4%) fell into the age group of 41-50, and 35 teachers (10.5%) were
above age 51.
Teaching years. Five categories of teaching years were provided for participants
in the survey. Thirty-two teachers (9.6%) had “less than 5 years” of teaching experience.
Fifty-nine teachers (17.7%) had “5 to 9 years” of teaching experience. Seventy-two
teachers (21.6%) had “10 to 14 years” of teaching experience. Fifty-seven teachers
(17.1%) had “more than 15 but less than 19 years” of teaching experience. Teachers with
“more than 20 years” of teaching experience represented the highest percentage of
respondents that 109 (32.7%) teachers were found in this category.
Educational level. Among 333 valid responses, two teachers (0.6%) had “doctor
degree,” and 63 (18.9%) had “master degree.” A majority of the surveyed teachers (i.e.,
236, 70.9%, of the total sample) had “bachelor degree.” There were 32 teachers (9.6%)
who had an educational degree lower than “Bachelor.”
Teacher type. Teacher type refers to honor titles given teachers to acknowledge
their distinctive effectiveness and contribution in education. Teachers with “expert” titles
at different levels (e.g., national, provincial, municipal, and school) were regarded as the
role model for the particular level. Expert teachers are usually selected or recommended
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at different levels based on their age, years of teaching experience, professional rankings
and teaching effectiveness. Among 328 responded participants, 149 teachers (44.7%)
were ordinary teachers; 27 (8.1%) were titled as “municipal experts;” 95 (28.5%) were
considered as “district experts;” and 57 (17.1%) were “school experts.”
School rank. School rank is accredited by local educational agencies contingent
on various indicators, such as teacher quality, students’ academic performance in
enrollment exams, and quality of moral education2. In the survey, school rank was
categorized as “national key,” “provincial key,” “municipal key,” and “ordinary school.”
Among 333 responses, none of the teachers were from a “national key” school. One
hundred and twenty-eight (38.4%) teachers were from provincial-key schools; 29 (8.7%)
teachers were from municipal-key schools; and 176 teachers were from ordinary schools.
Teachers’ professional ranking. Teachers’ professional ranking includes four
levels: highest, level 1, level 2, and level 3, ranking downward. Chinese teacher’
professional ranking in K-12 schools is contingent on: teachers’ highest degree, years of
teaching experience, teaching performance, professional knowledge, and mentoring and
research experience. Based on the highest degree, the lower-ranked teacher should have
one to five years of teaching experience to be qualified to apply for the higher ranking.
The numbers and the associated percentages of surveyed teachers at each level were: 97
(29.1%), 131 (39.3%), 79 (23.7%) and 18 (5.4%), respectively.

2

Moral education is an important part of school education in China, although it is hard to
be assessed with quantifiable indicators. Each administrative level (e.g., provincial,
municipal and school district) has the specific standards for assessment of moral
education at local schools. The assessment of moral education usually focuses on: school
security, school culture, community service, citizen-related activities, and activities
related to being the successor of the Communist Party, and etc.
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Teachers’ extra administrative duties. Besides teaching, teachers might have
extra administrative duties. In the survey, teachers’ extra administrative duties or titles
included: principal, vice principal, chief of teaching, grade leader, banzhuren, and none.
Among the total 319 valid responses, one (0.3%) participant also worked as a principal;
13 (3.9%) were vice principal; 12 (3.6%) were chief of teaching; 66 (19.8%) were grade
leaders; 124 (37.5%) were banzhurens; and 103 (30.9%) surveyed teachers had no extra
administrative duties.
Descriptive Information of the Qualitative Data
Qualitative data were composed of three main parts. The first was written answers
to interview questions on the questionnaire provided by the surveyed teachers. The
second was the individual semi-structured interviews with 14 randomly selected teachers.
The third part was the artifacts pertaining to the evidence of teacher performance pay or
teacher performance evaluation shared by interviewed teachers.
Responses to interview questions of the survey. A total of 210 surveyed
teachers provided short answers to at least one open-ended question on the questionnaire.
As shown in Figure 3, 179 teachers answered Question 1. Among them, 119 were
elementary teachers while 60 were secondary teachers. Two hundred and five teachers
offered answers to Question 2, and elementary teachers accounted for 122 while
secondary teachers accounted for 83. For Question 3, the total number of answers were
137, and 93 were from elementary teachers while 44 were from secondary teachers. One
hundred and forty-three surveyed teachers responded to Question 4. Among them, 97
were elementary teachers and 46 were secondary teachers. Ninety-three elementary
teachers and 33 secondary teachers, a total of 126, answered Question 5.
85

250

205

200

179
150

122

100
50
60

143

137

119
93

97

44

46

33

Q3

Q4

Q5

83

0
Q1

Q2

126

Secondary Teachers

93

Elementary Teachers

Figure 3. Number of responses to interview questions on the survey questionnaire
provided by teachers in Panda School District of Kunming City, Yunnan Province,
China.
Demographic information of interviewed teachers. The interview participants
included 14 teachers from compulsory education schools in Panda School District of
Kunming City, with 6 elementary-school teachers and 8 secondary-school teachers.
Among them, 5 were female and 9 were male. Two teachers had less than 5 years of
teaching experience, 3 teachers taught in school for 5-10 years, and nine teachers had
over 10 years of teaching experience. Among 14 interviewees, eight teachers taught core
subjects (Chinese, Math, and English), four teachers taught social studies, and two
teachers taught science subjects. Half of the interviewed teachers had administrative
duties. Among them, two were school principals or vice principals, two were grade
leaders, two were team leaders of teaching and research, and one was the supervisor of
school moral education. Among the total 14 interviewees, five of them were banzhurens.
The specific data are shown in Table 10.
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Table 10
Demographic Information of 14 Interviewed Teachers in Panda School District of
Kunming City, Yunnan Province, China
Item

Category

Gender

Male
Female

Teaching
years

<5
5-10
>10
Core subjects (Chinese, Math, and
English)
Social Studies
Science
Elementary school
Secondary school

Subject

Grade level

Frequency
(Percentage)
N=14
5 (36%)
9 (64%)

Administrative Principal/Vice Principal
duties
Grade Leader
Team leader of Teaching and Research
Other
Other duties
Banzhuren
Other

2 (14%)
3 (21%)
9 (64%)
8 (57%)
4 (29%)
2 (14%)
6 (43%)
8 (57%)
2 (14%)
2 (14%)
2 (14%)
1 (7%)
5 (36%)
0 (0%)

Artifacts. Among four interviewed teachers who provided related artifacts, two
interviewed teachers shared school performance evaluation plans and the other two
teachers shared their salary schemes during interviews. While, the remaining 10
interviewed teachers did not provide documents regarding school-level performance pay
or performance evaluation due to varied reasons, such as school confidentiality, difficulty
accessing an online copy, or no copy available to teachers. The available artifacts were
analyzed by holistic coding and the results are embedded within findings of the research
questions below.
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Findings for Research Question 1:
To what extent do participating teachers support the implementation of
performance pay at their public schools?
As shown in Figure 4, for the question regarding the general level of teachers’
support for performance pay, among 333 valid responses, 136 (40.8%) teachers selected
supportive, 18 (5.4%) teachers selected very supportive, which indicated that
approximately 46% of total surveyed teachers supported performance pay. One hundred
and twenty-eight (38.4%) teachers selected neutral. The numbers (percentages) of
surveyed teachers selected very unsupportive and unsupportive were 13 (3.9%) and 38
(11.4%), respectively.
45%

38.40%

40%

40.80%

35%
30%
25%
20%
11.40%

15%
10%
5%
0%

5.40%

3.90%

very
unsupportive

unsupportive

neutral

supportive

very supportive

Figure 4. Teachers’ general attitude toward performance pay in Panda school district of
Kunming city, Yunnan province, China
Figure 5 presents teachers’ general attitude toward performance pay by school
level. Approximately 12.3% elementary-school participants selected very unsupportive
(4.9%) or unsupportive (7.4%), while the percentages of secondary-school participants on
these two selections were 18.1% (2.9% and 15.2%, respectively). For elementary-school
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teachers, 52.5% of participants selected supportive (45.7%) or very supportive (6.8%).
For secondary-school teachers, 40.4% of participants selected supportive (36.3%) or very
supportive (4.1%). The percentages of participants whose attitudes were neutral at
elementary schools and secondary schools were 35.2% and 41.5%, respectively.
90%
80%
70%
60%

41.50%

50%

36.30%

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

2.90%
4.90%
very
unsupportive

15.20%

35.20%

45.70%
4.10%
6.80%

7.40%
unsupportive

neutral

Elementary Schools

supportive

very supportive

Secondary Schools

Figure 5. Teachers’ general attitude toward performance pay by school level in Panda
school district of Kunming City, Yunnan Province, China
Findings for Research Question 2:
From the perspectives of participating teachers, what are the specific merits and
problems of performance pay?
To answer this research question, the qualitative data from responses to openended questions on the questionnaire and individual semi-structured interviews were
analyzed using content analysis. The findings suggest that the surveyed and interviewed
teachers have observed more problems than merits with performance pay.
Merits of the teacher performance pay. For merits of teacher performance pay,
some teachers’ responses indicated that they believed teacher performance pay could be
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beneficial because it “sounds” like an effective policy to motivate teachers and its
intention is to support teachers. Regarding the goal, the function, and the intended
outcomes, some teachers acknowledged the merits of performance pay as follows. Also,
Table 11 shows the number of respondents who identified the themes regarding merits of
performance pay in the open-ended survey questions and in interviews, respectively.
Table 11
Frequencies of Respondents Identifying Themes Regarding Merits of Performance Pay in
Surveys and Interviews
Themes
Theme 1: Motivate teachers and reward good
performance.
Theme 2: Reflect teachers’ working load.
Theme 3: Introduce competition among teachers
in public schools.

Survey
8

Interviews
2

3
4

1
1

1) Teacher performance pay’s original goal of motivating teachers and
rewarding good performance is theoretically appealing. Two teachers’ comments
exemplified this point:
“The goal and concept of performance pay is proper because that the front-line
teachers shall be motivated to make more effort in teaching, especially for young
teachers. Also, they are more willing to take on extra responsibility because of the
incentive payment.”
“I think it can motivate teachers to continuously improve their professional
performance.”
2) Teacher performance pay accurately reflects teachers’ working load to some
degree. One teacher’s comment was:
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“I felt like our salary scheme is more open than before after implementing
performance pay because it shows our teaching load, such as the subject we’re
teaching and the number of classes we have to teach per week to reach full
capacity.”
3) Teacher performance pay introduced competition among teachers in public
schools. Two teachers’ comments on this point were:
“Teacher performance pay might bring in the competition mechanism, which is a
good thing for the development of public schools.”
“Performance pay creates competition, which breaks the egalitarianism in public
schools.”
Problems with teacher performance pay. The analysis of the qualitative data
generated 14 themes pertaining the problems of teacher performance pay perceived by
the surveyed and the interviewed teachers. These main problems were further classified
into four major categories. The categories and key themes are listed in Table 12.
Limited and unbalanced funding. The first category “Limited and Unbalanced
Funding” represented the problems of performance pay in the funding source at the level
of the local educational agency. Two themes were under this category:
First, the local educational agency had a limited budget to support teachers’
performance pay. Two teachers commented that:
“Even though school has the right to design the implementation plan, the whole
cake is too small. It’s hard to design a plan that can satisfy everyone.”
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“The funding for performance pay from the school district is limited, but school
administrators still saved part of it for some other irrelevant rewards.
Consequently, the performance pay per teacher is really low.”
Compared to other school districts in Kunming city, the funding for teacher
performance pay in Panda School District was relatively low. Another teacher stated:
“Panda School District has the best students’ academic performance and best
educational resources, but teacher performance pay here is the lowest among the
four main districts of the city.”
Second, the local educational agency distributed unbalanced performance bonus
irrespective of school contexts. Teachers at low-ranked schools where students’ source
were not as good as the high-ranked schools expressed their concerns regarding the
unbalanced input in teacher performance pay at the district level. Two teachers shared
that:
“It is unfair that teachers at the advantageous schools have a higher end-of-year
bonus than us, just because their students’ have better academic achievement.
The government never thinks about the disadvantaged schools’ situation. Our
teachers made even more effort than teachers in those schools because our source
of students was not as good as those schools.”
“Even though the average amount of teacher performance pay at our district is
uniform, those advantageous schools could always obtain extra funding for
rewarding their teachers. However, schools like us don’t have that extra funding.
So, teachers had opinions towards the performance pay.”
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Table 12
Major Categories and Themes Regarding Problems of Teacher Performance Pay
Perceived by Participating Teachers
Categories
Limited and
Unbalanced Funding

1)
2)

Problematic
Implementation
Process

1)
2)
3)
4)

Unfairness

1)
2)
3)
4)

Demotivating

1)
2)
3)
4)

Themes
Local educational agency had limited budget to
support teachers’ performance pay.
Local educational agency distributed performance
bonus irrespective to school contexts.
Teachers were not well informed of the
implementation plan.
The implementation plan of performance pay was
not transparent to teachers.
The indicators of teacher performance pay were
oversimplified, failing to reflect the complexity of
teachers’ work.
Teacher performance pay failed to differentiate
teachers based on their effectiveness and
responsibilities.
The school-level implementation plan of
performance pay lacked the voice from the frontline teachers.
The school-level performance pay favored those in
administrative positions.
Teachers’ original payment was used as an
incentive in performance pay.
The fundamentally uniform standards of the
performance pay plan were lacking within the
school district.
The amount of performance pay was too small to
motivate teachers.
Teacher performance pay caused conflicts among
colleagues.
Teacher performance pay increased “teaching to the
test” practice.
For maintaining collective benefits and harmony,
teacher performance pay failed to reward good
performance.
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Problematic implementation process. The category of “Problematic
Implementation Process” included the problems that arose during the implementation of
performance pay at the school level. Four themes emerged under this category:
The first problem identified was that teachers were not well informed of the
implementation plan. It was worth noting that seven out of 14 interviewees with
administrative duties stated that they understood the teacher performance policy included
indicators and distribution plans, while the other seven teachers (those without
administrative duties) reported they only had a rough understanding regarding teacher
performance pay policy and its indicators. Some teachers commented that they “just
know the general idea, not the specific details.” However, not all seven teachers with
administrative duties were confident about their understanding of the policy when they
were asked to introduce their school plan of teacher performance pay. Some of them
continuously corrected their responses regarding the indicators and design of teacher
performance pay during interviews, which suggests their vague knowledge about the
school plan of performance pay.
Additionally, only four of the total 14 interviewed teachers shared artifacts of
teacher performance pay (evidence of performance evaluation and performance pay at
schools) during or after interviews. The explanations provided by the teachers who did
not share artifacts suggests that teachers had limited access to the evaluation or
performance pay plans and they were not familiar with them. Two teachers who provided
their own salary schemes expressed uncertainty when they introduced the details of their
salary schemes. One of them found it was hard to differentiate categories within
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performance pay by the confusing titles, such as “basic performance pay,” “rewarding
performance pay,” and “subsidy of reform.”
The second theme under this category was that the implementation plan of
performance pay was not transparent to teachers. Some teachers thought manipulations
were involved in the implementation process, which were unfair to them. The theme was
supported by comments from three teachers:
“Even for me, a math teacher, I couldn’t understand the plan of performance pay.
The HR representative just read the whole plan, involving figures and formula, in
the meeting. I felt the administrators don’t want teachers to fully understand the
plan in case you might have opinions. They tried to confuse teachers.”
“The administrators explained the plan of performance pay in school meetings,
but the reality is different from what they said. And teachers were always
confused about their performance pay.”
“We used to have a piece of paper indicating the salary structure, so that we
know how much we got for each category. But now, everything is electronic, and
our monthly salary is only a number in the bank account. We don’t know what
was included. Even though you may check with the HR person, no one would
bother to do that as long as you didn't find [the amount of] your salary was too
weird this month.”
The third theme is that the indicators of teacher performance pay were simplified,
failing to reflect the complexity of teachers’ work. Although the national policy
advocated that it was forbidden to use students’ test score as the only indicator to
evaluate teachers’ performance, some interviewed teachers still perceived that indicators
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of teacher performance pay were oversimplified and, in most circumstances, students’
enrollment achievement was used as the only indicator for distributing teachers’
performance pay. Besides students’ enrollment achievements, attendance and teaching
loads were the other two most frequently used indicators in teacher performance pay
because of the quantifiable characteristics. A teacher stated, “Teaching is a complicated
process and the quantifiable indicators, such as teaching load and students achievement
restricted the range of teaching effects.”
Some interviewed teachers reported that, from the perspective of administrators,
teacher performance pay has done a good job reflecting teachers’ performance in both
quantity and quality. However, from the interviewed teachers’ perspective, indicators of
“quantity” and “quality” were unreasonable. For instance, the quantity of teacher
performance was simply calculated by whether teachers had absences or sick leave and
the total teaching loads per week, while students’ test scores demonstrated the quality of
teacher performance. None of interviewed teachers reported that they ever had classroom
observation or professional knowledge tests for performance evaluations. Only one
elementary teacher mentioned that novice teachers were required to be observed by
experienced teachers for improving instructional skills, which was unrelated to the
performance pay.
The fourth theme—“Teacher performance pay failed to differentiate teachers
based on their effectiveness and responsibilities” —suggested a problem associated with
the function of the performance pay. Multiple causes, encompassing previous themes,
resulted in this problem. Especially, the third theme—the oversimplified indicators failed
to reflect the sophistication of teachers’ work—was the direct cause. Admittedly, the
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initial cause of this problem was the limited funding for the teacher performance pay,
which made it difficult to craft a versatile plan showing distinguished differences among
teachers. The other reason reported by interviewed teachers was the “egalitarian”
philosophy school administrators held. In some schools, administrators were afraid of
conflicts that might be triggered by the prominently diverged performance pay; therefore,
they purposefully minimized the disparities of performance pay among teachers. This
egalitarianism demotivated the effective teachers or hard-working teachers who deserved
more performance pay than the ineffective teachers or regular teachers.
The categories of “Unfairness,” and “Demotivating” captured the problems
pertaining the impacts of implementing performance pay as perceived by participating
teachers.
Unfairness. The participating teachers perceptions of “unfairness” can be grouped
into the following four themes.
1) The school-level implementation plan of performance pay lacked the voice
from the front-line teachers. According to teachers’ responses, the absence of the frontline teachers’ participation in the decision-making of the school-level teacher
performance pay plan was a result of both the centralized school administrative system
and teachers’ passive position in school decision-making process. Several teachers
commented:
“School had meetings and administrators said teachers’ suggestions were
welcomed, but none of teachers’ suggestions have ever been taken.”
“Performance pay is a school-level thing, all decisions were made by
administrators.”
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“Teachers are afraid of expressing opinions because we don’t have democracy in
China.”
“Teachers have no power to control it, so just let it be, especially for young
teachers.”
“Public school is an organization where you could stay without great
contribution, as long as you don’t challenge school administrators”.
2) The school-level performance pay favored administrative positions. Some
interviewed teachers felt this was unfair because they perceived their work was more
challenging than the administrators’. Additionally, some teachers had the opinion that
teacher performance pay should focus on teachers’ teaching, but not the administrative
work because it was called “teacher performance pay.” Even though some administrators
had multiple duties, including teaching, their effort in teaching was not as much as the
full-time teachers’. Other interviewed teachers perceived that some administrators had
multiple positions, but not every position required full effort. These teachers shared the
opinion that a person’s time and energy is limited. They doubted that administrators who
had multiple duties could accomplish well all the associated work. In some
circumstances, administrators only used the titles of their duties to claim the performance
pay without doing any substantial work. Therefore, teachers felt it was unfair when the
performance pay put high values on administrative titles but failed to give enough credits
for front-line teachers’ invisible work, especially banzhurens’.
3) Teachers’ original salary was treated as an incentive in the performance pay
structure. Two teachers shared their concerns:

98

“It is unfair to use what originally belonged to us as incentives. If you don’t teach
core subjects and you’re not a banzhuren with different administrative titles, you
cannot obtain the full-amount of the incentive even though you do the same work
as before.”
“It’s unreasonable to use our money to reward us. If it is called performance pay,
there should be extra funding to reward good performance. Otherwise, how could
teachers be motivated by taking their money from one pocket and putting only
part of it into the other one?”
4) The performance pay plan was lacking fundamentally uniform standards within
the school district. Several interviewed teachers admitted that they and their colleagues
frequently discussed the salary issue with teachers from other schools in Panda School
District. Through comparison, teachers felt it was unfair when they found that teachers
with similar backgrounds and working loads at different schools obtained different
performance pay due to the different evaluation standards and performance plans used by
individual schools. One teacher commented:
“Within one school district, there should be some uniformed standards. It is
unfair that our performance pay is based on professional ranking while that of
other schools is based on teaching load.”
Demotivating. Both the surveyed and interviewed teachers perceived the
implementation of performance pay demotivated them, which was contrary to its original
goal. Three main themes emerged under the “Demotivate Teachers” category.
1) The amount of performance pay was too small to motivate teachers. Some
interviewed teachers perceived that the performance pay in their salary scheme was too
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low, so that they “lost passion and interest in working.” They thought the low amount of
performance pay was not worth their extra effort, because “the extra effort doesn’t make
a difference in the salary,” especially for experienced teachers with high professional
ranking whose basic salary was a major part of their salary scheme. However, young
teachers who tried to earn more in performance pay by making extra effort and taking
more responsibilities to make up their disadvantages in the basic salary were demotivated
because the amount of performance pay was too low no matter how hard they tried.
Furthermore, young teachers were more likely to turnover or even quit the teaching
profession because, as one teacher shared, “Due to the low amount of performance pay
and the unfair implementation plan, teachers lost passion and interest in working.”
Additionally, teachers felt demotivated when comparing their salary with that of
other professionals. Local governmental officials’ salaries were frequently used for
comparison with teachers’ due to the similar organizational characteristics of public
sectors and the advocacy of national policy that teachers’ salary should not be lower than
local governmental officials’. Many teachers felt demotivated that their salary and endof-year bonus were lower than the governmental officials’. One teacher shared:
“Teachers’ work is much more energy-consuming than governmental officials,
but teachers’ performance pay is lower than theirs, even though the national
policy has advocated to treat teachers equally as governmental officials.”
Some teachers perceived that the low performance pay associated with the
universal low teacher salary failed to satisfy their middle-class living requirements. They
thought teacher deserved a “decent” and “respectful” life, equal to their effort and social
class. However, the low salary—including the low performance pay—failed to recognize
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teachers’ hard work and contribution. Among the issues of the performance pay
implementation, how much the salary could be increased was what concerned teachers
the most. Some interviewed teachers admitted that they secretly found other sources
outside school to earn money, such as being private tutors or teaching at after-class
tutorial schools, accepting the risking of being fired if schools found out.
Even though teachers felt demotivated by the low amount of performance pay,
they thought the implementation of performance pay had no impact on their teaching and
working because they had high professional ethics. Even if they felt disappointed, they
still endeavored to teach students as usual. However, some teachers also admitted they
had doubts about the persistence of their work ethic. Two teachers shared:
“How long can my passion and spirit of altruism sustain? In many situations,
when you feel tired, you can’t help thinking whether my endeavor was worthy.
Teachers always think about it.”
“In many situations, teachers, especially banzhurens, contribute a lot based on
their unselfish spirit and the sense of responsibility without complaint and without
recognitions from the school, but they still do their work all the time. But, it is
unfair and unreasonable to compensate teachers’ sense of responsibility with
such low payment.”
2) The performance pay caused conflicts among colleagues. Some teachers found
that the unfair and nontransparent performance pay caused conflicts among colleagues,
even though the conflicts were not shown in public. Also, some teachers felt pressure
from the competition and conflicts caused by the performance pay, which negatively
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influenced their job satisfaction and mental health. They felt “both physically and
mentally tired.”
3) The performance pay pressured teachers to teach to the test. Several
interviewed teachers reported that the test-score-driven teacher performance pay
unintentionally “forced” teachers to teach to test. Several interviewed teachers had the
philosophy that education should foster students’ well-rounded development, but in the
meantime teachers were urged to put emphasis on students’ test scores in order to gain
higher performance pay.
4) For maintaining collective benefits and harmonic school culture, the teacher
performance pay failed to reward good performance. Two teachers’ comments
exemplified this theme:
“In our school, teacher performance pay did not make a difference. I don’t want
to say it’s useless, but it is in that way. For maintaining harmony, it’s hard to
reform thoroughly. Our school leaders were afraid of conflicts, so they just made
everyone equal, which was meaningless to teachers. For those hardworking
teachers, that’s unfair and demotivating.”
“For the good of the whole, the benefits of a small number of teachers, especially
expert teachers and banzhurens, were sacrificed. Usually, principals talked with
these teachers privately and persuaded them to accept the reality and teachers
had no options other than agreeing.”
In the process, the goal of performance pay was shifted from motivating the
individual teacher to equalizing teachers’ payment, which teachers felt demotivated.
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Findings for Research Question 3:
What are Chinese teachers’ perceptions, in Yunnan Province, toward performance
evaluation measures?
Both quantitative and qualitative results provided answers to this research
question. Quantitative results showed teacher preferences on 15 generic performance
evaluation measures. Qualitative results indicated the most important dimension(s) of
performance evaluation perceived by participating teachers according to their school
performance evaluation plan and the reasons associated with their preferences.
Additionally, three themes of participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance
evaluation were generated.
Quantitative results. The sample size, means and standard deviations for each of
the 15 items pertaining to teachers’ preferences toward performance evaluation measures
are shown in Table 13, with means ranked in descending order. Participating teachers
selected “serving as banzhuren, or on other duties,” “students’ test scores,” and
“performance evaluations by principals” as the top three measures in teacher performance
evaluation. “banhuren” is similar to the advisor and the counselor in schools in the U.S.
Teachers who are banzhurens usually working longer hours and taking more
responsibilities, including monitoring and advising students, and contacting with parents,
than teachers who are not banzhurens. The bottom three measures selected by
participating teachers were “performance evaluations by peers,” “awards certifications”,
and “independent evaluation of teaching portfolios.”
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test the statistical
difference among the 15 ranked items. Given the significant result of the Mauchly’s test,
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c2(104) =1471.533, p= .000, which indicated the violation of the assumption of
sphericity, and the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (e=.562), which is smaller
than .75, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to interpret the result of withinsubject effects (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). A statistically significant repeated measures
ANOVA was obtained, Greenhouse-Geisser correction = 176.919, F(7.865, 2611.019) =
25.014, p=.000, eta square is .07 (see Table 14). It shows that the 15 items are statistically
different from each other.
Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Item of Teachers’ Preferences Toward
Performance Evaluation Measures
Item
Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties
Students’ test scores
Performance evaluations by principals
Time spent in professional development
Collaboration with peers and staff
Efforts to involve parents in students’ education
Teaching in specific subject
Mentoring other teachers
Working with students outside of class time
Student evaluations of teaching performance
Parent satisfaction with teacher
Highest academic qualification degree
Performance evaluations by peers
Awards certifications
Independent evaluation of teaching portfolios
Note. Survey items were scored on a 1-5 range.
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M
4.03
3.88
3.80
3.79
3.62
3.62
3.59
3.57
3.57
3.57
3.56
3.50
3.37
3.37
3.34

SD
0.82
0.91
0.89
0.82
0.79
0.84
1.02
0.80
0.90
0.72
0.73
1.03
0.84
0.86
0.81

Table 14
Test of Within-Subject Effects of 15 Items of Teachers’ Preferences Toward Performance
Evaluation Measures
Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

factor1

Sphericity
Assumed
GreenhouseGeisser
Huynh-Feldt
Lower-bound
Error
Sphericity
(factor1) Assumed
GreenhouseGeisser
Huynh-Feldt
Lower-bound

Mean
Square

df

F

Sig.

Partial
Eta
Squared

176.919

14

12.637 25.014

.000

.070

176.919

7.865

22.496 25.014

.000

.070

176.919
176.919

8.073
1.000

21.914 25.014
176.919 25.014

.000
.000

.070
.070

2348.181

4648

.505

2348.181 2611.019

.899

2348.181 2680.377
2348.181 332.000

.876
7.073

As shown in Table 15, the pairwise comparisons among the first and the last three
items suggested that the first three items chosen by participating teachers were
statistically different from the bottom three ones, respectively. Similarly, the bottom three
items chosen by participating teachers were statistically different from the top three ones,
respectively.
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Table 15
Pairwise Comparisons of the Top Three and the Bottom Three Items Regarding
Teachers’ Preferences Toward Performance Evaluation Measures
Mean
Differ
ence
(I-J)
.150
.233
.661*
.664*

Std.
(J) factor1
Error
Students’ test scores
.047
Performance evaluations by principals
.071
Performance evaluations by peers
.059
Awards certifications
.053
Independent evaluation of teaching
.697* .057
portfolios
Students’
Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties
-.150 .047
test scores
Performance evaluations by principals
.083
.068
Performance evaluations by peers
.511* .061
Awards certifications
.514* .061
Independent evaluation of teaching
.547* .059
portfolios
Performance Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties
-.233 .071
evaluations
Students’ test scores
-.083 .068
by principals Performance evaluations by peers
.428* .057
Awards certifications
.431* .068
Independent evaluation of teaching
.464* .060
portfolios
Performance Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties
-.661* .059
evaluations
Students’ test scores
-.511* .061
by peers
Performance evaluations by principals
-.428* .057
Awards certifications
.003
.050
Independent evaluation of teaching
.036
.036
portfolios
*
Awards
Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties
-.664
.053
certifications Students’ test scores
-.514* .061
Performance evaluations by principals
-.431* .068
Performance evaluations by peers
-.003 .050
Independent evaluation of teaching
.033
.045
portfolios
*
Independent Serving as banzhuren, or on other duties
-.697
.057
evaluation of Students’ test scores
-.547* .059
teaching
Performance evaluations by principals
-.464* .060
portfolios
Awards certifications
-.036 .036
Independent evaluation of teaching
-.033 .045
portfolios
Note. * p =.000. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
(I) factor1
Serving as
banzhuren,
or on other
duties
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Sig.a
.021
.018
.000
.000

95% Confidence
Interval for
Differencea
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
.012
.288
.022
.444
.485
.836
.506
.822

.000

.528

.865

.021
1.000
.000
.000

-.288
-.118
.332
.332

-.012
.284
.690
.695

.000

.373

.720

.018
1.000
.000
.000

-.444
-.284
.258
.230

-.022
.118
.598
.632

.000

.288

.640

.000
.000
.000
1.000

-.836
-.690
-.598
-.143

-.485
-.332
-.258
.149

1.000

-.071

.143

.000
.000
.000
1.000

-.822
-.695
-.632
-.149

-.506
-.332
-.230
.143

1.000

-.101

.167

.000
.000
.000
1.000

-.865
-.720
-.640
-.143

-.528
-.373
-.288
.071

1.000

-.167

.101

Qualitative results. Survey participants provided short answers to the question
regarding the most important aspects/indicators of performance evaluation (e.g., teachers’
ethics, professional ranking, education degree, teaching experience, working load,
teaching process, and student’s achievement) and the associated reasons. The findings
revealed that surveyed teachers mentioned most frequently “ethics,” “working load,” and
“teaching practice.” Teachers who chose “ethics” regarded ethics to be the fundamental
quality of being a teacher. They believed that a teacher’s ethics had a great impact on
students because a teacher is a role model for students in daily teaching practice.
Additionally, some surveyed teachers thought teachers’ ethics were the basis for building
up a nation’s overall morality. It is closely related to both the personal and the national
interest. Surveyed teachers who chose “working load” and “teaching process” thought the
two indicators reflected teachers’ working performance in quantity and quality,
respectively. Two representative statements made by the teachers were:
“Teaching process represents the comprehensive working process.”
“Some of teachers’ work is invisible, but the working load could reflect how much
we’ve done in some degree.”
Some teachers also stated that all the indicators were important, but they admitted
that not all the indicators were quantifiable. Only the quantifiable indicators (e.g.,
professional ranking and administrative duties) were frequently used to evaluate teachers’
performance.
During interviews, all 14 teachers provided their understanding of the indicators
that were used to evaluate their performance and their opinions regarding performance
evaluation. Two teachers shared their school-level performance evaluation plan.
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Generally speaking, “ethics,” “competence,” “attendance,” and “effectiveness” were the
four major parts of performance evaluation emphasized by school administrators. The
specific evaluation indicators under each category and the corresponding percentage were
different across schools, but the universal indicators mentioned by interviewed teachers
are summarized in Table 16.
Table 16
Summaries of Teacher Performance Evaluation Categories and Indicators
Categories
Ethics
Competence

Attendance

Effectiveness
Extra credits

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Indicators
Obeying school rules and regulations
Fulfilling professional duties
Teaching practice
o Planning instruction
o Delivering instruction
o Classroom observation
o Assessment of student learning
Professional development (training)
Banzhuren work
Administrative duties
Daily attendance
Basic teaching load per week
Extra-curricular activities
Students’ academic achievements (ranking)
Publications
Awards in teaching or researching
Distinctive contribution

According to teachers’ responses, the full credits in “ethics” and “attendance”
were default values if a teacher had not broken any laws or rules and had no record of
absence or tardiness. In most circumstances, the full credits for “teaching practice” were
also a default value if teachers had no teaching accident (e.g., absence without notice, late
attendance and early dismiss) or lawsuit from students or parents, even though the
indicators of teaching practice (e.g., instruction planning, delivering, and assessment for
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students) were specified in the evaluation plans and were expected to be part of the
evaluation. Student achievement was frequently used as the indicator for teachers’
teaching quality or effectiveness in terms of the class rank among the cohort within and
across schools. Some teachers were concerned about using “publication” in performance
evaluation because they thought putting high values on publications would distract
teachers’ attention from teaching and publications cannot demonstrate actual classroom
performance.
Based on teachers’ responses, the following three themes emerged, which were
associated with teachers’ perceptions toward the implementation of performance
evaluation.
1) Teacher performance evaluation was more summative than formative,
mainly serving the purpose of accrediting teachers’ professional ranking. Some
interviewed teachers demonstrated this point by stating:
“Performance evaluation is just an expression used by administrators; there is no
substantial evaluation at school. We have evaluation for administrators’ work,
but no formal evaluation for teachers.”
“It is a common sense that teachers who need evaluation results to upgrade the
professional ranking are usually evaluated as ‘excellent.’ Teachers’ professional
ranking is important in teachers’ professional development. We usually take turns
to be ‘excellent’ because it is fairer to every teacher and each teacher’s condition
could be considered.”
2) Teacher performance evaluation lacked uniform and specific standards and
rubrics. Regarding this point, some interviewed teachers expressed their perceptions as:
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“Each school’s evaluation is different. In my school, I found the evaluation is
non-transparent. I don’t know what is linked with my performance results and the
performance incentive.”
“I think the specific standards are important for teachers, so that the results or
the incentives could differentiate teachers’ performance. If the evaluation
[doesn’t] differentiate teachers’ performance, I think it is useless. A complete
plan should be able to represent the subject’s characteristics; teachers’ working
load, both in class and after class; and students’ academic achievement. All the
details should be taken into consideration.”
3) The process of teacher performance evaluation was simplified to focus on
limited quantifiable indicators that are biased and problematic. Teachers’ attendance
record, administrative titles, student test score were the frequently used indicators, which
were quantifiable, but failed to fully represent teachers’ performance. Some illustrative
comments by the interviewed teachers are:
“Student achievement is a biased indicator in teacher evaluation. In some
circumstances, students’ testing scores fail to reflect teachers’ effort in a short
period. Additionally, we don’t have tests for students every month, but teachers’
salary should be distributed monthly. We can’t evaluate students monthly and use
the results to evaluate teachers. So, it is unfair to use students’ academic
achievement to evaluate teachers.”
“Now, our evaluation is mainly based on attendance and students’ test scores. It
seems like the evaluation includes both teaching quantity and quality, but
substantially, as we all know, it does not.”
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“Why are administrative duties…included in teacher performance evaluation?
Why didn’t schools…make an additional plan for administrative duties? It should
not be mixed up with teachers’ teaching performance. Teachers’ performance
evaluation should be just about teaching.”
Findings for Research Question 4:
What factors emerge from a perception survey of participating teachers regarding
performance pay and teacher evaluation?
Principal component analysis. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was
conducted with all 63 items of the questionnaire. The validity of PCA is contingent on
sample size. Regarding sample size, Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) have suggested that
factor analysis should have at least 300 cases in total. Stevens (1996) indicated that
including 5-20 participants per variable is an appropriate way to determine sample size.
Based on these guidelines, the sample size (N = 333) was large enough for conducting
factor analysis. Initially, the question regarding whether the PCA was appropriate for the
scale was examined by the following criteria. First, 61 of the 63 items correlated at least
.30 with at least one other item, indicating reasonable factorability. Second, the KaiserMeyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .91, which is above the
recommended value of .6. Additionally, the Bartlett’s test was statistically significant for
the data, c2 (1953) = 13226.65, p < .001. Therefore, given these overall conditions, PCA
was considered appropriate for the scale.
Factors. Thirteen factors/components were extracted by the initial PCA with
promax rotation, explaining 67.11% of the variance. I chose promax rotation because
correlation between items existed and correlation between factors was hypothesized. The
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results of the initial PCA indicated low to medium correlations among the extracted
factors, which further indicated that the promax rotation was reasonable. The Cronbach’s
alpha internal consistency reliability coefficient of the overall scale was .95. Three
methods were used to determine how many factors should be retained for further
interpretation.
First is the Kaiser’s eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule: factors with eigenvalues
greater than one were retained for interpretation (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007).
According to this rule, 13 factors should be retained in the analysis. However, this rule
was critiqued as problematic for retaining too many factors because “the number of
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 is highly influenced by the number of variables” (Reise,
Waller, & Comrey, 2000, p. 291). Due to the critique, other methods were used.
The second method is the Cattell’s scree plot test. As shown in Figure 6, the first
six factors should be retained because the line leveled off at the point of the sixth factor.
However, this rule involves subjective judgment, which is not completely accurate.
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Figure 6. Scree plot of initial principal component analysis
Third, the Horn’s parallel analysis was conducted using the syntax of O’Connor
(2000). By comparing the raw data eigenvalues with the mean and the 95th percentile
random data eigenvalues, the first seven factors should be retained for interpretation,
because the observed (raw data) eigenvalue for each factor was larger than the
corresponding 95th percentile random data eigenvalue (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007;
see Table 17). Figure 7 presents the scree plot for the results of the parallel analysis,
showing that seven factors were above the mean and should be retained. Because the
parallel analysis is regarded as the best available alternative, providing the most accurate
approach for solving the number-of-factors-to-retain problem for the PCA (Henson &
Roberts, 2006; Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007), the first seven factors were retained for
interpretation, which explained 55.18% of the variance. The proportion of total variance
explained by the seven-factor model was greater than the average proportion in factor
analysis, which was 52.03% (Henson & Roberts, 2006).
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Table 17
Raw Data Eigenvalues, Mean, and Percentile Random Data Eigenvalues for 10 Roots
Generated by Parallel Analysis
Root
Raw Data
Means
Percentile
1
16.60
1.98
2.06
2
5.55
1.89
1.96
3
3.78
1.83
1.88
4
2.67
1.77
1.82
5
2.34
1.72
1.77
6
2.02
1.67
1.72
7
1.81
1.63
1.67
8
1.57
1.59
1.63
9
1.41
1.56
1.59
10
1.28
1.52
1.55
Note. N= 333; 63 variables; 1000 datasets.

Figure 7. Scree plot of parallel analysis
Loadings. Due to the circumstances of zero loading and cross loadings of items
on factors, two rules were applied for the item screening. First, .40 was arbitrarily chosen
as a cut-off point for interpreting loadings. If an item had a loading of <.40 on any of the
factors, the item was eliminated. Second, in the circumstance of cross loading, “an item is
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retained if its primary loading is greater than .5-.6 and, also if its second highest factor
loading is smaller than .2-.3” (Matsunaga, 2010, p. 101). Given the rules, a total of 16
items (Q5, Q6, Q12, Q13, Q14, Q17, Q26, Q27, Q35, Q45, Q46, Q48, M4, M5, M12,
M15) were eliminated from the item pool.
Final PCA results. A final PCA of the remaining 47 items, using promax
rotations, was conducted with the seven factors explaining 58.40% of the variance (see
Table 18). The KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .90, and the Bartlett’s test was
statistically significant for the data, c2 (1081) = 8791.54, p < .001. The Cronbach’s alpha
internal consistency reliability coefficient of the updated scale (47 items) was .93. The
results suggested low to medium correlation among the extracted factors, as shown in
Table 19.
Table 18
Total Variance Explained by Seven Factors Extracted from PCA with Promax Rotation
Initial Eigenvalues

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings

Rotation
Sums of
Squared
Loading
s

Component

Total

Total

Total

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

12.41
4.14
3.29
2.39
2.14
1.58
1.49

% of

Cumulative

Variance

%

26.41
8.81
7.01
5.08
4.56
3.35
3.17

26.41
35.23
42.23
47.31
51.87
55.22
58.40

12.41
4.14
3.29
2.39
2.14
1.58
1.49
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% of

Cumulative

Variance

%

26.41
8.81
7.01
5.08
4.56
3.35
3.17

26.41
35.23
42.23
47.31
51.87
55.22
58.40

10.52
8.50
4.67
7.27
6.65
3.48
4.65

Table 19
Component Correlation Matrix Extracted by PCA with Promax Rotation
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

1
1.000
.546
.213
.478
.555
.255
.347

2
.546
1.000
.130
.522
.373
.133
.382

3
.213
.130
1.000
.154
.074
.179
.213

4
.478
.522
.154
1.000
.448
.111
.319

5
.555
.373
.074
.448
1.000
.173
.159

6
7
.255 .347
.133 .382
.179 .213
.111 .319
.173 .159
1.000 .127
.127 1.000

Based on the items and the corresponding loadings on the factors, the seven
factors were labeled as collaboration and effectiveness, pressure and turnover,
collaborative measures, policy and structure, motivation and satisfaction, input-based
measures, and mixed measures. Among the factors, collaboration and effectiveness,
pressure and turnover, policy and structure, and motivation and satisfaction focused on
teachers’ perceptions towards performance pay, while collaborative measures, inputbased measures, and mixed measures concentrated on teachers’ perceptions of
performance evaluation measures. The names of four factors regarding teachers’
perceptions toward performance pay were decided by the high-loading items contained
within each factor, which indicated particular dimensions of teachers’ perceived impact
of performance pay. Labels for the three factors focusing on teachers’ perceptions toward
performance evaluation measures were adapted from S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016), although
the items underneath each factor were not completely the same as in S. Liu, Zhao, et al.
(2016). The specific discussion regarding the comparisons of factors across two different
studies are presented in Chapter 5. Figure 8 shows the final factors extracted through
PCA using three methods and the associated statistics (number of items, the reliability
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coefficient, the explained variance for each factor). The factor loading matrix (pattern
matrix) of the seven-factor model is presented in Table 20, together with communalities
of each item, the number of items contained in each factor, the Cronbach’s alpha values
for each factor and the variance explained by each one.
The Cronbach’s alpha values for each factor (subscale) were .93, .84, .87, .84, .76,
.68, and .50, respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha values of .50 indicated poor internal
consistency of the subscale (Gliem & Gliem, 2003), but the possible reasons might be the
small number of items (6) in the subscale and different question types for the items.
Different from the other factors, mixed measures included items across two parts of the
scale. Four items regarding teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay were loaded on
this factor along with two items of performance evaluation measures. However, the four
items were also associated with performance evaluation indicating multiple sources of
teacher performance evaluation; therefore, the factor was retained. Additionally, each
factor’s alpha value was basically aligned with its percentage of explained variance,
which was in descending order from the first factor to the seventh.

Figure 8. Factors generated through principal component analysis with the number of
items, the reliability coefficient and the explained variance for each factor
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Table 20
Factor Loadings and Communalities Based on a Principal Component Analysis with Promax Rotation for 46 Items
from the Survey of Chinese Teachers' Perceptions of Performance Pay (N=333)
Item

CE

I have a clear understanding regarding teacher performance
pay at my school.
I know about the composition of my total salary.
I clearly understand about working duties associated with
my payment.
I clearly understand the performance evaluation rubrics
associated with my payment.
I support teacher performance pay at my school.
I fully understand the national policy of performance pay at
compulsory schools.
According to national policy, 70% of payment is due to
basic duties and 30% is incentive payment, and I think it is
reasonable.
After teacher performance pay reform, I think my payment
is higher than local governmental officials.
I am satisfied with the policy of teacher performance pay.
Teacher performance pay at my school is based on teacher
performance evaluation.
For obtaining incentive payment, I will change or have
already changed my teaching methods.
Teacher performance pay will motivate teachers to work
harder for obtaining higher payment.
Teacher performance pay is not a long-term policy, so
teachers are pessimistic about its long-lasting results.
Implementing teacher performance pay can retain effective
teachers.
Implementing teacher performance pay can attract more
excellent teachers.
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PT

CM

PS

MS

IM

MM

h2

0.84
0.95

0.66
0.73

0.91

0.73

0.87
0.44
0.47

0.76
0.62
0.37

0.51
0.46
0.43

0.56
0.46
0.61

0.44

0.60

0.75

0.45

0.87

0.55

0.50

0.27
0.63

0.66

0.59

0.66

Item

CE

Teacher performance pay at my school can effectively
identify effective teachers.
Teachers have strong objection towards teacher
performance pay at my school.
Teacher performance pay at my school has negative
influence on school culture and colleague relationship.
Implementing teacher performance pay disturbs teachers’
collaboration.
Teacher performance pay at my school can improve
students’ academic achievement.
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers’ job
satisfaction is improved.
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers have
more pressure than before.
Prior to the policy, I prefer how school is operating now.

0.54
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CM

PS

MS

IM

MM

h2
0.60

0.67

0.56

0.81

0.64

0.84

0.61

0.76

0.63

0.67

0.65
0.61

0.38
0.64

0.61

0.57

0.62

0.62
0.47

0.59

I always want to transfer to the other schools after
implementing teacher performance pay.
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at
my school have more passion in working.
If there is a chance, I want to change my job.
After implementing teacher performance pay, I want to
become a better teacher due to the collaborative culture
encouraged by my school.
After implementing teacher performance pay, I feel
supported from the other teachers.
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at
my school prefer competition rather than collaboration.
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at
my school do not trust each other any more.
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at
my school feel they have responsibility to try the best to
help each other.

PT

0.71

0.52

0.56

1.03

0.70

0.89

0.72

0.47

0.71

0.53
0.67

Item

CE
PT
CM PS
MS IM
MM
h2
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at
my school encourage students to keep trying when they
come across challenging academic questions.
0.88
0.64
After implementing teacher performance pay, teachers at
my school always help each other, even if it’s not their
duty.
0.94
0.72
The school administrators decide my payment based on
teacher performance evaluation with reliable information of
my performance.
0.54
0.67
After implementing teacher performance pay, my school
principal tends to award teachers who show loyalty to him
or her.
0.50
0.58
My school principal fully knows my performance.
0.41
0.50
Highest academic qualification degree
-0.58
0.49
Students’ test scores
0.69
0.57
Performance evaluations by principals
-0.68
0.41
Student evaluations of teaching performance
0.83
0.70
Collaboration with peers and staff
0.75
0.68
Efforts to involve parents in students’ education
0.81
0.70
Awards certifications
0.57
0.42
Parent satisfaction with teacher
0.75
0.68
Teaching in specific subject
0.66
0.49
Serving as Banzhuren, or other duties
0.65
0.60
Mentoring other teachers
0.63
0.67
Number of items per factor
11
10
6
5
6
3
6
Alpha
0.93
0.84 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.68 0.5
% of variance
26.41 8.81 7.01 5.08 4.56 3.35 3.17
Note. CE=Collaboration and Effectiveness; PT=Pressure and Turnover; CM=Collaborative Measures;
PS=Policy and Structure; MS=Motivation and Satisfaction; IM=Input-based Measures; MM=Mixed Measures; h2=communality.
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Mixed measures, as the seventh factor, only explained 3.17% of the variance, so the
associated alpha was the lowest.
It is interesting to note that the loadings for items of evaluation measures were
negative while the loadings for items of performance pay were positive, indicating
negative correlations among the items and between the factor and the items with negative
loadings. For example, the negative relationship between “performance evaluations by
principals (-0.68)” and “my school principal fully knows my performance (0.41)”
suggests that if the school principals fully know teachers’ performance, teachers are less
likely to choose “performance evaluation by principals” in performance evaluation. The
positive relationship between “I support teacher performance pay at my school (0.44)”
and “my school principal fully knows my performance (0.41)” shows that if the school
principals fully know teachers’ performance, teachers are more likely to support the
school-based performance pay.
Findings for Research Question 5:
Are there differences in the perceptions of participants toward performance pay
based on selected characteristics of teachers (gender, teaching experience, teacher
type, and teachers’ professional ranking) and schools (school level and school
rank)?
MANOVAs. Multiple one-way multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA)
was used to explore the research question because MANOVA is a statistical technique for
comparing the mean differences among different groups when more than one correlated
dependent variable is involved. In the analysis, four dependent variables (collaboration
and effectiveness, pressure and turnover, policy and structure, motivation and
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satisfaction) were the extracted factor scores computed with regression technique during
the PCA. One predictor (from selected characteristics of teachers and schools) with
multiple comparison groups was entered into the analysis each time for testing the
differences in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay based on the specific
characteristics of teachers and schools. The selected characteristics of teachers and
schools included: gender, teaching experience, teacher type, teachers’ professional
ranking, school level, and school rank.
All four dependent variables were normally distributed such that the range of
skewness and kurtosis values were within -2 and 2. The histogram of each dependent
variable also provided the visual evidence of normal distributions. Boxplots were used to
check outliers of each dependent variable. Several mild outliers (n < 5) were found with
each variable, but due to the large sample size and the normal distribution of each
variable, mild outliers were retained.
Box’s M tests were used to test homogeneity of the covariance for each
MANOVA. The significant results indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of the
covariance matrix was violated for all predictors (gender, teaching experience, teacher
type, and teachers’ professional ranking, school level, and school rank). Additionally, for
each predictor, the sample size of each group was unequal. Attributed to these, the tests
might lose some robustness, even though the total sample size was large. Therefore, the
values of Pillai’s Trace, the most conservative among the available analysis techniques,
were used to interpret the results of MANOVAs. Table 21 shows the MANOVA results
of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay by the characteristics of teachers’
gender, teaching experience, teacher type, professional ranking, school level, and school
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rank. The descriptive statistics and follow-up statistical analysis results for each predictor
was presented below.
Table 21
MANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions toward Performance Pay Based on Selected
Characteristics of Teachers and Schools
Variables

Value of
Pillai’s
Trace
.025
.105

Gender
Teaching
Experience
Teacher
.053
Type
Teachers’
.171
Professional
ranking
School
.039
Level
School Rank .171
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

2.111
2.179

4
16

328
1296

.79
.005*

Partial
Eta
Squared
.025
.026

1.453

12

969

.136

.018

7.683

12

960

.001*

.035

3.346

4

328

.011*

.039

7.683

8

656

.000**

.086

Gender. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward performance
pay based on teachers’ gender are documented in Table 22. A one-way MANOVA was
conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay between male teachers and female
teachers. A statistically non-significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace =
.025, F (4, 328) = 2.111, p > .05 (see Table 21). There was no mean difference in
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay between male teachers and female
teachers.
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Table 22
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Pay by Gender
Variable
Collaboration and
Effectiveness
Pressure and Turnover
Policy and Structure
Motivation and Satisfaction

Gender
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female

M
-.093
.036
-.182
.071
.003
-.001
.064
-.025

SD
.944
1.020
.919
1.023
1.025
.992
.791
1.070

n
93
240
93
240
93
240
93
240

Teaching experience. The descriptive statistics with means, standard deviations,
and sample size for teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay based on teachers’
years of teaching experience are documented in Table 23. A one-way MANOVA was
conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay among teachers with different years of
teaching experience. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s
Trace = .105, F(16, 1296) = 2.179, p < .05 (see Table 21). The multivariate effect size
was estimated at .026, which implied that 2.6% of the variance in the canonically derived
dependent variable was accounted for by teachers’ teaching experience.
Given the significant MANOVA result, a series of one-way ANOVAs on each of
the four dependent variables was conducted as follow-up tests to the MANOVA. The
Bonferroni approach was employed to prevent Type I error (alpha level .05/4= .0125). No
significant univariate main effect for teachers’ teaching experience was obtained for
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in collaboration and effectiveness,
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pressure and turnover, policy and structure, or motivation and satisfaction (see Table
24).
Table 23
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Pay by Teachers’ Years of Experience
Variable
Collaboration and Effectiveness

Pressure and Turnover

Policy and Structure

Motivation and Satisfaction

Years of
experience
<5 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
>20 years
<5 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
>20 years
<5 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
>20 years
<5 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
>20 years

M
.326
-.151
-.047
-.081
.037
.310
.039
.044
-.168
-.079
-.171
-.010
.112
-.034
-.015
.358
.102
.152
-.150
-.186
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SD
.994
.836
1.026
.994
1.060
.993
.835
1.001
.994
1.083
1.103
.774
.945
1.024
1.113
.944
.715
.675
1.126
1.209

n
32
59
72
57
109
32
59
72
57
109
32
59
72
57
109
32
59
72
57
109

Table 24
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Pay Based on Teachers’
Years of Experience
Variable
Collaboration
and
Effectiveness
Pressure and
Turnover
Policy and
Structure
Motivation and
Satisfaction

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Contrast
5.409
Error
322.471

4
324

1.352
.995

1.359

Partial
Eta
Squared
.248
.016

Contrast
5.557
Error
324.035
Contrast
1.921
Error
328.369
Contrast 11.409
Error
318.469

4
324
4
324
4
324

1.389
1.000
.480
1.013
2.852
.983

1.389

.237

.017

.474

.755

.006

2.902

.022

.035

Teacher type. Table 25 shows the descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions
toward performance pay based on teacher type. The one-way MANOVA was conducted
to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of teachers’
perceptions toward performance pay among different types of teachers. A statistically
non-significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .053, F(12, 969) = 1.453,
p > .05 (see Table 21). There was no mean difference in teachers’ perceptions toward
performance pay among teachers with different levels of expert titles.
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Table 25
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Pay by Teacher Type
Variable
Collaboration and
Effectiveness
Pressure and Turnover

Policy and Structure

Motivation and
Satisfaction

Teacher type
Municipal expert
District expert
School expert
Non-expert
Municipal expert
District expert
School expert
Non-expert
Municipal expert
District expert
School expert
Non-expert
Municipal expert
District expert
School expert
Non-expert

M
.167
-.002
-.104
-.013
.245
-.102
.076
-.007
.078
.106
.114
-.119
.013
-.028
.204
-.072

SD
1.003
1.044
.906
1.015
.841
1.059
1.024
.980
.836
1.118
.923
.978
1.125
1.012
.650
1.078

n
27
95
57
149
27
95
57
149
27
95
57
149
27
95
57
149

Teachers’ professional ranking. The descriptive statistics of teachers’
perceptions toward performance pay based on teachers’ professional ranking are shown
in Table 26. A one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would
be one or more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay among
teachers with different professional rankings. A statistically significant MANOVA effect
was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .171, F(12, 960) = 7.683, p < .05 (see Table 21). The
multivariate effect size was estimated at .086, which implied that 8.6% of the variance in
the canonically derived dependent variable was accounted for by teachers’ professional
ranking.
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Table 26
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Pay by Teachers’ Professional Ranking
Teacher’s
professional ranking
Collaboration and
Highest
Effectiveness
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Pressure and Turnover Highest
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Policy and Structure
Highest
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Motivation and
Highest
Satisfaction
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Variable

M
-.156
.003
.104
.114
.013
-.051
.019
.302
-.046
.100
-.195
.315
-.276
-.045
.233
.490

SD
.977
1.035
.928
1.145
1.016
1.009
.930
1.168
.968
1.009
1.060
.829
1.160
1.003
.645
.847

n
97
131
79
18
97
131
79
18
97
131
79
18
97
131
79
18

Due to the statistically significant MANOVA result, multiple one-way ANOVAs
were conducted to explore the mean differences among groups on each of the dependent
variables. One significant univariate main effect for teachers’ professional ranking was
obtained for teachers’ perceptions on performance pay in motivation and satisfaction,
F(3, 321) = 5.674, p < .0125, partial eta square = .050 (see Table 27). Attributed to the
statistically significant Levene’s test result, F(3, 321) = 7.469, p = .000, which violated
the assumption of equal variance, and unequal sample sizes across groups, the GamesHowell test was employed for post hoc pairwise comparisons. To control the familywise
error rate of alpha across comparisons, the Bonferroni approach was applied so that the
alpha level for the comparisons was .0125/6 = .002. Significant pairwise difference was
obtained in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in motivation and satisfaction
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between teachers with the highest professional ranking and teachers with the Level 2
professional ranking, M = -0.509, SD = .138, p = .002, 99% CI [-0.937, -0.081]. This
suggests that teachers with the highest professional ranking had lower motivation and
satisfaction regarding performance pay than teachers with the Level 2 professional
ranking.
Table 27
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Pay Based on Teachers’
Professional Ranking
Dependent Variable

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Collaboration Contrast
and
Error
Effectiveness
Pressure and
Contrast
Turnover
Error
Policy and
Contrast
Structure
Error
Motivation
Contrast
and
Error
Satisfaction
Note. * p < .0125. ** p = .00.

3.381
3
320.522 321

1.127 1.129 .337
.999

2.023
3
322.222 321
6.307
3
321.583 321
16.164
3
304.804 321

.674 .672 .570
1.004
2.102 2.098 .100
1.002
5.388 5.674 .001*
.950

Partial
Eta
Squared
.010
.006
.019
.050

School level. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward
performance pay based on school level are documented in Table 28. A one-way
MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean
differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay between elementary schools
and secondary schools. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s
Trace = .039, F(4, 328) = 3.346, p < .05 (see Table 21). The multivariate effect size was
estimated at .039, which implied that 3.9% of the variance in the canonically derived
dependent variable was accounted for by the level of school.
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Table 28
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Pay by School Level
Variable
Collaboration and
Effectiveness
Pressure and Turnover
Policy and Structure
Motivation and Satisfaction

School level
Elementary
Secondary
Elementary
Secondary
Elementary
Secondary
Elementary
Secondary

M
.126
-.119
.137
-.129
.155
-.147
.006
-.005

SD
1.034
.954
1.025
.961
1.017
.964
1.136
.855

n
162
171
162
171
162
171
162
171

Given the significant MANOVA results, multiple one-way ANOVAs were
conducted to test the univariate main effect on each of the four dependent variables. A
significant univariate main effect in terms of school level was obtained for teachers’
perceptions on the performance pay in policy and structure, F(1, 331) = 7.731, p < .0125,
partial eta square = .023 (see Table 29). This indicates that elementary teachers were
more positive regarding their understanding about performance pay’s policy and structure
than secondary teachers.
Table 29
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Pay Based on School
Level
Dependent Variable

Sum of
df
Mean
F
Squares
Square
4.985
1
4.985 5.046
327.015 331
.988

Collaboration
Contrast
and
Error
Effectiveness
Pressure and
Contrast
5.891
1
Turnover
Error
326.109 331
Policy and
Contrast
7.577
1
Structure
Error
324.423 331
Motivation and Contrast
.010
1
Satisfaction
Error
331.990 331
Note. * p < .0125. ** p = .00.

5.891 5.980
.985
7.577 7.731
.980
.010 .010
1.003
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Sig.
.025

Partial Eta
Squared
.015

.015

.018

.006*

.023

.921

.000

School rank. Table 30 shows the descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions
toward performance pay based on school rank. A one-way MANOVA was conducted to
test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of teachers’
perceptions toward performance pay among teachers from schools with different ranks. A
statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillais’ Trace = .171, F(8, 656) =
7.683, p < .05 (see Table 21). The multivariate effect size was estimated at .086, which
implied that 8.6% of the variance in the canonically derived dependent variable was
accounted for by teachers’ teaching experience. Among six characteristics, school rank is
the strongest influence on teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay, but the effect
size (.086) is relatively quite weak.
Table 30
Descriptive Statistics of Four Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Pay by School Rank
Variable
Collaboration and
Effectiveness
Pressure and Turnover

Policy and Structure

Motivation and
Satisfaction

School rank
Provincial Key
Municipal Key
Ordinary
Total
Provincial Key
Municipal Key
Ordinary
Total
Provincial Key
Municipal Key
Ordinary
Total
Provincial Key
Municipal Key
Ordinary
Total

M
.214
-.297
-.107
.000
.126
.341
-.148
.000
.196
.345
-.200
.000
.316
.386
-.293
.000

SD
1.005
.552
1.027
1.000
1.013
.837
.994
1.000
.936
.734
1.043
1.000
.720
.471
1.141
1.000

n
128
29
176
333
128
29
176
333
128
29
176
333
128
29
176
333

Given the significance of the overall test, a series of one-way ANOVAs were
conducted as follow-up tests to explore the univariate main effect on each of the four
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dependent variables. Significant univariate main effects in terms of school rank were
obtained for teachers’ perceptions on performance pay in collaboration and effectiveness,
F(2, 330) = 5.369, p < .0125, partial eta square = .032; in pressure and turnover, F(2,
330) = 4.716, p < .0125, partial eta square = .028; in policy and structure, F(2, 330) =
8.016, p < .0125, partial eta square = .046; and in motivation and satisfaction, F(2, 330) =
17.760, p < .0125, partial eta square = .097 (see Table 31).
Table 31
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Pay Based on School
Rank
Dependent Variable

Sum of
Squares

df

Collaboration
Contrast
and
Error
Effectiveness
Pressure and
Contrast
Turnover
Error
Policy and
Contrast
Structure
Error
Motivation and Contrast
Satisfaction
Error
Note. * p < .0125. ** p = .00.

10.463
2
321.537 330

Mean
Square
5.231
.974

F

Sig.

5.369 .005*

9.225
2 4.613 4.716 .010*
322.775 330
.978
15.382
2 7.691 8.016 .000**
316.618 330
.959
32.262
2 16.131 17.760 .000**
299.738 330
.908

Partial
Eta
Squared
.032
.028
.046
.097

The sample sizes across three groups were unequal. The results of Levene’s tests
were significant for collaboration and effectiveness, F(2, 330) = 9.029, p = .000; policy
and structure, F(2, 330) = 6.165, p = .002; motivation and satisfaction F(2, 330) =
19.101, p = .000; and nonsignificant for pressure and turnover F(2, 330) = 1.095, p =
.336. Therefore, the Games-Howell tests were used for post hoc pairwise comparison for
collaboration and effectiveness, policy and structure, and motivation and satisfaction,
while the Tukey test was used for pressure and turnover. Meanwhile, the Bonferroni
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approach was applied to control the familywise error rate across comparisons that the
alpha level for the ANOVAs is .0125/3 = .004. Significant pairwise differences were
obtained in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in collaboration and
effectiveness between teachers from provincial key schools and teachers from municipal
key schools, M = 0.512, SD = .136, p = .001, 99% CI [0.115, 0.908]. Additionally,
significant pairwise differences were obtained for policy and structure between teachers
from ordinary schools and teachers from provincial key schools, M = -0.396, SD = .114,
p = .002, 99% CI [-0.722, -0.069]; and between teachers from ordinary schools and
teachers from municipal key schools, M = -.544, SD = .157, p = .003, 99% CI [-1.012,
0.077]. Additionally, significant pairwise differences were obtained for motivation and
satisfaction between teachers from ordinary schools and teachers from provincial key
schools, M = -0.610, SD = .107, p = .000, 99% CI [-0.916, -0.303], and between teachers
from ordinary schools and teachers from municipal key schools, M = -0.679, SD = .123, p
= .000, 99% CI [-1.036, -0.322]. The results suggest that in collaboration and
effectiveness, teachers from provincial key schools had a more positive attitude than
teachers from municipal key schools. Additionally, teachers from ordinary schools were
less familiar with performance pay’s policy and structure than teachers from the higherranked schools. Meanwhile, teachers from ordinary schools had a less positive attitude
toward the impacts of performance pay on motivation and satisfaction than teachers from
the higher-ranked schools. The significant pairwise comparisons for each dependent
variable were summarized in Table 32.
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Table 32
Summary of Significant Pairwise Comparisons for Chinese Teachers’ Perceptions
Toward Performance Pay
Variable
Collaboration and
Effectiveness
Pressures and
Turnover
Policy and
Structure

Significant Pairwise Comparisons
• Provincial-key-school teachers were more positive than
municipal-key-school teachers
• None
•
•
•

Motivation and
Satisfaction

•
•
•

Elementary teachers were less familiar than secondary
teachers
Ordinary-school teachers were less familiar than
provincial-key-school teachers
Ordinary-school teachers were less familiar than
municipal-key-school teachers
Teachers with the highest professional ranking were less
positive than teachers with the level-2 professional
ranking.
Ordinary-school teachers were less positive than
provincial-key-school teachers.
Ordinary-school teachers were less positive than
municipal-key-school teachers

Findings for Research Question 6:
Are there differences in the perceptions of participating teachers regarding
evaluation measures upon which performance pay is based in their public schools in
terms of selected characteristics of teachers (e.g., gender, teaching experience,
professional ranking) and schools (e.g., grade level, school rank)?
MANOVAs. To answer the question, several one-way MANOVAs were
conducted with three dependent variables (collaborative measures, input-based
measures, and mixed measures), which were the extracted factor scores computed with
the regression technique during the PCA in Research Question 4. One predictor (selected
characteristics of teachers and schools) with multiple groups was entered in the analysis
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each time for testing the differences in teachers’ perceptions toward performance
evaluation measures based on the specific characteristics of teachers and schools. The
selected characteristics of teachers and schools included: gender, teaching experience,
teacher type, teachers’ professional ranking, school level and school rank.
Based on the distribution histograms and the skewness and kurtosis values, all
three dependent variables were normally distributed. Boxplots were used to check
outliers of each dependent variable. Several mild outliers (n < 5) were found with each
variable, but due to the large sample size and normal distribution of each variable, the
mild outliers were retained.
Box’s M tests were used to test homogeneity of the covariance for each
MANOVA. The significant results indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of the
covariance matrix was violated for gender, teaching experience, teacher type, teachers’
professional ranking, school level, and school rank. Additionally, for each predictor, the
sample size in each group was unequal. Due to these conditions, the tests lost some
robustness, although the total sample size was large. Therefore, the values of Pillai’s
Trace were used to interpret the results of MANOVAs. Table 33 shows the MANOVA
results of teachers’ perceptions towards performance evaluation measures by gender,
teaching experience, teacher type, teachers’ professional ranking, school level and school
rank. The descriptive statistics and follow-up statistical analysis results for each predictor
are presented in Tables 34-45.
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Table 33
MANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Measures
Based on Selected Characteristics of Teachers and Schools
Variable
Gender
Teaching
experience
Teacher type
Teachers’
professional
ranking
School level
School rank

Value of
Pillai’s
Trace
.050
.105

F

Hypothesis
df

Error df

Sig.

5.758
2.938

3
12

329
972

.001**
.001**

Partial
Eta
Squared
.050
.035

.155
.124

5.876
4.613

9
9

972
963

.000**
.000**

.052
.041

.105
.381

12.840
25.822

3
6

329
658

.000**
.000**

.105
.191

Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

Gender. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward performance
evaluation measures based on teachers’ gender are documented in Table 34. A one-way
MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean
differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation measures between
male teachers and female teachers. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was
obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .050, F(3, 329) = 5.758, p < .05 (see Table 33). The
multivariate effect size was estimated at .050, which implied that 5% of the variance in
the canonically derived dependent variable was accounted for by teachers’ gender.
Table 34
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Evaluation by Gender
Variable
Collaborative measures
Input-based measures
Mixed measures

School level
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female

M
-.203
.079
.014
-.006
-.321
.124
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SD
1.132
.934
.956
1.018
1.028
.963

n
93
240
93
240
93
240

Given the significant result of MANOVA, multiple one-way ANOVAs were
conducted to test the univariate main effect on each of the three dependent variables. A
significant univariate main effect in terms of gender was obtained for teachers’
perceptions toward performance evaluation in mixed measures, F(1, 331) = 13.827, p <
.017, partial eta square = .040 (see Table 35). In this study, female teachers had a more
supportive attitude of using mixed measures in performance evaluation than male
teachers.
Table 35
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on
Gender
Dependent Variable

Sum of
Squares

Collaborative Contrast
5.340
measures
Error
326.660
Input-based
Contrast
.026
measures
Error
331.974
Mixed
Contrast 13.313
measures
Error
318.687
*
**
Note. p < .017. p = .00.

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

1 5.340 5.411 .021
331
.987
1
.026
.026 .872
331 1.003
1 13.313 13.827 .000**
331
.963

Partial
Eta
Squared
.016
.000
.040

Teaching experience. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward
performance evaluation measures based on years of teaching experience are documented
in Table 36. The one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there
would be one or more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance
evaluation measures among teachers with different years of teaching experience. A
statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .105, F(12, 972)
= 2.938, p < .05 (see Table 33). The multivariate effect size was estimated at .035, which
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implied that 3.5% of the variance in the canonically derived dependent variable was
accounted for by teachers’ years of teaching experience.
Table 36
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Evaluation by Teacher’s Years of Experience
Variable
Collaborative
measures

Years of experience
<5 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
>20 years
Input-based measures <5 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
>20 years
Mixed measures
<5 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
>20 years

M
.065
.069
-.177
-.018
.068
.222
.185
.059
-.168
-.128
.326
-.399
-.247
.126
.195

SD
.830
1.223
.963
.945
.962
.583
.878
.928
1.230
1.053
.851
.940
1.067
.910
.990

n
32
59
72
57
109
32
59
72
57
109
32
59
72
57
109

A series of one-way ANOVAs on each of the three dependent variables was
conducted as follow-up tests to the MANOVA. A significant univariate main effect for
teachers’ teaching experience was obtained for teachers’ perceptions on mixed measures
of performance evaluation, F(4, 324) = 5.865, p < .017, partial eta square = .068 (see
Table 34). Due to the nonsignificant result of the Levene’s test of equal variance, F(4,
324) = 1.655, p = .160, the Turkey test was used for post hoc pairwise comparisons
among groups. The Bonferroni approach was applied to control the familywise error rate
across comparisons that the alpha level for the pairwise comparisons was .017/10 = .002.
Nonsignificant pairwise differences for teachers’ teaching experience were obtained in
teachers’ perceptions toward mixed measures.
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Table 37
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on
Teacher’s Years of Experience
Dependent Variable

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Collaborative Contrast
measures
Error
Input-based
Contrast
measures
Error
Mixed
Contrast
measures
Error
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .00.

3.182
323.931
7.259
320.782
22.215
306.803

4
324
4
324
4
324

.795
1.000
1.815
.990
5.554
.947

.796

Sig.
.529

Partial
Eta
Squared
.010

1.833 .122

.022

5.865 .000**

.068

Teacher type. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward
performance evaluation measures based on teacher type are documented in Table 38. A
MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or more mean
differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation measures among
different types of teachers. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained,
Pillai’s Trace = .155, F(9, 972) = 5.876, p < .05 (see Table 33). The multivariate effect
size was estimated at .052, which implied that 5.2% of the variance in the canonically
derived dependent variable was accounted for by teachers’ types.
Given the significance of the overall test, the univariate main effects were
examined with one-way ANOVAs on each of the three dependent variables. Significant
univariate main effects for teacher type were obtained for teachers’ perceptions on
“mixed measures”, F(2, 324) = 11.392, p < .017, partial eta square = .095 (see Table 39).
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Table 38
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Evaluation by Teacher Type
Variable
Collaborative measures

Input-based measures

Mixed measures

Teacher type
Municipal expert
District expert
School expert
Non-expert
Municipal expert
District expert
School expert
Non-expert
Municipal expert
District expert
School expert
Non-expert

M
-.044
-.003
-.357
.125
.361
.063
.157
-.181
.266
.063
-.670
.155

SD
.897
.989
.963
1.019
.718
.947
1.019
1.050
.938
1.075
.918
.899

n
27
95
57
149
27
95
57
149
27
95
57
149

Table 39
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on
Teacher Type
Dependent Variable

Sum of
Squares

df

Collaborative Contrast
9.588
3
measures
Error
318.555 324
Input-based
Contrast 10.182
3
measures
Error
318.987 324
Mixed
Contrast 31.453
3
measures
Error
298.183 324
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .000.

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

3.196 3.251 .022
.983
3.394 3.447 .017
.985
10.484 11.392 .000**
.920

Partial
Eta
Squared
.029
.031
.095

Due to the nonsignificant result of the Levene’s test, F(3, 324) = 1.755, p = .156,
the Turkey test was used for post hoc pairwise comparisons among groups. Bonferroni
approach was applied to control the familywise error rate across comparisons that the
alpha level for the pairwise comparisons was .017/6 = .003. Significant pairwise
differences were obtained in teachers’ perceptions toward mixed measures of
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performance evaluation between school-expert teachers and municipal-expert teachers, M
= -0.936, SD = .224, p = .000, 99% CI [-1.631, -0.240]; between school-expert teachers
and district-expert teachers, M = -0.733, SD = .161, p = .000, 99% CI [-1.231, -0.234];
and between school-expert teachers and non-expert teachers, M = -.825, SD = .149, p =
.000, 99% CI [-1.289, -0.362]. The results suggest that school-expert teachers in this
sample were less positive toward using mixed measures in performance evaluation than
municipal-expert teachers, district-expert teachers, and non-expert teachers.
Teachers’ professional ranking. The descriptive statistics of teachers’
perceptions toward performance evaluation measures based on teachers’ professional
ranking are documented in Table 40. The one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the
hypothesis that there would be one or more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions
toward performance evaluation measures among teachers with different professional
rankings. A statistically significant MANOVA effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .124,
F(9, 963) = 4.613, p < .05 (see Table 33). The multivariate effect size was estimated at
.041, which implied that 4.1% of the variance in the canonically derived dependent
variable was accounted for by teachers’ professional ranking.
The follow-up one-way ANOVAs on each of the three dependent variables were
conducted to explore the group mean differences on the specific performance evaluation
measure. Significant univariate main effects for teachers’ professional ranking were
obtained for: teachers’ perceptions on collaborative measures of performance evaluation,
F(3, 321) = 3.857, p < .017, partial eta square = .035; teachers’ perceptions on inputbased measures, F(3, 321) = 4.301, p < .017, partial eta square = .039; teachers’
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perceptions on mixed measures, F(3, 321) = 5.149, p < .017, partial eta square = .002 (see
Table 41).
Table 40
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Evaluation by Teacher’s Professional Ranking
Variable
Collaborative
measures
Input-based
measures
Mixed measures

Teacher’s
professional ranking
Highest
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Highest
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Highest
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3

M
.005
.169
-.263
-.339
-.252
-.034
.268
.190
.082
.179
-.333
-.272

SD
.984
1.002
.979
.860
1.122
1.018
.802
.627
.996
.907
1.078
1.028

n
97
131
79
18
97
131
79
18
97
131
79
18

Table 41
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on
Teacher’s Professional Ranking
Dependent Variable

Sum of
Squares

Collaborative Contrast
11.201
measures
Error
310.758
Input-based
Contrast
12.553
measures
Error
312.325
Mixed
Contrast
14.955
measures
Error
310.752
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .00.

df
3
321
3
321
3
321

Mean
Square
3.734
.968
4.184
.973
4.985
.968

F

Sig.

3.857 .010*

Partial
Eta
Squared
.035

4.301 .005*

.039

5.149 .002*

.046

Results of Levene’s tests were: nonsignificant for collaborative measures, F(3,
321) = 0.196, p = .899; significant for input-based measures, F(3, 321) = 3.851, p = .010;
and significant for mixed measures, F(3, 321) = 2.789, p = .041. Given the violations of
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equal variances and unequal sample sizes of groups, Games-Howell tests were used for
post hoc pairwise comparisons for input-based measures and mixed measures. The Tukey
test was employed for collaborative measures. Meanwhile, the Bonferroni approach was
applied to control the familywise error rate of alpha across comparisons. The alpha level
was .017/6 = .003. A significant pairwise difference was obtained in teachers’
perceptions toward input-based measures between teachers with the highest professional
ranking and teachers with the Level 2 professional ranking, M = -0.519, SD = .149, p =
.003, CI [-0.916, -.0123]. Additionally, a significant pairwise difference was obtained in
teachers’ perceptions toward mixed measures between teachers with the Level 1
professional ranking and teachers with the Level 2 professional ranking, M = 0.512, SD =
.140, p = .002, CI [0.140, 0.884]. The results demonstrate that teachers in this study with
the highest professional ranking preferred using input-based measures in performance
evaluation less than teachers with the Level 2 professional ranking. Teachers with the
Level 1 professional ranking were more likely to support using mixed measures than
teachers with Level 2 professional ranking.
School level. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward
performance evaluation measures based on school level are documented in Table 42. A
one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or
more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluations between
elementary schools and secondary schools. A statistically significant MANOVA effect
was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .105, F(3, 329) = 12.840, p < .05 (see Table 33). The
multivariate effect size was estimated at .105, which implied that 10.5% of the variance
in the canonically derived dependent variable was accounted for by level of school.
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Table 42
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Evaluation by School Level
Variable
Collaborative measures
Input-based measures
Mixed measures

School level
Elementary
Secondary
Elementary
Secondary
Elementary
Secondary

M
.200
-.190
-.117
.111
.237
-.225

SD
.949
1.013
.933
1.050
.921
1.023

n
162
171
162
171
162
171

Multiple one-way ANOVAs were conducted to test the univariate main effect on
each of the three dependent variables. Significant univariate main effects in terms of
school level were obtained for teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation on:
collaborative measures, F(1, 331) = 13.105, p < .017, partial eta square = .038; and
mixed measures, F(1, 331) = 18.727, p < .017, partial eta square = .054 (see Table 43).
Elementary teachers in this sample were more positive toward using collaborative
measures and mixed measures than secondary teachers.
Table 43
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on
School Level
Dependent Variable

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Collaborative Contrast
measures
Error
Input-based
Contrast
measures
Error
Mixed
Contrast
measures
Error
**
Note. p = .00.

12.644
319.356
4.332
327.668
17.777
314.223

1
331
1
331
1
331

12.644 13.105 .000**
.965
4.332 4.376 .037
.990
17.777 18.727 .000**
.949
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F

Sig.

Partial
Eta
Squared
.038
.013
.054

School rank. The descriptive statistics of teachers’ perceptions toward
performance evaluation measures based on school rank were documented in Table 44. A
one-way MANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be one or
more mean differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation measures
among teachers from schools with different ranks. A statistically significant MANOVA
effect was obtained, Pillai’s Trace = .381, F(6, 658) = 25.822, p < .05 (see Table 33). The
multivariate effect size was estimated at .191, which implied that 19.1% of the variance
in the canonically derived dependent variable was accounted for by school rank.
Table 44
Descriptive Statistics of Three Dependent Variables of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward
Performance Evaluation by School Rank
Variable
Collaborative measures
Input-based measures
Mixed measures

School rank
Provincial Key
Municipal Key
Ordinary
Provincial Key
Municipal Key
Ordinary
Provincial Key
Municipal Key
Ordinary

M
-.221
.205
.127
.239
-1.426
.061
-.379
-.484
.355

SD
1.106
.977
.893
.857
.725
.947
1.105
.610
.825

n
128
29
176
128
29
176
128
29
176

Given the significance of the overall test, the univariate main effects were
examined with one-way ANOVAs on each of the three dependent variables. Significant
univariate main effects for school rank were obtained for teachers’ perceptions on:
collaborative measures, F(2, 330) = 5.300, p < .017, partial eta square = .031; inputbased measures, F(2, 330) = 41.676, p < .017, partial eta square = .202; and mixed
measures, F(2, 330) = 27.469, p < .017, partial eta square = .143 (see Table 45).
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Table 45
ANOVA Results of Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Based on
School Rank
Dependent Variable

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Collaborative Contrast 10.332
2 5.166 5.300 .005*
measures
Error
321.668 330
.975
Input-based
Contrast 66.947
2 33.473 41.676 .000**
measures
Error
265.053 330
.803
Mixed
Contrast 47.382
2 23.691 27.469 .000**
measures
Error
284.618 330
.862
Note. * p < .017. ** p = .00.

Partial
Eta
Squared
.031
.202
.143

The results of Levene’s tests were: significant for collaborative measures, F(2,
330) = 4.539, p = .011; nonsignificant for input-based measures F(2, 330) = 0.701, p =
.497; and significant for mixed measures, F(2, 330) = 17.197, p = .000. For collaborative
measures and mixed measures, given the violations of equal variances and unequal
sample sizes across groups, Games-Howell tests were used for post hoc pairwise
comparisons. The Tukey test was employed for input-based measures. Meanwhile, the
Bonferroni approach was applied to control the familywise error rate across comparisons
that the alpha level for the ANOVAs is .017/3 = .006. Significant pairwise differences
were obtained in teachers’ perceptions toward input-based measures between teachers
from municipal key schools and teachers from ordinary schools, M = -1.488, SD = .180,
p = .000, CI [-1.910, -1.065], and between teachers from municipal key schools and
teachers from provincial key schools, M = -1.665, SD = .184, p = .000, CI [-2.099, 1.231]. Additionally, significant pairwise differences were obtained in teachers’
perceptions toward mixed measures of performance evaluation between ordinary schools
and provincial key schools, M = 0.734, SD = .116, p = .000, CI [0.461, 1.007], and
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between ordinary schools and municipal key schools, M = 0.839, SD = .129, p = .000, CI
[0.526, 1.152]. The results indicate that municipal-key-school teachers in this study
preferred using input-based measures less than ordinary-school teachers and provincialkey-school teachers. Additionally, ordinary-school teachers in this study were more
positive toward using mixed measures than the other higher-ranked-school teachers. The
significant pairwise comparisons for each dependent variable are summarized in Table
46.
Table 46
Summary of Significant Pairwise Comparisons for Chinese Teachers’ Perceptions
Toward Performance Evaluation
Variable
Significant Pairwise Comparison
Collaborative • Elementary teachers were more supportive than secondary
Measures
teachers.
Input-based
• Teachers with the highest professional ranking were less
Measures
supportive than teachers with the Level 2 professional
ranking.
• Municipal-key-school teachers were less supportive than
ordinary-school teachers.
• Municipal-key-school teachers were less supportive than
principal-key-school teachers.
Mixed
• Female teachers were more supportive than male teachers.
Measures
• School-expert teachers were less supportive than municipalexpert teachers.
• School-expert teachers were less supportive than districtexpert teachers.
• School-expert teachers were less supportive than non-expert
teachers.
• Teachers with the Level 1 professional ranking were more
supportive than teachers with the Level 2 professional
ranking.
• Elementary teachers were more supportive than secondary
teachers.
• Ordinary-school teachers were more supportive than
municipal-key-school teachers.
• Ordinary-school teachers were more supportive than
provincial-key-school teachers.
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CHAPTER 5
Discussion
Summary of Findings
In this study, I explored teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and the
associated performance evaluation measures at 16 elementary and secondary public
schools of Panda district in Kunming City, Yunnan province, China. Teacher
performance pay is an important topic linked to teacher evaluation, teacher effectiveness,
teacher retention, and student achievement. The impact of performance pay on teachers
includes various aspects from teachers’ intrinsic motivation (e.g., Ballou & Podgursky,
1993; Jacob & Springer, 2008) to students’ learning outcomes (e.g., Pham et al., 2017).
The policy of teacher performance pay has been implemented in China for eight years;
many researchers have discussed issues involved in the implementation process in a
theoretical analysis approach (e.g., B. Li, 2014; Mi & Dai, 2011; X. Wang, 2013; Wei,
2013). But teachers’ voice and perceptions toward performance pay and performance
evaluation measures were rarely investigated. Without teachers’ support and cooperation,
the effects of the policy implementation would be questionable. This mixed-method study
presented empirical evidence of teachers’ perceptions of the performance pay policy and
its implementation at the school level, which not only includes the voice of front-line
teachers but also offers implications for policy stakeholders, school administrators and
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researchers in decision-making, school practices, and future research. The findings of the
study include:
•

Teachers had low support of performance pay in Panda School District of
Kunming city, Yunan province, China.

•

Three themes related to the value of performance pay and 14 themes related to
problems associated with performance pay emerged from the data generated with
participating teachers. Teachers perceived the merits of performance pay in terms
of its theoretical goal (motivation), application (clearer salary scheme), and
impact (competition mechanism). The major categories of problems included
limited and unbalanced funding; problematic implementation process; unfairness;
and demotivation.

•

The top three performance evaluation measures preferred by participating
teachers were: serving as banzhuren, or on other duties; students’ test scores; and
performance evaluation by principals. According to the school-based performance
evaluation plan, “ethics,” “working load,” and “teaching practice” were the most
important categories of performance evaluation perceived by participating
teachers. Teachers reported that only quantifiable indicators were normally used
in teacher evaluation. Three themes regarding teachers’ perceptions toward
performance evaluation emerged through qualitative data analysis. First,
performance evaluation was more summative than formative; second, specific
evaluation standards and rubrics were lacking; third, performance evaluation
measures were oversimplified and ineffective.
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•

A seven-factor model was extracted from the teacher perception survey through
Principal Component Analyses and explained 58.4% of the variance among
teachers regarding their perceptions toward performance pay and performance
evaluation. Four factors (collaboration and effectiveness, pressure and turnover,
policy and structure, and motivation and satisfaction) focused on teachers’
perceptions toward performance pay; three factors (collaborative measures, inputbased measures, and mixed measures) represented teachers’ perceptions toward
performance evaluation.

•

Participating teachers’ perceptions related to performance pay were significantly
different with small effect sizes (in parentheses) based on teachers’ teaching
experience (.026), professional ranking (.035), school level (.039), and school
rank (.086).

•

Participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation were
significantly different with small effect sizes (in parentheses) based on teachers’
gender (.050), teaching experience (.035), type (.052), professional ranking (.041),
school level (.105), and school rank (.191).

Discussion
This study reveals some themes that are consistent with previous studies, while
some themes were inconsistent to previous ones or newly found, which may be worth
further discussion. The themes for discussion were explored as follows.
Low teacher support for performance pay. The findings suggest that surveyed
teachers expressed low (46%) support for performance pay, which was similar to the
support rate (48.5%) found in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016). Considering the support rate in
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S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) was reported only by middle-school teachers, the
corresponding support rate of secondary teachers (40.4%) in this study was actually
lower than that found in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016a). Also, the finding was consistent to
H. Zhao, et al. (2011), who found that most of the Chinese public-school teachers in their
study opposed teacher performance pay, although 93% of the school administrators
supported it. Compared to school administrators’ high support rate, the consistent low
teacher support across studies is more likely to provide the objective evidence for any
failures in performance pay implementation. Due to the results of the present study and
previous literature, five possible reasons might be associated with the low-level teacher
support to performance pay.
More problems than merits. Based on teachers’ responses to the survey and
interview questions pertaining to the merits and problems of performance pay, more
problems than merits were identified by participating teachers, suggesting that teachers
were not satisfied with the program. For example, problems of performance pay included:
unfairness perceived by teachers; conflicts among colleagues brought on by competition
for performance pay; the small amount of performance pay; unbalanced funding
distribution irrespective to school contexts, et cetera. These themes align with the reasons
teachers opposed performance pay in a study conducted by Ballou and Podgursky (1993).
It is worth noting that, in the present study, teachers perceived unfairness in various
aspects, which linked with demotivation for working. According to equity theory
(Adams, 1963) and previous research evidence (e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 1991; S. Liu,
Zhao, et al., 2016; S. Liu & Onwuegbuzie, 2014), if teachers felt treated unfairly by
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examining their inputs (i.e., work effort) and outputs (i.e., salary) compared with others,
they were less likely to show support for school reforms.
Targeting school development over teacher development. From the international
perspective, teachers’ support for performance pay or incentive pay was inconsistent
from study to study. For example, 64% of participating teachers supported the POINT
program in the U.S. (Springer, Ballou, et al., 2010); only moderate teacher support was
found among teachers from public schools in Florida (Jacob & Springer, 2008); 80% of
Indian teachers from 300 government-run schools had supportive opinions toward
incentive pay (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011); and 100% surveyed teachers (one
headmaster and three teachers at each school) from 100 schools supported the incentive
program in Kenya (Glewwe et al., 2010). Although these studies were not completely
comparable due to the heterogeneity of program design, teacher and school
characteristics, and research methods (Jones, 2013; Sojourner et al., 2014, it was
important to learn from the successful programs with a high rate of teacher support. For
example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) pointed out that framing the
performance pay programs more toward “teacher recognition,” rather than toward
“school accountability,” would be helpful to build a friendly relationship between
teachers and administrators and, therefore, acquire better support from teachers.
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., J. Wang, 2012), the results from my study indicate
that participating teachers’ personal development was neglected in the implementation of
performance pay. Some schools even required teachers to sacrifice their personal benefits
to maintain the harmonic school culture. The program design with an emphasis on
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organizational development but not teachers’ development, might be one reason for low
teacher support.
Failing to focus on teachers’ teaching performance. It is worth noting that the
successful international cases mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were designed to
award extra money to teachers for their excellent performance in teaching and their
success in improving student test scores. However, teacher performance pay in the
Chinese context strove to break the impression that student test scores were used as the
only indicator for teacher performance evaluation and reduce teaching-to-the-test
phenomena in the classroom through a new emphasis of using multiple sources to
evaluate teachers as reflected in multiple government policy documents. Therefore,
teacher performance pay in China was intended to motivate teachers through recognizing
their duties and contributions both inside and outside the classroom, instead of rewarding
directly their performance in classroom teaching. This seemed to be a departure from
teaching quality or effectiveness, which should be the focal point for any quality
educational system. If teacher performance pay concentrated on teachers’ working loads
in non-teaching categories—but not their teaching quality—then teachers were less likely
to obtain high performance pay and to be motivated to work harder if they had no
adjustments in teaching loads or duties. Furthermore, if the performance evaluation
system failed to inform and guide teachers’ professional development, teachers were less
likely to have a supportive attitude.
Lacking effective communication. The present study indicated that participating
teachers had limited understanding about performance pay due to multiple reasons, such
as the limited access to the plan, complex and confusing contents, and lacking thorough
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discussions between teachers and administrators. If teachers have limited understanding
about the performance pay reform, they are less likely to be motivated and show their
support (Lundström, 2012. Communication is an important media in social relations, so
does in school reform. Additionally, participating teachers found that the process of
performance evaluation was not open and transparent. According to Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (2011), performance pay based on “objective measures of performance
that are transparently and fairly applied” (p. 396) would obtain teachers’ support.
Therefore, if teachers found the implementation process problematic, they were less
likely to show their support.
Communication is bilateral. School administrators fail to effectively deliver the
information. Meanwhile, teachers are less likely to actively communicate with
administrators. One possible reason is the lack of democracy in public sectors in China.
Teachers are afraid to speak out their concerns or provide suggestions, especially young
teachers. Also, there is no Teacher Union similar group to help teachers defend their
benefits. Therefore, teachers fail to express their opinions and make suggestions, which
leads to ineffective or “zero” communication between teachers and administrators
regarding performance pay.
Limited funding support. In the aforementioned international cases, extra money
or bonus pay was used to reward teachers, which meant teachers could obtain higher pay
if they made extra efforts to improve student achievement. But in the Chinese contexts,
similar to the finding in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016), interviewed teachers in the present
study reported their total salary was decreased after implementing performance pay, and
some schools used the teachers’ own money (which used to be part of their salary) as
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performance pay. The result is inconsistent with previous studies (e.g., Fu & Gui, 2010;
X. Li, 2010) which indicates the increase of teachers’ salaries in general after
implementing performance pay in some provinces. However, the increase of teachers’
salaries might be attributed to the development of the local economy, the increase of
teachers’ years of teaching, and the promotion of teachers’ professional ranking, which
are associated with teachers’ basic salary. There is no directly causal relationship
between the implementation of performance pay and the general increase of teachers’
salary. However, some scholars pointed out that the intention of the performance pay
reform was to minimize the inequality in pay between teachers in different schools (L.
Wang et al., 2014) through increasing the basic salary while decreasing the performance
pay. From the identified problems of performance pay, a series of new inequalities are
created in the process. The limited amount of performance pay sets barriers for school
administrators in designing the school-based plan, which further leads to unfairness and
demotivating perceived by teachers. If the performance pay program did not live up to
the expectations of incentivizing teachers, teachers would not support the program.
Problems of performance pay perceived by teachers. Four main categories
with 14 themes emerged from the qualitative data regarding problems associated with
teacher performance pay (see Figure 9). The four major issues indicated problems from
the origin (funding), to the process (implementation), and to final impacts (unfairness and
demotivation) perceived by participating teachers. The problems were interrelated.
Specifically, the fundamental problem was the limited funding used for teacher
performance pay and the unbalanced distribution among schools at the district level,
which failed to consider school contexts. The problems involved in the implementation
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were demonstrated from two aspects. One is the poor design of the implementation plan
at school level, with oversimplified indicators disconnected from the complexity of
teachers’ work. Implementation also included failure to differentiate teachers’
effectiveness and responsibilities using performance pay. Finally, participating teachers
perceived ineffective communication between administrators and teachers about the
performance pay plan; teachers reported that they were not well informed about the plan
and the implementing process was nontransparent. The last two categories—unfairness
and demotivation—suggested the impacts of performance pay perceived by participating
teachers. Unfairness perceived by teachers was described as: their opinions being
ignored; their performance not being appropriately rewarded; their salary being lower
than before; and their performance pay being lower than teachers from the other schools
and districts. Meanwhile, teachers were demotivated by the small amount of incentives,
negative side effects brought by performance pay (e.g., conflicts among colleagues,
teaching to the test), and administrators’ egalitarian philosophy.
• Ineffective
communication
• Non-transparent process
• Oversimplified indicators
• Failing to differentiate
teaching effectiveness

• Limited budget
• Unbalanced
distribution

• Lacking voice of front-line
teachers
• In favor of administrative
positions
• Using original payment as
performance pay
• Lacking uniform standards

Limited and
Unbalanced
Funding

Problematic
Implementat
ion Process

Unfairness

Demotivating
•
•
•
•
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Small amount
Conflicts among colleagues
Teaching to test
Failing to reward good
performance

Figure 9. Categories and themes of problems perceived by participating teachers
The qualitative themes found in the present study were consistent with issues of
teacher performance pay in China discussed in previous literature. For example, teachers
felt unmotivated or demotivated due to the small amount of performance pay (X. Li,
2010; K. Liu, 2012); teacher performance pay resulted in teaching to the test (H. Li & Li,
2011), high pressure (He & Liu, 2011), and tensions in collegial relationships (X. Liu,
2011); and teachers were unsatisfied about using teachers’ original salaries as incentives
(H. Liu, 2012; S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). The findings are consistent across schools and
regions in China, which indicates that even though the performance pay implementation
plans are school-based, the universal problems might be attributed to factors beyond
school contexts and regional disparities. Two possible factors are discussed in the
following sections.
The first factor is the decentralization of the national policy. The national policy
of teacher performance pay suggested that the implementation of teacher performance
pay should be based on local economic development and that implementation plans
should be school-based. It seemed that local educational agencies and administrators
were empowered in the decision-making process, which was regarded as a good sign of
decentralization (S. Liu, Zhao, et al., 2016). However, too much freedom at the local
level resulted in limited teacher performance funding and overly diverse implementation
plans, which led to participating teachers’ perceptions of unfairness and demotivation.
The second factor is the traditional Chinese culture rooted in Confucianism.
Competition and conflicts brought by the reform of teacher performance pay might be
against the tenet of harmony in Confucianism (B. Li, 2014). Therefore, some school
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administrators employed egalitarian methods or sacrificed veteran teachers’ benefits to
meet the collective benefits for avoiding tensions among teachers and maintaining the
harmonic school culture. However, this has contributed to teachers’ sense of unfairness
and demotivation.
Compared with the teacher support rate found in Question 1 that only 15.3% of
participating teachers show very unsupportive or unsupportive attitudes toward
performance pay, the qualitative themes regarding problems perceived by teachers
suggests that teachers were strongly unsatisfied with performance pay. The inconsistency
between results of two research questions indicates that teachers’ response to the survey
questionnaire may have lacked validity to some degree and the qualitative data is
important in digging into information underneath. It also indicates that the Chinese
teachers are more open to interviews than to surveys and they do have opinions toward
the implementation of performance pay, but school administrators fail to provide a path
for them to express their opinions.
Teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation measures. The findings
indicate that the top three performance evaluation measures preferred by teachers were
“serving as banzhuren, or on other duties,” “students’ test scores,” and “performance
evaluations by principals.” However, the results are not completely consistent with S.
Liu, Xu, et al. (2016), who found the top three measures preferred by teachers were:
“collaboration with faculty and staff,” “efforts to involve parents in student education,”
and “students’ test scores” (see Table 47). The main reason associated with the difference
is that answer choices provided to participants in both studies are not completely same,
for example, “serving as banzhuren, or on other duties,” “highest academic qualification
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degree,” “teaching in particular subject” were not included in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016).
Admittedly, there are divergence in two studies’ samples in terms of teachers’
characteristics and perceptions toward performance evaluation measures. However, there
might have been stronger correlation between the findings if the study contexts were
more similar. The three least preferred evaluation measures found in both studies were
the same (i.e., “performance evaluations by peers,” “awards certifications,” “independent
evaluation of teaching portfolios”).
Table 47
Comparison of Most Preferred and Least Preferred Evaluation Measures (Mean) Among
Selected Chinese Teachers in Two Studies
Evaluation
Measures
Most
preferred
measures

The present study

S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016)a

•

Serving as banzhuren, or • Collaboration with faculty
on other duties (4.03)
and staff (3.83)
• Students’ test scores
• Efforts to involve parents
(3.88)
in student education (3.76)
• Performance evaluations • Students’ test scores (3.67)
by principals (3.80)
Least
• Performance evaluations • Award certificates (3.11)
preferred
by peers (3.37)
measures
• Awards certifications
• Performance evaluations
(3.37)
by peers (3.09)
• Independent evaluation
• Independent evaluation of
of teaching portfolios
teaching portfolios (2.99)
(3.34)
a
Adapted from “Chinese Middle School Teachers’ Preferences Regarding Performance
Evaluation Measures,” by S. Liu, X. Xu, and J. Stronge, 2016, Educational Assessment,
Evaluation and Accountability, 28, p. 170. Copyright 2016 by Springer International
Publishing AG.
The quantitative results of teachers’ preference on “serving as banzhuren, or on
other duties” were consistent with the qualitative result. Interviewed teachers recognized
the great effort banzhuren made and agreed that banzhuren work deserved incentive
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rewards. Meanwhile, teachers’ choice of this measure suggested that they supported the
philosophy of “more credits for larger workload,” which is the theme of performance
pay.
“Performance evaluations by principals” was a striking finding because Qi (2012)
showed that school administrators were teachers’ least preferred evaluator of
performance. Additionally, results from the PCA in the present study indicated that
teachers were less preferred to be evaluated by principals if they thought the principals
know their performance. The contradictory results indicated that the participating
teachers prefer to be evaluated by their principals if they think the principals have limited
knowledge about their performance. The possible explanation might be that teachers
usually impress their principals by their good performance. But, if principals fully know
their performance, including both good and bad, the results of performance evaluation
might be not as good as if principals only know their good sides.
For the least preferred measures, Chinese teachers’ dislike of “awards
certifications” were consistent with previous study (S. Liu, Xu, et al., 2016). According
to the qualitative result, “independent evaluation of teaching portfolios” was not familiar
to Chinese teachers and not often used in performance evaluation. Therefore,
participating teachers ranked it as the least preferred measure.
Three themes were generated regarding teachers’ perceptions toward performance
evaluation; these were consistent with previous studies in the Chinese context. First,
performance evaluation was more summative than formative (e.g., Hong, 2014; Meng &
Yuan, 2014). Second, specific evaluation standards and rubrics were lacking (e.g., Hong,
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2014; C. Li, 2014; Mao, 2013). Third, performance evaluation measures were
oversimplified and inaccurate (e.g., Mi & Dai, 2011; Xiong, 2009).
Regarding evaluation measures, teachers have concerns toward students’
achievement, because it is frequently used as the only indicator for teacher performance
evaluation. It “guides” teachers to focus on improving students’ test scores, and finally
results in teaching to test (Chai & Wang, 2010; H. Li & Li, 2011). It is contradictory to
the nature of education that teaching and learning spans a long-term period (B. Li, 2014).
However, the quantitative results show that students’ achievement is among the top three
evaluation measures preferred by participating teachers. Three possible explanations for
the inconsistent results are presented here.
First, teachers agree that students’ achievement is an objective measure showing
teaching effectiveness, but they think students’ achievement is not a comprehensive
measure manifesting all their efforts. As mentioned by interviewed teachers, it is unfair to
link performance pay with students’ test scores of a certain exam, because there are many
other uncontrollable factors associated with students’ test scores. Second, the education
system in China is test-centered, therefore, teachers’ accountability is primarily aligned
with students’ achievement. Test-based enrollment exams at different levels (middle
school, high school, and college) decide the educational quality students obtain for the
following educational period, and further impact students’ future. In recent years, with
internationalization and globalization, the government attempts to “shift” the centrality of
testing in the education system through emphasizing on the well-development education
(emphasizing moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic education) and teacher evaluation
with multiple indicators. However, the impact is limited due to the fact that students’ test
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scores are still the only criteria in school selection. Consequently, the essential role of
students’ achievement in teachers’ performance evaluation is still unshakable. Third, the
inequality of performance pay is tied to the emphasis on students’ achievement.
Interviewed teachers from the disadvantaged schools reported that student source was a
cause for the disparity of performance pay between them and teachers from the
advantageous schools. The reason is that the school would award teachers if their
students’ achievement were ranked in the top three or five in enrollment exams (usually
uniform at the provincial level), and these top-ranked students were usually from the
advantageous schools. Therefore, teachers in the disadvantaged schools would fail to
obtain this part of performance pay, which they felt unfair because they worked as hard
as teachers in the advantageous schools.
Factors extracted from the teacher perception survey. Seven factors were not
completely the same as the factors found in both S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) and S. Liu,
Zhao, et al. (2016) studies. In the present study, four factors representing teachers’
perceptions toward performance pay were: collaboration and effectiveness, pressure and
turnover, policy and structures, and motivation and satisfaction. Compared to S. Liu,
Zhao, et al. (2016), the similar dimensions were effectiveness, pressure/stress, motivation,
and collaboration. The divergent dimensions were fairness and competition (S. Liu,
Zhao, et al., 2016) compared to turnover, satisfaction and policy and structures (present
study; see Table 48). The similar dimensions indicated the universal concerns teachers
had across samples, but the dissimilar factors showed the distinctive concerns teachers
had for different teacher samples.
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Turnover was one dimension that teachers had strong opinions about in the
present study, and the qualitative results similarly indicated that participating teachers
perceived an increase of teacher turnover at schools after the implementation of
performance pay. The result was consistent with Lai (2014). However, the international
studies (e.g., Springer et al., 2008) showed that increasing the amounts of incentive
decreased teacher turnover rate. Therefore, the limited amount of performance pay might
be one of the reasons teachers in the present study perceived turnover to be caused by
performance pay. Also, fairness was a dimension generated in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016),
but not in the present study. However, qualitative results in both studies demonstrated
that teachers felt unfairness regarding the implementation of performance pay from
various aspects. This finding was consistent with previous studies in the Chinese context
(e.g., H. Li & Li, 2011; C. Li, 2014; H. Liu, 2012; K. Liu; 2012; X. Liu, 2011).
Table 48
Comparison of Factors (Alpha of Internal Consistency) Representing Chinese Teachers’
Perceptions toward Performance Pay in Two Studies
The present study
S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016)a
• Collaboration and Effectiveness • Fairness and Effectiveness (.89)
(.93)
• Competition and Stress (.64)
• Pressure and Turnover (.84)
• Motivation (.49)
• Policy and Structures (.84)
• Peer Collaboration (.82)
• Motivation and Satisfaction (.76)
a
Adapted from “Chinese Teachers’ Attitudes Toward Performance Pay: The Cases of
Three Schools,” by S. Liu, D. Zhao, and W. Xie, 2016, International Journal of
Educational Management, 30, p. 799. Copyright 2016 by Emerald Group Publishing
Limited.
Additionally, the items with the associated loadings under policy and structure
suggested that surveyed teachers had a clear understanding of the structure of
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performance pay at their schools. However, the qualitative results contradicted this
finding. Interviewed teachers were unfamiliar with school-based implementation plans
for performance pay. Similarly, Jacob and Springer (2008) found teachers knew little
about the operation of incentive program based on teachers’ responses to survey
questions. The possible explanation for the discrepancy between quantitative and
qualitative results in the present study might be that surveyed teachers provided socially
desirable response, rather than expressing their real knowledge level about performance
pay, because they were afraid the survey was an inspection to them.
The quantitative factors suggested teachers’ perceived impacts of performance
pay on teaching effectiveness. However, the qualitative data showed that some teachers
felt no influence of performance pay on their teaching practice, which was contrary to the
quantitative result. Teachers expressed that they were not satisfied with performance pay,
but their self-efficacy and sense of responsibility supported them to continue teaching as
they had before the implementation of performance pay, which was consistent with Mao
(2013). However, teachers also stated that they had concerns regarding how long such
support would last. It seemed performance pay might not have a long-term impact on
teaching effectiveness in that teachers’ self-efficacy and sense of responsibility were
consumed by the negative influence perceived by teachers. If teachers’ self-efficacy
decreased, they were less likely to support performance pay (Jacob & Springer, 2008),
and their teaching practice and associated student achievement would be negatively
affected (Fan & Ren, 2013).
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The three factors focusing on teachers’ perceptions toward performance
evaluation in the present study were labeled with the same names as in Liu et al. (2016b),
but the specific items under each factor were dissimilar (see Table 49).
There are two possible reasons for the inconsistency of results between studies.
First, the items entered into factor analysis were not completely identical for the two
studies. In the present study, 64 items of the teacher perception scale were entered into
PCA as a whole, including items associated with performance pay and items regarding
performance evaluation measures, for maintaining the complete data structure. But,
separate PCAs were conducted for teachers’ perceptions of performance pay and
teachers’ perceptions of performance evaluation measures in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) and
S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) because the two studies were separately conducted.
Second, different techniques of PCAs were used. For example, considering the
correlations between items and correlation among factors, I chose promax rotation for
PCAs, while S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) used PCA with oblimin rotation. Although both
rotations were oblique (assuming correlation between factors), the heterogeneity of
results might still exist. Additionally, the cut-off point of pattern/structure coefficient was
.40 in my study, while it was .35 in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016). Therefore, varied items were
retained for each factor.
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Table 49
Comparison of Factors and the Associated Items (Loading) Representing Chinese
Teachers’ Perceptions Toward Performance Evaluation Measures

Collaborative
Measures

The present study

S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016)

•

Student evaluations of
teaching performance (.83)
Efforts to involve parents in
student education (.81)
Collaboration with peers and
staff (.75)
Parent satisfaction with
teacher (.75)
Mentoring other teachers (.63)
Awards certifications (.57)

•

Students’ test scores (.69)
Teaching in specific subject
(.66)
Serving as Banzhuren, or other
duties (.65)
Performance evaluations by
principals (-.68)
Highest academic
qualification degree (-.58)
According to national policy,
70% of payment is due to
basic duties and 30% is
incentive payment, and I think
it is reasonable. (.51)
Teacher performance pay is
based on teacher performance
evaluation. (.44)
I support teacher performance
pay at my school (.44)
My school principal fully
knows my performance. (.41)

•
•

•
•
•
•
•
Input-based
Measures

•
•
•

Mixed
Measures

•
•
•

•
•
•
a

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Efforts to involve parents in
student education (.73)
Collaboration with faculty
and staff (.72)
Parent satisfaction with
teacher (.71)
Student evaluations of
teaching performance (.71)
Working with students
outside of class time (.67)
Time spent in professional
development (.63)
Award Certificate (.85)
Mentoring other teachers
(.59)

Performance evaluations by
principals (.81)
Performance evaluations by
peers (.71)
Students’ test scores (.62)
Independent evaluation of
teaching portfolios (.54)

Adapted from “Chinese Middle School Teachers’ Preferences Regarding Performance
Evaluation Measures,” by S. Liu, X. Xu, and J. Stronge, 2016, Educational Assessment,
Evaluation and Accountability, 28, p. 171. Copyright 2016 by Springer International
Publishing AG.
The interesting relationships among items underneath mixed measures showed a
positive association between “I support teacher performance pay at my school.” and “My
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school principal fully knows my performance.” In other words, participating teachers
were more likely to support performance pay when they think their principals have a
comprehensive understanding about their performance. This is consistent with previous
studies which demonstrated a positive association between teachers’ support of
performance pay and teachers’ perceptions of their school leaders (Goldhaber et al., 2011
Jacob & Springer, 2008). Principals’ complete knowledge about teachers’ performance
shows that principals care for teachers and they have a close relationship, which reflects
principals’ leadership. Therefore, based on the assumption that if teachers favor the
principals’ leadership, teachers are more likely to support performance pay, principals’
leadership is important in the reform of performance pay.
Differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay based on
selected characteristics. Six characteristics of teachers and schools were explored for
differences in teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay. MANOVA results were
significant for teachers’ teaching experience, professional ranking, school level, and
school rank. The non-significant finding with regard to teachers’ gender was consistent
with S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) and studies in the international contexts (e.g., Jacob &
Springer, 2008; Jones, 2013). However, different from S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016), the
findings indicated significant differences with regard to teachers’ teaching experience and
professional ranking. Besides the small sample size cited by S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016),
the other major reason for this discrepancy might be the data analysis method. MANOVA
was employed in the present study while separate one-way ANOVAs were used in S. Liu,
Zhao, et al. (2016). MANOVA is regarded as more powerful than univariate ANOVA
when multiple dependent variables are examined (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014).
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Specifically, teachers with the highest professional ranking had less positive
attitudes regarding motivation and satisfaction of performance pay. The result can also be
applied to veteran teachers and young teachers because professional ranking is positively
associated with teachers’ years of teaching experience, even though no significant
univariate main effect for teachers’ teaching experience were found for teachers’
perceptions toward performance pay. The finding that veteran teachers had less positive
attitudes in motivation and satisfaction for performance pay was similar to previous
studies in both the Chinese context (e.g., L. Wang et al., 2014) and international contexts
(e.g., Ballou & Podgurskdy, 1993; Jones, 2013; Sojourner et al., 2014. Additionally, the
qualitative results showed aligned with this finding. For example, veteran teachers
already had a high basic salary due to their long years of teaching experience and high
professional ranking, and they thought the performance pay was too small to be worth
extra effort, so they perceived less motivation for performance pay than young teachers
who counted on performance pay to increase their overall salary. Similarly, the veteran
teachers already worked as effectively as they could before the implementation of
performance pay, therefore, they were less likely to be motivated, which is consistent
with Springer, Ballou, et al. (2010).
The finding of different perceptions teachers had based on their professional
ranking was inconsistent with S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016). One possible reason, besides the
sample size and the statistical technique, might be that the sample of the present study
included both elementary and secondary teachers, while only middle school teachers
were sampled in S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016). In China, elementary teachers’ and secondary
teachers’ professional rankings were accredited differently with various criteria.
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Therefore, the present study sample involved more variability in terms of teachers’
professional ranking for teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay.
Significant results were also found based on teachers’ school level and school
rank. The finding on school level was consistent with studies in the international context
(e.g., Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Burns et al., 2009; Jacob & Springer, 2007; Goldhaber
et al., 2011). It is reasonable that elementary teachers and secondary teachers had
different perceptions toward performance pay due to their divergent work load (e.g.,
difficulty level of subjects, teaching hours per week) and pressure of student
achievement.
The difference related to school rank was a striking finding because the effect size
(.086) was the largest among the significant results. School rank was not examined in
terms of teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay in previous studies in the Chinese
context. The case study of S. Liu, Zhao, et al. (2016) explored teachers’ perceptions
within a particular school context, but school rank was not mentioned. However, school
rank might be associated with the amount of performance pay and the program design.
The qualitative findings of the present study demonstrated this point. Teachers from the
ordinary schools stated that they felt they had been treated unfairly due to having less
performance pay than teachers from the high-ranked schools because they made the
same, or even more, effort than teachers from high-ranked schools to improve students’
achievement. After the implementation of performance pay, the local government had
made an effort to balance teachers’ salary among schools by controlling the various
incomes of schools (L. Wang et al., 2014). But according to teachers’ responses, the
high-ranked schools still have a variety of monetary awards (e.g., students’ high rank in
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enrollment exams), and teachers’ performance pay in those schools was higher than
teachers in ordinary schools because the implementation plan was school-based.
However, from the practical significance, it might be unfeasible to distribute the funding
of performance pay according to school rank, because it would create unfairness.
Differences of teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation
measures based on selected characteristics. Teachers’ perceptions of performance
evaluation measures were statistically significant on teachers’ gender, teaching
experience, type, professional ranking, school level and school rank. In contrast, due to
the small sample size, no significant results were found in S. Liu, Xu, et al. (2016) related
to teachers’ gender, professional ranking, and teaching experience. From the statistically
significant pairwise comparisons, female teachers in my study were more supportive of
using mixed measures in performance evaluation. Mixed measures include items: “I
support teacher performance pay at my school” and “Teacher performance pay at my
school is based on teacher performance evaluation.” This suggests that participating
female teachers had a more positive attitude toward performance pay and performance
evaluation than participating male teachers, which was inconsistent with previous
international studies (e.g., Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Jacob & Springer, 2008).
Additionally, elementary teachers were more supportive of using collaborative
measures and mixed measures in performance evaluation than secondary teachers.
Collaborative measures include measures like student evaluations of teaching
performance, efforts to involve parents in students’ education, and parent satisfaction
with teacher. Previous researchers have expressed doubt regarding the reliability of
students’ and parents’ evaluation on teachers’ performance (F. Liang, 2012), but studies
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also indicated the importance of involving multiple evaluators in teacher performance
evaluation (e.g., N. Li, 2010). Parental involvement is more important in elementary
schools than in secondary schools, so elementary teachers might have more cooperation
with parents and put a higher value on parents’ satisfaction than secondary teachers do,
which might explain the significant pairwise comparison. Also, elementary teachers’
more supportive attitude toward mixed measures indicated their more positive attitude
toward performance pay and performance evaluation than secondary teachers’. But, the
result is inconsistent with Goldhaber et al. (2011) and Jacob and Springer (2008). The
possible reason might be the different school system, teachers’ working load, and the
difference in working hours between China and the U.S. For example, Jacob and Springer
(2008) indicated that secondary teachers were expected to teach longer than elementary
teachers, so they were more likely to support incentive programs than elementary
teachers, but the standard cannot be applied to Chinese teachers. In China, elementary
teachers work as long as secondary teachers do, so some other reasons, such as pressure
of students’ enrollment exams, might be associated with the difference of perceptions
between elementary teachers and secondary teachers.
School-expert teachers were found less positive toward mixed measures than nonexpert teachers and the higher-level-expert teachers (municipal-expert teachers and
provincial-expert teachers). No relevant previous studies explored the differences among
the groups of expert teachers in the Chinese context. The hypothesized reason is that,
compared to the higher-level-expert teachers who might have extra rewards from the
corresponding governmental agency to approve their teaching effectiveness at the certain
level, school-expert teachers fail to obtain such extra payment from schools. Meanwhile,
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compared to non-expert teachers, school-expert teachers have more responsibilities and
heavier working loads. Without extra rewards identifying their extra efforts, they are less
likely to have a positive attitude toward performance pay and the associated mixed
measures.
Ordinary-school teachers were found more supportive in mixed measures than
municipal-key-school teachers and provincial-key-school teachers, which also indicated
that ordinary-school teachers were more supportive for performance pay than municipalkey-school teachers and provincial-key-school teachers. There are two possible reasons.
First, teachers from both municipal-key schools and provincial-key schools used to have
higher performance pay than teachers from ordinary schools, because higher-ranked
schools used to have more advantages in funding (extra money paid by parents, and
rewards from local government for the schools’ good performance) than ordinary
schools. However, the extra funding was disallowed after implementing performance
pay, and the amount of teachers’ performance pay was largely decreased in the higherranked schools. Therefore, comparing the “loss” in performance pay, higher-rankedschool teachers have the less supportive attitude toward performance pay than ordinaryschool teachers.
Second, compared with ordinary schools, higher-ranked schools usually have
more expert teachers who have the high-level professional ranking. The other findings in
the present study indicated teachers with higher-level professional rankings were less
likely to be motivated by performance pay than teachers with the low-level professional
ranking, and teachers with higher-level professional rankings had the less supportive
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attitude toward mixed measures than teachers with low professional ranking. Therefore,
ordinary-school teachers were more supportive than higher-ranked-school teachers.
It is worth noting that the school rank accounts for 20.2% of the variance of
teachers’ perceptions toward input-based evaluation measures, which is the largest
among the six characteristics identified. Three items are under input-based measures:
students’ test scores, teaching in specific subject, and serving as banzhuren, or other
duties. The three items were the most influential factors resulting in disparities of
teachers’ performance pay. This finding suggests that teachers from different ranked
schools have diverse perceptions toward these three items. The point echoes the previous
finding that teachers from the lower-ranked schools felt unfairly treated because they
work as hard as teachers from the higher-ranked schools, while they fail to be equally
rewarded due to to student achievement differences and funding associated with school
rank.
Additionally, both school level and school rank, newly explored in the present
study, accounted for approximately 30% of the differences in teachers’ perceptions
toward performance evaluation; teacher characteristics (e.g., gender, teaching experience,
type, professional ranking) only accounted for 17.8% of the differences. From the
statistical significance, this suggests that school-level factors had a larger impact than
teacher-level factors on teachers’ perceptions toward performance evaluation. From the
practical significance, it implies that if the local government wanted to balance teachers’
perceptions toward performance evaluation across schools, building uniform evaluation
standards considering school-level factors would be necessary.
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Implications
Based on the tentative findings from my study, I have developed implications for
teaching practice, leadership, and future research.
Practice. Teachers perceived unfairness due to the inequality among schools
created by diverse performance pay plans. It seemed challenging for administrators to
design the school-based plan with fairness, feasibility and, more importantly, teachers’
support. Therefore, at the municipal or provincial level, the government should publish
guidance considering school contexts (e.g., school level and school rank) to regulate the
design of school-level implementation plan. For example, develop guidance specific for
elementary schools and secondary schools, respectively, and frame the policy targeting
teacher development. Meanwhile, local educational agencies should inspect the
implementation of performance pay at schools and restrict the overlay of administrative
duties, such as distributing teachers’ performance pay based on the quantity of
administrative duties, to reduce the negative effect of performance pay on teachers.
Additionally, policymakers and school administrators should focus on the structure of
performance pay plans and the associated performance evaluation indicators. Given the
statistically significant variation of teachers’ perceptions based on teachers’
characteristics, any performance pay plan should consider elements such as teachers’
years of experience and professional ranking. The implementation plan should indicate
not only the methods, but also the associated conditions based on both individual and
organizational characteristics. Furthermore, considering the impact of performance pay
on teachers’ collaboration, satisfaction, pressure, effectiveness, and collegial relationships
among teachers, policymakers and school administrators should periodically conduct
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program evaluations, collecting teachers’ opinions to modify the implementation plan
and meet the needs of teachers.
Leadership. The study provides a way to hear the voice of front-line teachers
regarding performance pay and performance evaluation for school administrators and
policymakers. Although teachers’ voices may not be strong enough to reform
performance pay in the Chinese context, it does affect the quality of schooling. If teachers
feel their opinions are being ignored, they will be less likely to support performance pay.
Therefore, including teachers’ voices in the decision-making process is critical to school
leadership. It is important to build the path for teachers to freely express their opinions.
Additionally, the study results indicate that teachers’ perceptions of their principals’
leadership influenced their attitudes toward performance pay. To enhance performance
pay support, it is necessary to improve school leadership. School leaders, especially those
lacking strong leadership practices should attend principal professional development
programs alongside implementing performance pay. Finally, funding for teacher
performance pay is distributed at the district level and the funding amount is associated
with educational input. Thus, increasing the educational input is the fundamental way to
improve teacher performance pay. The district-level government should align the
educational input with the local economy to serve the needs of local schools and teachers
better. More importantly, provide corresponding rewards to teachers in the disadvantaged
schools to confirm their efforts and motivate them to improve the teaching practice.
Future research. Results of this study provide empirical evidence of
participating teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and performance evaluation
in the Chinese context. Findings also add to the literature related to international studies
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of teacher performance pay from Chinese teachers’ perspectives. Given the diversity
across regions in China and the limited generalizability of the sample, future research
should consider a larger and more representative sample, including teachers from rural
areas, to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of teachers’ perception toward
performance pay. The study investigated the extent of teachers’ support for performance
pay based on teachers’ self-reported response on the survey, which might be biased by
teachers’ personal attitude. Therefore, future research should employ the more objective
statistical method such as ordinary least squares regression to predict teachers’ attitude
toward performance pay with reliable predictors. Additionally, based on large effect sizes
obtained from school-level characteristics, future research should use more advanced
statistical analyses such as hierarchical linear model to examine the impact of factors at
varying hierarchical levels (teacher, cohort, and school) on teachers’ perceptions. The
last, but not the least, implication is that more qualitative studies are needed to explore
teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay and performance evaluation because it is
revealing to explore teachers’ real experience and thoughts in a deep level compared to
quantitative studies.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Form-English
Consent Form
Please read this consent form carefully before you decide whether or not to
participate in this study.
Study Title: Teachers’ Perceptions of Teacher Performance Pay in China
Investigator: Yi Hua
Background and Purpose: You are being asked to participate in a study project, which
is one part of the dissertation required for my Ph.D. degree. The purpose of this study is
to investigate Chinese teachers’ perceptions for teacher performance pay at public regular
schools in China. As a teacher working at public regular schools in China, you are in a
position to provide me with your perceptions of teacher performance pay, and I would
appreciate it if you would agree to participate in this study.
Procedures: The study will be composed of two parts: survey and individual interview.
Your involvement in the study might be limited solely to taking a survey or taking both a
survey and an interview. The survey is composed of 63 items and five open-ended items,
which might take 15-20 minutes to accomplish. You will be asked to provide relevant
demographic information used in the study to answer research questions. If you will
participate in the interview, questions regarding your understanding and concerns of
performance pay will be asked. With your permission, I will audiotape the interview, but
only for the purpose of accurately transcribing our conversations. The audiotapes and
transcriptions will be stored securely in my personal computer, and will be destroyed
when the study has been completed.
Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. You do not have
to answer every questions asked of me. Should you decide at any time after giving
consent to participate that you no longer wish to be involved with the study, you may
withdraw your consent without penalty and prejudice by informing me of your decision
via email or telephone. My and my supervisor’s contact information is listed below.
Confidentiality and Privacy: None of the information collected in the survey will be
used to reveal your identity as a participant or to link your responses with your identity.
Pseudonyms in interview documents will be used to protect your privacy and
confidentiality. The information that you provide in the study will be handled
confidentially. Without your permission, the information will not be used in any
presentation or publication. The audio records will be destroyed after the study is
complete. Please know though that you do not have to answer any questions or discuss
any topics that make you feel uncomfortable.
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Costs and Benefits to You: This survey may take approximately 15-20 minutes to
complete and the individual interview may take approximately 40-60 minutes. There are
no direct benefits to you. However, you may request a copy of the study’s results from
me by sending an email requesting results to yhua@email.wm.edu.
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact me (the
researcher), or the supervising professor, Dr. James Stronge (jhstro@wm.edu) at The
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia (757-880-3881). If you have
additional questions or concerns or regarding your rights as a study participant, or are
dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of this study, you may contact, anonymously if
you wish, Dr. Tom Ward at 757-221-2358 (tjward@wm.edu) or Dr. Ray McCoy at 757221-2783 (rwmcco@wm.edu), chairs of the two William & Mary committees that
supervise the treatment of study participants.
SIGNATURE: I confirm that the purpose of the research, the study procedures, and the
possible discomforts as well as benefits have been explained to me. All of my questions
have been answered. I agree to participate in the research study described above.
Signature:______________________

Date: _____________

You will receive a copy of this form for your records.
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Appendix B: Informed Consent Form-Chinese

63
5

15-20

》

.

》
15-20
40-60
yhua@email.wm.edu

》

Dr. James Stronge (

757-221-2358) (
2783) (

(
)
jhstro@wm.edu) (

: 757-880-3881)

Dr. Tom Ward (
Dr. Ray McCoy (
757-221-

tjward@wm.edu)
rwmcco@wm.edu)

______________________

:______________________
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Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire-English
Teacher Perception Survey:
Teacher Performance Pay
School name:
Grade:
Subject:
BACKGROUND: Many schools are conducting teacher performance pay based on
teacher performance evaluation. This study is attempting to identify how teachers
perceive connecting teacher performance pay with performance evaluations.
DIRECTIONS: Based on your knowledge and experience, please respond to the
following questions regarding your perceptions of teacher performance pay. Please
indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement on a scale of Strongly
Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Not Know (3), Agree (4), to Strongly Agree (5).
Thank you for your participation.
Part I: Background Information
1. Your gender is:
a. Male
b. Female
2. Your age is:
a. 21-30
b. 31-40

d. 41-50

3. Your teaching experience is:
a. Less than 5 years b. 5-9 years
years

e. above 51

c. 10-14 years

4. Your education degree is:
a. Doctor
b. Master
c. Bachelor

d. 15-19 years

d. High School

e. More than 20

e. Other

5. Your school is:
a. urban school b. suburban school c. county school d. township school e. village
school
6. Your school is:
a. national key school b. provincial key school c. municipal key school d. ordinary
school
7. You are:
a. municipal expert teacher b. district-level expert teacher
teacher
d. non-expert teacher

c. school-level expert

8. besides teaching classes, the other administrative title(s) you have is(are):
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a. principal
b. vice principal
e. Banzhuren f. none

c. chief of teaching

9. Your professional ranking is:
a. high
b. level one c. level two

d. grade leader

d. primary level

10. Your general view towards the implementation of teacher performance pay is:
a. strongly disagree b. disagree
c. neutral
d. agree
e. strongly agree
Part II
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about
performance pay?
(Circle One Response in Each Row)
Strongly Disagree Not
Disagree
Know
1. I have a clear understanding
1
2
3
regarding teacher performance
pay at my school.
2. I know about the composition
1
2
3
of my total salary.

Agree
4

Strongly
Agree
5

4

5

3. I clearly understand about
working duties associated with
my payment.
4. I clearly understand the
performance evaluation rubrics
associated with my payment.
5. I think teacher performance
pay at my school is reasonable.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

6. Teacher performance pay at
my school failed to effectively
motivate me.
7. I support teacher performance
pay at my school.
8. I fully understand the national
policy of teacher performance
pay at compulsory schools.
9. According to national policy,
70% of payment is due to basic
duties and 30% is incentive
payment, and I think it is
reasonable.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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10. After teacher performance
pay reform, I think my payment
is higher than local governmental
officials.
11. I am satisfied with the policy
of teacher performance pay.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

12. I am satisfied with the
implementation of teacher
performance pay at my school.
13. Teacher performance pay at
my school ignored what I think is
important to my performance
evaluation.
14. I think it is necessary to
implement teacher performance
pay.
15. Teacher performance pay at
my school is based on teacher
performance evaluation.
16. For obtaining incentive
payment, I will change or have
already changed my teaching
methods.
17. Teacher performance pay at
my school is fair to all teachers.
18. Teacher performance pay will
motivate teachers to work harder
for obtaining higher payment.
19. Teacher performance pay is
not a long-term policy, so
teachers are pessimistic about its
long-lasting results.
20. Implementing teacher
performance pay can retain
effective teachers.
21. Implementing teacher
performance pay can attract more
excellent teachers.
22. Teacher performance pay at
my school can effectively
identify effective teachers.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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23. Teachers have strong
objection towards teacher
performance pay at my school.
24. Teacher performance pay at
my school has negative influence
on school culture and colleague
relationship.
25. Implementing teacher
performance pay disturbs
teachers’ collaboration.
26. Teacher performance pay at
my school can improve teachers’
professional level.
27. Teacher performance pay at
my school can improve teachers’
teaching.
28. Teacher performance pay at
my school can improve students’
academic achievement.
29. After implementing teacher
performance pay, teachers’ job
satisfaction is improved.
30. After implementing teacher
performance pay, teachers have
more pressure than before.
31. Prior to the policy, I prefer
how school is operating now.
32. I always want to transfer to
the other schools after
implementing teacher
performance pay.
33. After implementing teacher
performance pay, teachers at my
school have more passion in
working.
34. If there is a chance, I want to
change my job.
35. My salary has been improved
since the policy has been
implemented.
36. After implementing teacher
performance pay, I want to
become a better teacher due to
the collaborative culture
encouraged by my school.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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2

3

4

5

1

2
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4
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2
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1

2
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1
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2
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4

5
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37. After implementing teacher
performance pay, I feel supported
from the other teachers.
38. After implementing teacher
performance pay, teachers at my
school prefer competition rather
than collaboration.
39. After implementing teacher
performance pay, teachers at my
school do not trust each other any
more.
40. After implementing teacher
performance pay, teachers at my
school feel they have
responsibility to try the best to
help each other.
41. After implementing teacher
performance pay, teachers at my
school encourage students to
keep trying when they come
across challenging academic
questions.
42. After implementing teacher
performance pay, teachers at my
school always help each other,
even if it’s not their duty.
43. The school administrators
decide my payment based on
teacher performance evaluation
with reliable information of my
performance.
44. After implementing teacher
performance pay, my school
principal tends to award teachers
who show loyalty to him or her.
45. My school principal has the
autonomy to distribute incentives
to excellent teachers.
46. School administrators have
ever communicated with me
regarding the process of teacher
performance pay.
47. My school principal fully
knows my performance.
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4
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48. My school principal and other
evaluators should participate in
training to improve their
knowledge and abilities of
performance evaluation.

1

2

3

4

5

Part III
How much importance would you give to each of the following in teacher
performance evaluation?
(Circle One Response in Each Row)
Not
Low
Moderate
Important Importance
1. Highest
1
2
3
academic
qualification
degree.
2. Students’ test
1
2
3
scores.
3. Performance
1
2
3
evaluations by
principals.
4. Performance
1
2
3
evaluations by
peers.
5. Independent
1
2
3
evaluation of
teaching
portfolios.
6. Student
1
2
3
evaluations of
teaching
performance.
7. Collaboration
1
2
3
with peers and
staff.
8. Efforts to
1
2
3
involve parents in
students’
education.
9. Awards
1
2
3
certifications.
10. Parent
1
2
3
satisfaction with
teacher.
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Important High
Importance
4
5

4

5

4

5

4

5

4

5

4

5

4

5

4

5

4

5

4

5

11. Teaching in
specific subject.
12. Time spent in
professional
development.
13. Serving as
Banzhuren, or
other duties.
14. Mentoring
other teachers.
15. Working with
students outside of
class time.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Part IV
1. Which indicator(s) (e.g. teachers’ morality, professional ranking, education degree,
teaching experience, working load, teaching process, and student’s achievement) do you
think are the most important in teacher performance evaluation? And why?
2. What do you think are the main problems associated with the implementation of
teacher performance pay? And why?
(1) how much the salary can be increased
(2) whether teachers’ salary is lower than local governmental officials’ or not
(3) how does school allocate the incentive payment
(4) the disparities of performance pay across different school districts
(5) the disparities of performance pay among different schools at the same district
(6) the disparities of performance pay among colleagues
(7) others (please specify)
3. What do you think the primary problems of the implementation of teacher performance
pay?

4. What do you think the merits and shortcomings of teacher performance pay?

5. What are the influence of implementing teacher performance pay on your teaching,
peer relationship and students’ studying?
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Appendix D: Survey Questionnaire-Chinese

:

:

:

√

1.
a.

b.

2.
a. 21-30

b. 31-40

c. 41-50

d. 51

3.
a.
4.

5
/

a.

b. 5-9

c. 10-14

b.

c.

d. 15-19

d.
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e.

f.
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c.
:
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a.
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e.

c.

d.
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b.
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d.

10.

?
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b.
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d.

e.
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e.
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Appendix E: Interview Protocol-English
Interview Protocol
Project: Teachers’ Perceptions of Teacher Performance Pay in China
Instruction: Teacher performance pay has been implemented in China since 2009. The
study is going to investigate teachers’ perceptions toward performance pay, which
includes the content, the implementation process and the impact. Meanwhile, the study is
going to explore your perceptions of performance evaluation. You can answer the
questions based on your knowledge and thinking.
Time of Interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewer:
Interviewee(s):
1. Please introduce the implementation of teacher performance pay at your school.
What’s the implementation plan at your school?
2. What measures are used at your school to evaluate teachers’ performance? And what
do you think of these measures?
3. What are the influences of implementing teacher performance pay on your teaching?
On peer relationships? On students’ studying?
4. What do you think are the merits of teacher performance pay?

5. What are your concerns regarding teacher performance pay? And why?

6. What do you think are the main problems associated with the implementation of
teacher performance pay?

7. For better implementing teacher performance pay, do you have any suggestions to your
principal and local educational agency?
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Appendix F: Interview Protocol-Chinese
、

2009

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
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